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Abstract Trust in the digital data from heavy vehicle event data recorders (HVEDRs) is paramount to using the data in legal contests. Ensuring the trust in the HVEDR data requires an examination of the ways the digital information can be attacked, both purposefully and inadvertently. The goal or objective of an attack on HVEDR data will be to have the data omitted in a case. To this end, we developed an attack tree and establish a model for violating the trust needed for HVEDR data. The attack tree provides context for mitigations and also for functional requirements. A trust model is introduced as well as a discussion on what constitutes forensically sound data. The main contribution of this article is an attack tree-based model of both malicious and accidental events contributing to compromised event data recorder (EDR) data. A comprehensive list of mitigations for HVEDR systems results from this analysis.

Abstract Heavy vehicles are essential for the modern economy, delivering critical food, supplies, and freight throughout the world. Connected heavy vehicles are also driven by embedded computers that utilize internal communication using common standards. However, some implementations of the standards leave an opening for a malicious actor to abuse the system. One such abuse case is a cyber-attack known as the “Address Claim Attack.” Proposed in 2018, this attack uses a single network message to disable all communication to and from a target electronic control unit, which may have a detrimental effect on operating the vehicle. This article demonstrates the viability of the attack and then describes the implementation of a solution to prevent this attack in real time without requiring any intervention from the manufacturer of the target devices. The defense technique uses a bit-banged Controller Area Network (CAN) filter to detect the attack.

Abstract Identity-Anonymized CAN (IA-CAN) protocol is a secure CAN protocol, which provides the sender authentication by inserting a secret sequence of anonymous IDs (A-IDs) shared among the communication nodes. To prevent malicious attacks from the IA-CAN protocol, a secure and robust system error recovery mechanism is required. This article presents a central management method of IA-CAN, named the IA-CAN with a global A-ID, where a gateway plays a central role in the session initiation and system error recovery. Each ECU self-diagnoses the system errors, and (if an error happens) it automatically resynchronizes its A-ID generation by acquiring the recovery information from the gateway. We prototype both a hardware version of an IA-CAN controller and a system for the IA-CAN with a global A-ID using the controller to verify our concept.