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A framework is defined that includes requirements for cybersecurity processes and a common language for communicating and managing cybersecurity risk. ...This document specifies engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding concept, product development, production, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of electrical and electronic (E/E) systems in road vehicles, including their components and interfaces. ...This document does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity.

This recommended practice provides guidance on vehicle Cybersecurity and was created based off of, and expanded on from, existing practices which are being implemented or reported in industry, government and conference papers. ...Other proprietary Cybersecurity development processes and standards may have been established to support a specific manufacturer’s development processes, and may not be comprehensively represented in this document, however, information contained in this document may help refine existing in-house processes, methods, etc. ...This recommended practice establishes a set of high-level guiding principles for Cybersecurity as it relates to cyber-physical vehicle systems. This includes: Defining a complete lifecycle process framework that can be tailored and utilized within each organization’s development processes to incorporate Cybersecurity into cyber-physical vehicle systems from concept phase through production, operation, service, and decommissioning.

A framework is defined that includes requirements for cybersecurity processes and a common language for communicating and managing cybersecurity risk. ...This document specifies requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding engineering for concept, development, production, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning for road vehicle electrical and electronic (E/E) systems, including their components and interfaces. ...This document does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity.

This recommended practice provides guidance on vehicle Cybersecurity and was created based off of, and expanded on from, existing practices which are being implemented or reported in industry, government and conference papers. ...Other proprietary Cybersecurity development processes and standards may have been established to support a specific manufacturer’s development processes, and may not be comprehensively represented in this document, however, information contained in this document may help refine existing in-house processes, methods, etc. ...This recommended practice establishes a set of high-level guiding principles for Cybersecurity as it relates to cyber-physical vehicle systems. This includes: Defining a complete lifecycle process framework that can be tailored and utilized within each organization’s development processes to incorporate Cybersecurity into cyber-physical vehicle systems from concept phase through production, operation, service, and decommissioning.

This document provides a list of tests, techniques, actions – i.e. methods – for confirming the cybersecurity of a vehicle, its subsystems, and/or its components. There is no guidance provided on how to select from the list of methods, nor how to plan execution of those selected.

This document includes technical considerations on the planning and execution of verification and validation (“V&V”) of the cybersecurity of items and components of road vehicles, in the context of ISO/SAE 21434:2021. This document offers considerations on: • strategic approaches for V&V activities; • lists of, or references to, methods that can be applied; • distribution of V&V activities (between customer and supplier); • timing and execution thereof.

- Research existing maturity models - Highlight categories applicable to automotive - Identify a mapping of existing maturity model activities to 21434 work products - Covers organization and product security - Define levels of maturity for the automotive industry - Provide technical information report

This document elaborates on the Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL) concept and introduces the Targeted Attack Feasibility (TAF) concept, both within the context of cybersecurity engineering for road vehicles in accordance with ISO/SAE 21434. ...This document elaborates on the Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL) concept and introduces the Targeted Attack Feasibility (TAF) concept, both within the context of cybersecurity engineering for road vehicles in accordance with ISO/SAE 21434. This document describes the conceptual models, main principles, and relationships between CAL, TAF and other concepts. ...It provides guidelines to determine and use CAL and TAF for cybersecurity engineering of items and components.

The scope of the document is to define the cyber-security best practices to reduce interference with normal vehicle operation, or to minimize risk as to unauthorized access of the vehicle's control, diagnostic, or data storage system; access by equipment (i.e., permanently or semi-permanently installed diagnostic communication device, also known as dongle, etc.) which is either permanently or semi-permanently connected to the vehicle's OBD diagnostic connector, either SAE J1939-13, SAE J1962, or other future protocol; or hardwired directly to the in-vehicle network.

This document addresses the development of security material for application specifications in SAE V2X Technical Committees. The assumption in this document is that two groups with distinct missions contribute to the development of each standard: the “Application Specification Team is in charge of specifying the application functionality and the “Security Specification Team” is in charge of specifying the security. The two teams may, of course, have a significant overlap of members.

The scope of this SAE Recommended Practice is to require the use of the same Security Services as defined by the International Standard ISO/CD 15764, modified by the Class of Security as determined by the resource provider and referenced in Table 1, Extended Data Link Security References.

SAE is developing a number of standards, including the SAE J2945/x and SAE J3161/x series, that specify a set of applications using message sets from the SAE J2735 data dictionary. (“Application” is used here to mean “a collection of activities including interactions between different entities in the service of a collection of related goals and associated with a given IEEE Provider Service Identifier (PSID)”). Authenticity and integrity of the communications for these applications are ensured using digital signatures and IEEE 1609.2 digital certificates, which also indicate the permissions of the senders using Provider Service Identifiers (PSIDs) and Service Specific Permissions (SSPs). The PSID is a globally unique identifier associated with an application specification that unambiguously describes how to build interoperable instances of that application.

This SAE Recommended Practice establishes a uniform practice for protecting vehicle components from "unauthorized" access through a vehicle data link connector (DLC). The document defines a security system for motor vehicle and tool manufacturers. It will provide flexibility to tailor systems to the security needs of the vehicle manufacturer. The vehicle modules addressed are those that are capable of having solid state memory contents accessed or altered through the data link connector. Improper memory content alteration could potentially damage the electronics or other vehicle modules; risk the vehicle compliance to government legislated requirements; or risk the vehicle manufacturer's security interests. This document does not imply that other security measures are not required nor possible.

This SAE Information Report J2931/7 establishes the security requirements for digital communication between Plug-In Electric Vehicles (PEV), the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) and the utility, ESI, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and/or Home Area Network (HAN).

Access mechanisms to system data and/or control is a primary use case of the hardware protected security environment (hardware protected security environment) during different uses and stages of the system. The hardware protected security environment acts as a gatekeeper for these use cases and not necessarily as the executor of the function. This section is a generalization of such use cases in an attempt to extract common requirements for the hardware protected security environment that enable it to be a gatekeeper. Examples are: Creating a new key fob Re-flashing ECU firmware Reading/exporting PII out of the ECU Using a subscription-based feature Performing some service on an ECU Transferring ownership of the vehicle Some of these examples are discussed later in this section and some have detailed sections of their own. This list is by no means comprehensive.

Connected vehicles can provide data from multiple sensors that monitor both the vehicle and the environment through which the vehicle is passing. The data, when shared, can be used to enhance and optimize transportation operations and management—specifically, traffic flow and infrastructure maintenance. This document describes an interface between vehicle and infrastructure for collecting vehicle/probe data. That data may represent a single point in time or may be accumulated over defined periods of time or distance, or may be triggered based on circumstance. The purpose of this document is to define an interoperable means of collecting the vehicle/probe data in support of the use cases defined herein. There are many additional use cases that may be realized based on the interface defined in this document. Note that vehicle diagnostics are not included within the scope of this document, but diagnostics-related features may be added to probe data in a future supplemental document.

This document serves as the initial framework for defining the subject. The document serves as a detailed breakdown of security testing methods related to software and hardware testing. it is to remain vendor agnostic and focus on the type of testing available at the time of release. This is not a comprehensive list and is intended to be updated on a yet to be defined timeline.

This document describes a set of recommended actions to take to increase the likelihood of safe vehicle operation when a device (external test equipment, data collection device, etc.) whose normal operation has been compromised by a source external to the vehicle is connected to the vehicle’s diagnostic system. The term “diagnostic system” is intended to be a generic way to reference all the different ways that diagnostic commands might be injected into the system. The guidance in this document is intended to improve security without significantly impacting the ability for franchised dealer or independent aftermarket external test tools to perform legitimate diagnosis and maintenance functions. The goal is that intrusive services are only allowed to be performed when the vehicle is in a Safe State such that even if the intrusive service were to be initiated with adversarial intent the consequences of such a service would still be acceptable.

This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, relays, disk drives, LCD matrices, VME circuit cards, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, traceability, reliability, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively). An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly.

This SAE Information Report J2836 establishes the instructions for the documents required for the variety of potential functions for PEV communications, energy transfer options, interoperability and security. This includes the history, current status and future plans for migrating through these documents created in the Hybrid Communication and Interoperability Task Force, based on functional objective (e.g., (1) if I want to do V2G with an off-board inverter, what documents and items within them do I need, (2) What do we intend for V3 of SAE J2953, …).