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Additionally, we go beyond the attack vectors listed in UN-R155 - using our own analysis, experience and insights, we explored other attack vectors that will also affect vehicle cybersecurity.

Impact of Electric Vehicle Charging on Grid Energy Buffering discusses the unsettled issues and requirements needed to realize the potential of EV batteries for demand response and grid services, such as improved battery management, control strategies, and enhanced cybersecurity. Hybrid and fuel cell EVs have significant potential to act as “peakers” for longer duration buffering, and this approach has the potential to provide all the long-term energy buffering required by a VRE-intensive grid.

The paper includes a description of cybersecurity measures to protect the vehicle against malicious attacks.

The results of this work is allowed to identify a number of cybersecurity threats of the automated security-critical automotive systems, which reduces the efficiency of operation, road safety and system safety. ...According to the evaluating criterion of board electronics, the presence of poorly-protected communication channels, the 75% of the researched modern vehicles do not meet the minimum requirements of cybersecurity due to the danger of external blocking of vital systems. The revealed vulnerabilities of the security-critical automotive systems lead to the necessity of developing methods for mechanical and electronic protection of the modern vehicle. ...The law of normal distribution of the mid-points of the expert evaluation of the cyber-security of a modern vehicle has been determined. Based on the system approach, ranking of the main cybersecurity treats is performed.

The recently released SAE J3061 guidebook for cyber-physical vehicle systems provides high-level principles for automotive organizations for identifying and assessing cybersecurity threats and for designing cybersecurity aware systems in close relation to the ISO 26262 standard for the functional safety of road vehicles. ...., infotainment, car-2-car or car-2-infrastructure communication) as well as new advances toward advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) or even autonomous driving functions make cybersecurity another key factor to be taken into account by vehicle suppliers and manufacturers. ...Although these can capitalize on experiences from many other domains, they still have to face several unique challenges when gearing up for specific cybersecurity challenges. A key challenge is related to the increasing interconnection of automotive systems with networks (such as Car2X).

This method's detailed approach ensures that cybersecurity requirements can be readily implemented as a part of feature design, addressing the concerns of feature owners directly. ...This paper will discuss the merits of asset based approach to cybersecurity over attack based recognizing the inherent strengths and limitations of both methods and underscores the need for a unified approach.

With the rapid development of connected and autonomous vehicles, more sophisticated automotive systems running large portions of software and implementing a variety of communication interfaces are being developed. The ever-expanding codebase increases the risk for software vulnerabilities, while at the same time the large number of communication interfaces make the systems more susceptible to be targeted by attackers. As such, it is of utmost importance for automotive organizations to identify potential vulnerabilities early and continuously in the development lifecycle in an automated manner. In this paper, we suggest a practical approach for integrating fuzz testing into a Continuous Integration (CI) pipeline for automotive systems. As a first step, we have performed a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) of a general E/E architecture to identify high-risk interfaces and functions.

Therefore, modern cybersecurity validation is highly stressed for finding security vulnerabilities and robustness issues early and systematically at every stage of the product development process. ...The integration of a sophisticated fuzz testing program within the overall cybersecurity validation strategy allows for accommodating towards these challenging demands. In this paper, we review a general automotive cybersecurity engineering process containing functional testing, vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, and highlight shortcomings that can be complemented by fuzz testing. ...In this paper, we review a general automotive cybersecurity engineering process containing functional testing, vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, and highlight shortcomings that can be complemented by fuzz testing.

The car door handle is an essential component of any vehicle, as it plays a crucial role in providing access to the cabin and ensuring safety of the passenger. The primary function of the car door handle is to allow entry and exit from the vehicle while preventing unauthorized access. In addition to this, car door handles also play a critical role in ensuring passenger safety by keeping the door closed during accidents or when there is a significant amount of G-force acting on the vehicle. A typical car door handle comprises several components including the structure, cover, bowden lever, bracket, pins and other child parts. The structure provides the ergonomics and rigidity for grabbing the handle, while the cover gives the handle an aesthetic appearance. The Bowden lever facilitates the unlatching of the door and the intermediate parts ensure that the handle operates smoothly.

The caveat to these additional capabilities is issues like cybersecurity, complexity, etc. This paper is an exploration into FuSa and CAVs and will present a systematic approach to understand challenges and propose potential framework, Intelligent Vehicle Monitoring for Safety and Security (IVMSS) to handle faults/malfunctions in CAVs, and specifically autonomous systems.

Cyber security concerns in the automotive industry have been constantly increasing as automobiles are more computerized and networked. AUTOSAR is the standard architecture for automotive software development, addressing various aspects including security. The current version of AUTOSAR is concerned with only cryptography-based security for secure authentication at the communication level. However, there has been an increasing need for authorization security to control access on software resources such as data and services in the automobile. In this paper, we introduce attribute-based access control (ABAC) to AUTOSAR to address authorization in automotive software.

Facial recognition software (FRS) is a form of biometric security that detects a face, analyzes it, converts it to data, and then matches it with images in a database. This technology is currently being used in vehicles for safety and convenience features, such as detecting driver fatigue, ensuring ride share drivers are wearing a face covering, or unlocking the vehicle. Public transportation hubs can also use FRS to identify missing persons, intercept domestic terrorism, deter theft, and achieve other security initiatives. However, biometric data is sensitive and there are numerous remaining questions about how to implement and regulate FRS in a way that maximizes its safety and security potential while simultaneously ensuring individual’s right to privacy, data security, and technology-based equality.

The SAE AS2C Standard AS5506C Architecture Analysis and Description Language (AADL) is a modeling language for predictive analysis of real-time software reliant, safety and cybersecurity critical systems that provides both the precision of formal modeling and the tool-agnostic freedom of a text-based representation. ...AADL supports multiple domains of architectural analysis such as timing, latency, resources, safety, scheduling, and cybersecurity. Adventium Labs conducted an exercise to determine the applicability of software engineering practices (e.g., continuous integration (CI), application programming interface (API) sharing, test driven development (TDD)) to the AADL-based Architecture Centric Virtual Integration Process (ACVIP).

Multiple approaches have been created to enhance intra-vehicle communications security over the past three decades since the introduction of the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. The twin pair differential-mode communications bus is tremendously robust in the face of interference, yet physical access to the bus offers a variety of potential attack vectors whereby false messages and/or denial of service are achievable. This paper evaluates extensions of a Physical-layer (PHY) common-mode watermark-based authentication technique recently developed to improve authentication on the CAN bus by considering the watermark as a side-channel communications means for high value information. We also propose and analyze higher layer algorithms, with benefits and pitfalls, for employing the watermark as a physical-layer firewall.

Vehicles have more connectivity options now-a-days and these increasing connection options are giving more chances for an intruder to exploit the system. So, the vehicle manufacturers need to make the ECU in the vehicle more secure. To make the system secure, the embedded system must secure all the assets in the system. Examples of assets are Software, Kernel or Operating system, cryptographic Keys, Passwords, user data, etc. In this, securing the Kernel is extremely important as an intruder can even exploit the operating system characteristics just by changing the kernel code without introducing a trojan in the system. Also, the Kernel is the one entity that manages all permissions, so, if the kernel is hacked, these permissions also get compromised. The proposed approach is to make the kernel secure by doing the integrity check periodically of the kernel code loaded into the main memory of the system.

Significant growth of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) has unlocked many services and applications opportunities in the healthcare sector. Aerial transportation of medical cargo delivery can be an effective and alternative way to ground-based transport systems in times of emergency. To improve the security and the trust of such aerial transportation systems, Blockchain can be used as a potential technology to manage, operate and monitor the entire process. In this paper, we present a blockchain network solution based on Ethereum for the transportation of medical cargo such as blood, medicines, vaccines, etc. The smart contract solution developed in solidity language was tested using the Truffle program. Ganache blockchain test network was employed to host the blockchain network and test the operation of the proposed blockchain model. The suitability of the model is validated in real-time using a UAV and all the flight data are captured and uploaded into the blockchain.

Traditional Cybersecurity solutions fall short in meeting automotive ECU constraints such as zero false positives, intermittent connectivity, and low performance impact. ...We integrated Autonomous Security on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) system to evaluate the feasibility of mitigating Cybersecurity risks against potential threats. We identified key metrics that should be measured, such as level of security, ease of integration and system performance impact.

Here, we discuss the On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) regulations for next generation BEV/HEV, its vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats that come with hacking. We propose three cybersecurity attack detection and defense methods: Cyber-Attack detection algorithm, Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Method and, Feistel Cipher Block Method. ...These control methods autonomously diagnose a cybersecurity problem in a vehicle’s onboard system using an OBD interface, such as OBD-II when a fault caused by a cyberattack is detected, All of this is achieved in an internal communication network structure.

In-vehicle networks used for inter-ECU communication, most commonly the CAN bus, were not designed with cybersecurity in mind, and as a result, communication by corrupt devices connected to the bus is not authenticated.

We also analyze how useful Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CAL) are in this process and how quantitative as well as qualitative metrics can be utilized as evidence.