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A significant milestone in advancing cybersecurity within the automotive industry is the release of the first international standard for automotive cybersecurity ISO/SAE 21434:2021 ‘Road Vehicles — Cybersecurity Engineering’. A recently published type approval regulation for automotive cybersecurity (UN R155) is also tailored for member countries of the UNECE WP.29 alliance. ...Thus, the challenges for embedded automotive systems engineers are increasing while frameworks, tools and shared concepts for cybersecurity engineering and training are scarce. Hence, cybersecurity training in the automotive domain necessitates an understanding of domain-specific intricacies and the unique challenges at the intersection of cybersecurity and embedded systems engineering, elevating the need for improving the skill set and knowledge of automotive cybersecurity engineers. ...Hence, cybersecurity training in the automotive domain necessitates an understanding of domain-specific intricacies and the unique challenges at the intersection of cybersecurity and embedded systems engineering, elevating the need for improving the skill set and knowledge of automotive cybersecurity engineers. This paper delves into an automotive cybersecurity training concept aimed at enhancing the proficiency of development engineers.

With the development of vehicle intelligence and the Internet of Vehicles, how to protect the safety of the vehicle network system has become a focus issue that needs to be solved urgently. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is currently a very widely used vehicle-mounted bus, and its security largely determines the degree of vehicle-mounted information security. The CAN bus lacks adequate protection mechanisms and is vulnerable to external attacks such as replay attacks, modifying attacks, and so on. On the basis of the existing work, this paper proposes an authentication method that combines Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA256 and Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) algorithms. This method is based on dynamic identity authentication in challenge/response made and combined with the characteristics of the CAN bus itself as it achieves the identity authentication between the gateway and multiple electronic control units (ECUs).

Since the early 1990’s, commercial vehicles have suffered from repeated vulnerability exploitations that resulted in a need for improved automotive cybersecurity. This paper outlines the strategies and challenges of implementing an automotive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to secure intra-vehicle networks. ...This research successfully met the four requirements and demonstrated that using ZT principles in an on-vehicle network greatly improved the cybersecurity posture with manageable impact to system performance and deployment.

This increases the attractiveness of an attack on vehicles and thus introduces new risks for vehicle cybersecurity. Thus, just as safety became a critical part of the development in the late 20th century, the automotive domain must now consider cybersecurity as an integral part of the development of modern vehicles. ...Thus, just as safety became a critical part of the development in the late 20th century, the automotive domain must now consider cybersecurity as an integral part of the development of modern vehicles. Aware of this fact, the automotive industry has, therefore, recently taken multiple efforts in designing and producing safe and secure connected and automated vehicles. ...As the domain geared up for the cybersecurity challenges, they leveraged experiences from many other domains, but must face several unique challenges.

Consequently, rise of this technological trend is bringing forth safety and cybersecurity challenges in form of new threats, hazards and vulnerabilities. As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions. ...As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions.

Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.

With the introduction of Connected Vehicles, it is possible to extend the limited horizon of vehicles on the road by collective perceptions, where vehicles periodically share their information with other vehicles and servers using cloud. Nevertheless, by the time the connected vehicle spread expands, it is critical to understand the validation techniques which can be used to ensure a flawless transfer of data and connectivity. Connected vehicles are mainly characterized by the smartphone application which is provided to the end customers to access the connectivity features in the vehicle. The end result which is delivered to the customer is through the integrated telematics unit in the vehicle which communicates through a communication layer with the cloud platform. The cloud server in turn interacts with the final application layer of the mobile application given to the customer.

As well, functional safety and cybersecurity constraints will increase. Electrification implies replacing energy from thermal sources with electricity from the wall and will include enhanced integration between sub-systems and components, along with higher speed in real time controls.

In this paper, we outline past, present and future applications of automotive security for engine ECUs. Electronic immobilizers and anti-tuning countermeasures have been used for several years. Recently, OEMs and suppliers are facing more and more powerful attackers, and as a result, have introduced stronger countermeasures based on hardware security. Finally, with the advent of connected cars, it is expected that many things that currently require a physical connection will be done remotely in a near future. This includes remote diagnostics, reprogramming and engine calibration.

UNECE R155 explicitly references ISO/SAE 21434 and mandates a certified cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a prerequisite for automotive manufacturers to achieve vehicle type approval and sell new vehicle types. ...However, the gap in the CSMS framework is a lack in a standardized system that provides guidance and common criteria for automakers to measure a vehicle’s level of compliance and compute a publicly accepted cybersecurity rating. To help establish increased consumer confidence, OEMs and smart mobility stakeholders could take additional proactive steps to ensure the safety and security of their products. ...This paper addresses the above requirement and discusses the cybersecurity rating framework (CSRF) that could establish a framework for rating vehicle cybersecurity by standardizing the measurement criteria, parameter vectors, process, and tools.

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic.

Cybersecurity (CS) is crucial and significantly important in every product that is connected to the network/internet. ...Hence making it very important to guarantee that every single connected device shall have cybersecurity measures implemented to ensure the safety of the entire system. Looking into the forecasted worldwide growth in the electric vehicles (EV’s) segment, CS researchers have recently identified several vulnerabilities that exist in EV’s, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) devices, communications to EVs, and upstream services, such as EVSE vendor cloud services, third party systems, and grid operators. ...Additional processes have been defined in the process reference and assessment model for the CS engineering in order to incorporate the cybersecurity related processes in the ASPICE scope. This paper aims at providing a model & brief overview to establish a correlation between the ASPICE, ISO/SAE 21434 and the ISO 26262 functional safety (FS) standards for development of a secured cybersecurity software with all the considerations that an organization can undertake.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

Automotive system functionalities spread over a wide range of sub-domains ranging from non-driving related components to complex autonomous driving related components. The requirements to design and develop these components span across software, hardware, firmware, etc. elements. The successful development of these components to achieve the needs from the stockholders requires accurate understanding and traceability of the requirements of these component systems. The high-level customer requirements transformation into low level granularity requires an efficient requirement engineer. The manual understanding of the customer requirements from the requirement documents are influenced by the context and the knowledge gap of the requirement engineer in understanding and transforming the requirements.

With the increasing connectivity and complexity of modern automobiles, cybersecurity has become one of the most important properties of a vehicle. Various strategies have been proposed to enhance automotive cybersecurity. ...Various strategies have been proposed to enhance automotive cybersecurity. Digital twin (DT), regarded as one of the top 10 strategic technology trends by Gartner in 2018 and 2019, establishes digital representations in a virtual world and raises new ideas to benefit real-life objects. ...In this paper, we explored the possibility of using digital twin technology to improve automotive cybersecurity. We designed two kinds of digital twin models, named mirror DT and autonomous DT, and corresponding environments to support cybersecurity design, development, and maintenance in an auto’s lifecycle, as well as technique training.

The global time that is propagated and synchronized in vehicle E/E architecture is used in safety-critical, security-critical and time-critical applications. The cybersecurity attacks on the global time result in false time, accuracy degradation and DoS as stated in IETF RFC 7384.

A broad range of information is being delivered to and used within modern vehicles. Information-based applications are becoming more highly integrated into the automobile. Security services are necessary to provide appropriate protection for this information. Encryption, digital signature, and hash functionalities enable information security services such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. However, the consumer of in-vehicle information services will not accept security services that introduce any inconvenience to their activities. This paper will discuss various security service methods and security management systems and propose methods to integrate these services acceptably into vehicle-based applications.

A ranked list of value exchanges is created based on the impact of cybersecurity on the stakeholder map. System level-losses are identified from high impact value exchanges, which can then be fed into the step 1 of STPA-Sec analysis.

CAN bus network proved to be efficient and dynamic for small compact cars as well as heavy-duty vehicles (HDV). However, HDVs are more susceptible to malicious attacks due to lack of security in their intra-vehicle communication protocols. SAE proposed a new standard named J1939-91C for CAN-FD networks which provides methods for establishing trust and securing mutual messages with optional encryption. J1939-91C ensures message authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality by implementing complex cryptographic operations including hash functions and random key generation. In this paper, the three main phases of J1939-91C, i.e., Network Formation, Rekeying, and Message Exchange, are simulated and tested on Electronic Control Units (ECUs) supporting CAN-FD network. Numerous test vectors were generated and validated to support SAE J1939-91C. The mentioned vectors were produced by simulating different encryption and hashing algorithms with variable message and key lengths.

In agriculture industry, increasing use of Vehicle Internet of Things (IoT), telematics and emerging technologies are resulting in smarter machines with connected solutions. Inter and Intra Communication with vehicle to vehicle and inside vehicle - Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to ECU or ECU (Electronic Control Unit) to sensor, requirement for flow of data increased in-turn resulting in increased need for secure communication. In this paper, we focus on functional verification and validation of secure Controller Area Network (CAN) for intra vehicular communication to establish confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and freshness of data, supporting safety, advanced automation, protection of sensitive data and IP (Intellectual Property) protection. Network security algorithms and software security processes are the layers supporting to achieve our cause.