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AIA predicts flying air taxis, supersonic air travel, and space industry for 2050

In the “What’s Next for Aerospace and Defense: A Vision for 2050” study, AIA, New York City-based McKinsey & Company, and other industry partners reveal a comprehensive 30-year, Industry 4.0 forecast of air travel and spaceflight based on improvements in automation and digitization, next-generation materials, alternative energy sources and storage, and increased data throughput.


This document defines an Aircraft Data Interface Function (ADIF) developed for aircraft installations that incorporate network components based on commercially available technologies. This document defines a set of protocols and services for the exchange of aircraft avionics data across aircraft networks. A common set of services that may be used to access specific avionics parameters are described. The ADIF may be implemented as a generic network service, or it may be implemented as a dedicated service within an ARINC 759 Aircraft Interface Devices (AID) such as those used with an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). Supplement 8 includes improvements in the Aviation Data Broadcast Protocol (ADBP), adds support for the Media Independent Aircraft Messaging (MIAM) protocol, and contains data security enhancements. It also includes notification and deprecation of the Generic Aircraft Parameter Service (GAPS) protocol that will be deleted in a future supplement.


ARINC Report 679 defines the functional characteristics of an airborne server that will support Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) and similar peripherals used in the flight deck, cabin, and maintenance applications. The document defines how EFBs will efficiently, effectively, safely, and securely connect to the airborne server in a way that offer expanded capabilities to aircraft operators. The airborne server has two main functions, first to provide specific services to connected systems, and second to provide centralized security for the EFB and its data. This document is a functional airborne server definition. It does not define the physical characteristics of the server.
Best Practice

AVSC Best Practice for Core Automated Vehicle Safety Information

Automated driving system (ADS) manufacturers, developers, and operators need to provide clear information on their safety approach to relevant stakeholders. Explainability to diverse audiences helps build trust in statements from these organizations towards the shared value of safety. A defined list of core safety topics can help set expectations when communicating deployment and use-case-specific automated vehicle (AV) safety information. The topics listed in this best practice are implementation-agnostic and broadly applicable. This best practice describes how safety is continuous and connected throughout lifecycle stages and highlights considerations when including safety metrics as part of the communicated information. It lists topics that are considered core, provides a rationale, illustrative examples where applicable, suggestions of content that could be included for the example, and lists references and industry examples for further information.
Best Practice

AVSC Best Practice for Data Collection for Automated Driving System-Dedicated Vehicles (ADS-DVs) to Support Event Analysis

As technology and functionality of vehicle systems change, so do data recording needs. In ADS-dedicated vehicles (DV), the ADS perceives the environment and handles vehicle motion control, i.e., the dynamic driving task (DDT), as described in SAE J3016. When an ADS takes the place of a human driver, its sensing, processing, and control systems necessitate new considerations for data recording. Data recording is important to crash reconstruction, system performance investigations, and event analysis. It enables industry-wide improvements in ADS safety. This best practice makes recommendations for the ADS-DV data needed to support: (1) information about what the ADS "saw" and "did" and (2) identify the technology-relevant factors that contributed to the event.
Best Practice

AVSC Best Practice for Describing an Operational Design Domain: Conceptual Framework and Lexicon

An ADS-operated vehicle’s operational design domain (ODD) is defined by the manufacturer based on numerous factors. Research is underway at other organizations to define and organize ODD elements into taxonomies and other relational constructs. In order to enhance collaboration and communication between manufacturers and developers and transportation authorities, common terms and consistent frameworks are needed. The conceptual framework presented by Automated Vehicle Safety Consortium establishes a lexicon that can be used consistently by ADS developers and manufacturers responsible for defining their ADS ODD. A common framework and lexicon will reduce confusion, align expectations, and therefore build public trust, acceptance, and confidence.
Best Practice

AVSC Best Practice for Interactions Between ADS-DVs and Vulnerable Road Users (VRUs)

AVSC Best Practice for Interactions Between ADS-DVs and Vulnerable Road Users (VRUs) AVSC00009202208 establishes common terminology and a baseline understanding of the challenges posed, and framework to evaluate automated driving system-dedicated vehicle (ADS-DV) interactions with VRUs. This best practice can facilitate communication among the industry and public, help calibrate expectations of all traffic participants, and improve broader acceptance of SAE level 4 and level 5 ADS-equipped vehicles.
Best Practice

AVSC Information Report for Change Risk Management

AVSC Information Report for Change Risk Management AVSC00010202304 provides a process for change risk management for fleet-operated ADS-DVs using level 4 or 5 automation. The document addresses risks resulting from planned and unplanned changes in an ADS-DV design and/or operation. This information report is based on the concept of risk-informed decision-making. Making risk management decisions such as safety and change management, safety analysis, and safety assurance are especially applicable when moving from concept to production intent for the ADS-DV. Change Risk Management (CRM) does not replace best practices or other methods for managing safety anomalies or change management processes. It may instead be viewed as an additional resource that elaborates on how safety anomaly management and change management can be performed.

Abaco’s new avionics platforms transfer data up to 40Gbps with Thunderbolt 3 connectivity

Abaco Systems Inc. is launching a new family of avionics devices for test and simulation, development, and dataloading that feature Thunderbolt 3 interfaces. The new portable, high-speed, low-latency avionics devices – RCEI-830A-TB and QPM-1553-TB – are designed for a broad range of avionics applications and include Thunderbolt 3-to-PMC/XMC interfacing with ARINC 429 and MIL-STD-1553 protocols.
Journal Article

Accelerated Secure Boot for Real-Time Embedded Safety Systems

Abstract Secure boot is a fundamental security primitive for establishing trust in computer systems. For real-time safety applications, the time taken to perform the boot measurement conflicts with the need for near instant availability. To speed up the boot measurement while establishing an acceptable degree of trust, we propose a dual-phase secure boot algorithm that balances the strong requirement for data tamper detection with the strong requirement for real-time availability. A probabilistic boot measurement is executed in the first phase to allow the system to be quickly booted. This is followed by a full boot measurement to verify the first-phase results and generate the new sampled space for the next boot cycle. The dual-phase approach allows the system to be operational within a fraction of the time needed for a full boot measurement while producing a high detection probability of data tampering.
Technical Paper

Access Control Requirements for Autonomous Robotic Fleets

Access control enforces security policies for controlling critical resources. For V2X (Vehicle to Everything) autonomous military vehicle fleets, network middleware systems such as ROS (Robotic Operating System) expose system resources through networked publisher/subscriber and client/server paradigms. Without proper access control, these systems are vulnerable to attacks from compromised network nodes, which may perform data poisoning attacks, flood packets on a network, or attempt to gain lateral control of other resources. Access control for robotic middleware systems has been investigated in both ROS1 and ROS2. Still, these implementations do not have mechanisms for evaluating a policy's consistency and completeness or writing expressive policies for distributed fleets. We explore an RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) mechanism layered onto ROS environments that uses local permission caches with precomputed truth tables for fast policy evaluation.