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The NMFTA’s Vehicle Cybersecurity Requirements Woking Group (VCRWG), comprised of fleets, OEMs and cybersecurity experts, has worked the past few years to produce security requirements for Vehicle Network Gateways. ...Vehicle Network Gateways play an important role in vehicle cybersecurity – they are the component responsible for assuring vehicle network operations in the presence of untrustworthy devices on the aftermarket or diagnostics connectors.

It is essential to note that cybersecurity threats not only arise from inherent protocol defects but also consider software implementation vulnerabilities.

A significant milestone in advancing cybersecurity within the automotive industry is the release of the first international standard for automotive cybersecurity ISO/SAE 21434:2021 ‘Road Vehicles — Cybersecurity Engineering’. A recently published type approval regulation for automotive cybersecurity (UN R155) is also tailored for member countries of the UNECE WP.29 alliance. ...Thus, the challenges for embedded automotive systems engineers are increasing while frameworks, tools and shared concepts for cybersecurity engineering and training are scarce. Hence, cybersecurity training in the automotive domain necessitates an understanding of domain-specific intricacies and the unique challenges at the intersection of cybersecurity and embedded systems engineering, elevating the need for improving the skill set and knowledge of automotive cybersecurity engineers. ...Hence, cybersecurity training in the automotive domain necessitates an understanding of domain-specific intricacies and the unique challenges at the intersection of cybersecurity and embedded systems engineering, elevating the need for improving the skill set and knowledge of automotive cybersecurity engineers. This paper delves into an automotive cybersecurity training concept aimed at enhancing the proficiency of development engineers.

Since the early 1990’s, commercial vehicles have suffered from repeated vulnerability exploitations that resulted in a need for improved automotive cybersecurity. This paper outlines the strategies and challenges of implementing an automotive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to secure intra-vehicle networks. ...This research successfully met the four requirements and demonstrated that using ZT principles in an on-vehicle network greatly improved the cybersecurity posture with manageable impact to system performance and deployment.

This paper gives a definition of the SDV concept, provides views from different aspects, discusses the progress in vehicle E/E architecture, especially zone-based architecture with centralized computation, and various technologies including High-Performance Computing (HPC) platform, standardized vehicle software architecture, advanced onboard communication, Over-The-Air (OTA) update, and cybersecurity etc. that collectively enable the realization of SDV.

The article also focus on innovative approaches that have recently adopted my many cybersecurity professionals for secured operation of ITS involving block-chain, artificial intelligence, and Machine Learning.

IOOs and ADS developers agree that cost, communications, interoperability, cybersecurity, operation, maintenance, and other issues undercut efforts to deploy a comprehensive connected infrastructure.

Automotive system functionalities spread over a wide range of sub-domains ranging from non-driving related components to complex autonomous driving related components. The requirements to design and develop these components span across software, hardware, firmware, etc. elements. The successful development of these components to achieve the needs from the stockholders requires accurate understanding and traceability of the requirements of these component systems. The high-level customer requirements transformation into low level granularity requires an efficient requirement engineer. The manual understanding of the customer requirements from the requirement documents are influenced by the context and the knowledge gap of the requirement engineer in understanding and transforming the requirements.

This exercise confirms the necessity of a more restrictive cybersecurity posture in automotive peripherals with access to critical systems, in particular VDAs, and especially when such peripherals present a wireless interface.

With the increasing connectivity and complexity of modern automobiles, cybersecurity has become one of the most important properties of a vehicle. Various strategies have been proposed to enhance automotive cybersecurity. ...Various strategies have been proposed to enhance automotive cybersecurity. Digital twin (DT), regarded as one of the top 10 strategic technology trends by Gartner in 2018 and 2019, establishes digital representations in a virtual world and raises new ideas to benefit real-life objects. ...In this paper, we explored the possibility of using digital twin technology to improve automotive cybersecurity. We designed two kinds of digital twin models, named mirror DT and autonomous DT, and corresponding environments to support cybersecurity design, development, and maintenance in an auto’s lifecycle, as well as technique training.

But unfortunately, automotive cybersecurity researchers hardly produce a comprehensive detection method due to the confidential nature of Controller Area Network (CAN) DBC format files, which is a standard long maintained by car manufacturers.

The new generation vehicles these days are managed by networked controllers. A large portion of the networks is planned with more security which has recently roused researchers to exhibit various attacks against the system. This paper talks about the liabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN) inside In-vehicle communication protocol and a few potentials that could take due advantage of it. Moreover, this paper presents a few security measures proposed in the present examination status to defeat the attacks. In any case, the fundamental objective of this paper is to feature a comprehensive methodology known as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which has been a significant device in getting network data in systems over many years. To the best of our insight, there is no recorded writing on a through outline of IDS execution explicitly in the CAN transport network system.

Using a wireless medium for tractor-trailer communication will bring new cybersecurity challenges and requirements which requires new development and lifecycle considerations.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

There continues to be massive advancements in modern connected vehicles and with these advancements, connectivity continues to rapidly become more integral to the way these vehicles are designed and operated. Vehicle connectivity was originally introduced for the purpose of providing software updates to the vehicle’s main system software, and we have seen the adoption of Over The Air updates (OTA) become mainstream with most OEMs. The exploitation of this connectivity is far more reaching than just basic software updates. In the latest vehicles it is possible to update software not just on the main vehicle systems, but to potentially update embedded software in all smart ECUs within the vehicle. Only using the connectivity to push data to the vehicle is not making full use of the potential of this increased connectivity. Being able to collect vehicle data for offline analysis and processing also brings huge benefits to the use of this technology.

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic.

As a result of the ever-increasing application of cyber-physical components in the automotive industry, cybersecurity has become an urgent topic. Adapting technologies and communication protocols like Ethernet and WiFi in connected vehicles yields many attack scenarios. ...Consequently, ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155 (2021) define a standard and regulatory framework for automotive cybersecurity, Both documents follow a risk management-based approach and require a threat modeling methodology for risk analysis and identification. ...Initially, we transform cybersecurity guidelines to attack trees, and then we use their formal interpretations to assess the vehicle’s design.

By looking into the vehicle-infrastructure cooperation (VIC) which is oriented towards intelligent, networked and integrated development, this paper analyzes and proposes the essence and development direction of Intelligent Vehicle Infrastructure Cooperation Systems (I-VICS). With an in-depth analysis of technologies of core importance to VIC and influence factors that constrain VIC development as a whole, the paper comes up with a technological route for VIC, and identifies a direction for vehicle-infrastructure cooperative development that progresses from primary to intermediate cooperation, then to advanced cooperation, and finally to full-fledged cooperation. Policy recommendations aiming at strengthening top-level design, building an integrated vehicle-infrastructure-cloud platform, expediting independence of key techs, building robust standards and regulations for VIC, enhancing workforce development as well as greater efforts at market promotion are put forward.

Automotive electronics and enterprise IT are converging and thus open the doors for advanced hacking. With their immediate safety impact, cyberattacks on such systems will endanger passengers. Today, there are various methods of security verification and validation in the automotive industry. However, we realize that vulnerability detection is incomplete and inefficient with classic security testing. In this article, we show how an enhanced Grey-Box Penetration Test (GBPT) needs less test cases while being more effective in terms of coverage and indicating less false positives.

To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. ...With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.