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Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.

As well, functional safety and cybersecurity constraints will increase. Electrification implies replacing energy from thermal sources with electricity from the wall and will include enhanced integration between sub-systems and components, along with higher speed in real time controls.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

In agriculture industry, increasing use of Vehicle Internet of Things (IoT), telematics and emerging technologies are resulting in smarter machines with connected solutions. Inter and Intra Communication with vehicle to vehicle and inside vehicle - Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to ECU or ECU (Electronic Control Unit) to sensor, requirement for flow of data increased in-turn resulting in increased need for secure communication. In this paper, we focus on functional verification and validation of secure Controller Area Network (CAN) for intra vehicular communication to establish confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and freshness of data, supporting safety, advanced automation, protection of sensitive data and IP (Intellectual Property) protection. Network security algorithms and software security processes are the layers supporting to achieve our cause.

The paper includes a description of cybersecurity measures to protect the vehicle against malicious attacks.

The caveat to these additional capabilities is issues like cybersecurity, complexity, etc. This paper is an exploration into FuSa and CAVs and will present a systematic approach to understand challenges and propose potential framework, Intelligent Vehicle Monitoring for Safety and Security (IVMSS) to handle faults/malfunctions in CAVs, and specifically autonomous systems.

Here, we discuss the On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) regulations for next generation BEV/HEV, its vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats that come with hacking. We propose three cybersecurity attack detection and defense methods: Cyber-Attack detection algorithm, Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Method and, Feistel Cipher Block Method. ...These control methods autonomously diagnose a cybersecurity problem in a vehicle’s onboard system using an OBD interface, such as OBD-II when a fault caused by a cyberattack is detected, All of this is achieved in an internal communication network structure.

Automotive safety is always the focus of consumers, the selling point of products, the focus of technology. In order to achieve automatic driving, interconnection with the outside world, human-automatic system interaction, the security connotation of intelligent and connected vehicles (ICV) changes: information security is the basis of its security. Functional safety ensures that the system is operating properly. Behavioral safety guarantees a secure interaction between people and vehicles. Passive security should not be weakened, but should be strengthened based on new constraints. In terms of information safety, the threshold for attacking cloud, pipe, and vehicle information should be raised to ensure that ICV system does not fail due to malicious attacks. The cloud is divided into three cloud platforms according to functions: ICVs private cloud, TSP cloud, public cloud.

Cyber assurance of heavy trucks is a major concern with new designs as well as with supporting legacy systems. Many cyber security experts and analysts are used to working with traditional information technology (IT) networks and are familiar with a set of technologies that may not be directly useful in the commercial vehicle sector. To help connect security researchers to heavy trucks, a remotely accessible testbed has been prototyped for experimentation with security methodologies and techniques to evaluate and improve on existing technologies, as well as developing domain-specific technologies. The testbed relies on embedded Linux-based node controllers that can simulate the sensor inputs to various heavy vehicle electronic control units (ECUs). The node controller also monitors and affects the flow of network information between the ECUs and the vehicle communications backbone.

What standardization is needed to ensure that quantum technologies do not pose an unacceptable risk from an automotive cybersecurity perspective? Click here to access the full SAE EDGETM Research Report portfolio.