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With the development of vehicle intelligence and the Internet of Vehicles, how to protect the safety of the vehicle network system has become a focus issue that needs to be solved urgently. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is currently a very widely used vehicle-mounted bus, and its security largely determines the degree of vehicle-mounted information security. The CAN bus lacks adequate protection mechanisms and is vulnerable to external attacks such as replay attacks, modifying attacks, and so on. On the basis of the existing work, this paper proposes an authentication method that combines Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA256 and Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) algorithms. This method is based on dynamic identity authentication in challenge/response made and combined with the characteristics of the CAN bus itself as it achieves the identity authentication between the gateway and multiple electronic control units (ECUs).

Since the early 1990’s, commercial vehicles have suffered from repeated vulnerability exploitations that resulted in a need for improved automotive cybersecurity. This paper outlines the strategies and challenges of implementing an automotive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to secure intra-vehicle networks. ...This research successfully met the four requirements and demonstrated that using ZT principles in an on-vehicle network greatly improved the cybersecurity posture with manageable impact to system performance and deployment.

But unfortunately, automotive cybersecurity researchers hardly produce a comprehensive detection method due to the confidential nature of Controller Area Network (CAN) DBC format files, which is a standard long maintained by car manufacturers.

In adjusting the data flow, this is an option to increase the cybersecurity for a complete system. This addition to the cybersecurity system provides a clear benefit. ...While this is the traditional application experienced, there are other applications relevant to cybersecurity. As part of the blockchain technology, the nodes are responsible for decision-making.

This paper is the second in the series of documents designed to record the progress of a series of SAE documents - SAE J2836™, J2847, J2931, & J2953 - within the Plug-In Electric Vehicle (PEV) Communication Task Force. This follows the initial paper number 2010-01-0837, and continues with the test and modeling of the various PLC types for utility programs described in J2836/1™ & J2847/1. This also extends the communication to an off-board charger, described in J2836/2™ & J2847/2 and includes reverse energy flow described in J2836/3™ and J2847/3. The initial versions of J2836/1™ and J2847/1 were published early 2010. J2847/1 has now been re-opened to include updates from comments from the National Institute of Standards Technology (NIST) Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP), Smart Grid Architectural Committee (SGAC) and Cyber Security Working Group committee (SCWG).

UNECE R155 explicitly references ISO/SAE 21434 and mandates a certified cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a prerequisite for automotive manufacturers to achieve vehicle type approval and sell new vehicle types. ...However, the gap in the CSMS framework is a lack in a standardized system that provides guidance and common criteria for automakers to measure a vehicle’s level of compliance and compute a publicly accepted cybersecurity rating. To help establish increased consumer confidence, OEMs and smart mobility stakeholders could take additional proactive steps to ensure the safety and security of their products. ...This paper addresses the above requirement and discusses the cybersecurity rating framework (CSRF) that could establish a framework for rating vehicle cybersecurity by standardizing the measurement criteria, parameter vectors, process, and tools.

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

CAN bus network proved to be efficient and dynamic for small compact cars as well as heavy-duty vehicles (HDV). However, HDVs are more susceptible to malicious attacks due to lack of security in their intra-vehicle communication protocols. SAE proposed a new standard named J1939-91C for CAN-FD networks which provides methods for establishing trust and securing mutual messages with optional encryption. J1939-91C ensures message authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality by implementing complex cryptographic operations including hash functions and random key generation. In this paper, the three main phases of J1939-91C, i.e., Network Formation, Rekeying, and Message Exchange, are simulated and tested on Electronic Control Units (ECUs) supporting CAN-FD network. Numerous test vectors were generated and validated to support SAE J1939-91C. The mentioned vectors were produced by simulating different encryption and hashing algorithms with variable message and key lengths.

In conjunction with an increasing number of related laws and regulations (such as UNECE R155 and ISO 21434), these drive security requirements in different domains and areas. 2 In this paper we examine the upcoming trends in EE architectures and investigate the underlying cyber-security threats and corresponding security requirements that lead to potential requirements for “Automotive Embedded Hardware Trust Anchors” (AEHTA).

There continues to be massive advancements in modern connected vehicles and with these advancements, connectivity continues to rapidly become more integral to the way these vehicles are designed and operated. Vehicle connectivity was originally introduced for the purpose of providing software updates to the vehicle’s main system software, and we have seen the adoption of Over The Air updates (OTA) become mainstream with most OEMs. The exploitation of this connectivity is far more reaching than just basic software updates. In the latest vehicles it is possible to update software not just on the main vehicle systems, but to potentially update embedded software in all smart ECUs within the vehicle. Only using the connectivity to push data to the vehicle is not making full use of the potential of this increased connectivity. Being able to collect vehicle data for offline analysis and processing also brings huge benefits to the use of this technology.

The hypervisor offers many benefits to the vehicle architecture, both operationally and with cybersecurity. The proposed mitigant provides the structure to partition the various VMs. This allows for the different functions to be managed within their own distinct VM. ...While the cybersecurity applications are numerous, there are also the operational benefits. The hypervisor is designed to not only manage the VMs, but also to increase the efficiency of these via resource management.

As a result of the ever-increasing application of cyber-physical components in the automotive industry, cybersecurity has become an urgent topic. Adapting technologies and communication protocols like Ethernet and WiFi in connected vehicles yields many attack scenarios. ...Consequently, ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155 (2021) define a standard and regulatory framework for automotive cybersecurity, Both documents follow a risk management-based approach and require a threat modeling methodology for risk analysis and identification. ...Initially, we transform cybersecurity guidelines to attack trees, and then we use their formal interpretations to assess the vehicle’s design.

The results of this work is allowed to identify a number of cybersecurity threats of the automated security-critical automotive systems, which reduces the efficiency of operation, road safety and system safety. ...According to the evaluating criterion of board electronics, the presence of poorly-protected communication channels, the 75% of the researched modern vehicles do not meet the minimum requirements of cybersecurity due to the danger of external blocking of vital systems. The revealed vulnerabilities of the security-critical automotive systems lead to the necessity of developing methods for mechanical and electronic protection of the modern vehicle. ...The law of normal distribution of the mid-points of the expert evaluation of the cyber-security of a modern vehicle has been determined. Based on the system approach, ranking of the main cybersecurity treats is performed.

Multiple approaches have been created to enhance intra-vehicle communications security over the past three decades since the introduction of the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. The twin pair differential-mode communications bus is tremendously robust in the face of interference, yet physical access to the bus offers a variety of potential attack vectors whereby false messages and/or denial of service are achievable. This paper evaluates extensions of a Physical-layer (PHY) common-mode watermark-based authentication technique recently developed to improve authentication on the CAN bus by considering the watermark as a side-channel communications means for high value information. We also propose and analyze higher layer algorithms, with benefits and pitfalls, for employing the watermark as a physical-layer firewall.

Vehicles have more connectivity options now-a-days and these increasing connection options are giving more chances for an intruder to exploit the system. So, the vehicle manufacturers need to make the ECU in the vehicle more secure. To make the system secure, the embedded system must secure all the assets in the system. Examples of assets are Software, Kernel or Operating system, cryptographic Keys, Passwords, user data, etc. In this, securing the Kernel is extremely important as an intruder can even exploit the operating system characteristics just by changing the kernel code without introducing a trojan in the system. Also, the Kernel is the one entity that manages all permissions, so, if the kernel is hacked, these permissions also get compromised. The proposed approach is to make the kernel secure by doing the integrity check periodically of the kernel code loaded into the main memory of the system.

In-vehicle networks used for inter-ECU communication, most commonly the CAN bus, were not designed with cybersecurity in mind, and as a result, communication by corrupt devices connected to the bus is not authenticated.

We propose a security-testing framework to analyze attack feasibilities for automotive control software by integrating model-based development with model checking techniques. Many studies have pointed out the vulnerabilities in the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is widely used in in-vehicle network systems. However, many security attacks on automobiles did not explicitly consider the transmission timing of CAN packets to realize vulnerabilities. Additionally, in terms of security testing for automobiles, most existing studies have only focused on the generation of the testing packets to realize vulnerabilities, but they did not consider the timing of invoking a security testing. Therefore, we focus on the transmit timing of CAN packets to realize vulnerabilities. In our experiments, we have demonstrated the classification of feasible attacks at the early development phase by integrating the model checking techniques into a virtualized environment.

With the rapid development of vehicle intelligent and networking technology, the IT security of automotive systems becomes an important area of research. In addition to the basic vehicle control, intelligent advanced driver assistance systems, infotainment systems will all exchange data with in-vehicle network. Unfortunately, current communication network protocols, including Controller Area Network (CAN), FlexRay, MOST, and LIN have no security services, such as authentication or encryption, etc. Therefore, the vehicle are unprotected against malicious attacks. Since CAN bus is actually the most widely used field bus for in-vehicle communications in current automobiles, the security aspects of CAN bus is focused on. Based on the analysis of the current research status of CAN bus network security, this paper summarizes the CAN bus potential security vulnerabilities and the attack means.

The new generation vehicles these days are managed by networked controllers. A large portion of the networks is planned with more security which has recently roused researchers to exhibit various attacks against the system. This paper talks about the liabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN) inside In-vehicle communication protocol and a few potentials that could take due advantage of it. Moreover, this paper presents a few security measures proposed in the present examination status to defeat the attacks. In any case, the fundamental objective of this paper is to feature a comprehensive methodology known as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which has been a significant device in getting network data in systems over many years. To the best of our insight, there is no recorded writing on a through outline of IDS execution explicitly in the CAN transport network system.