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With the increased need for cybersecurity in automotive systems due to the development of more advanced technologies and corresponding increased threat vectors, coupled with the upcoming International Organization for Standardization and the Society for Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 cybersecurity standard for automotive systems and cybersecurity regulations in The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UNECE WP.29), it is becoming increasingly important for auto manufacturers and suppliers to have a clear and common understanding and agreement of cybersecurity metrics for the development and deployment of vehicles. ...Cybersecurity for automotive systems is challenging, and one of the major challenges is how to measure this specific system property. ...With the increased need for cybersecurity in automotive systems due to the development of more advanced technologies and corresponding increased threat vectors, coupled with the upcoming International Organization for Standardization and the Society for Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 cybersecurity standard for automotive systems and cybersecurity regulations in The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UNECE WP.29), it is becoming increasingly important for auto manufacturers and suppliers to have a clear and common understanding and agreement of cybersecurity metrics for the development and deployment of vehicles.

Its extensive application of data networks, including enhanced external digital communication, forced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for the first time, to set “Special Conditions” for cybersecurity. In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. ...In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. The resulting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) resolutions, US and European Union (EU) legislations, FAA and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, and the DO-326/ED-202 set of standards are already the de-facto, and soon becoming the official, standards for legislation, regulation, and best practices, with the FAA already mandating it to a constantly growing extent for a few years now—and EASA adopting the set in its entirety in July 2020.

In this paper, we outline past, present and future applications of automotive security for engine ECUs. Electronic immobilizers and anti-tuning countermeasures have been used for several years. Recently, OEMs and suppliers are facing more and more powerful attackers, and as a result, have introduced stronger countermeasures based on hardware security. Finally, with the advent of connected cars, it is expected that many things that currently require a physical connection will be done remotely in a near future. This includes remote diagnostics, reprogramming and engine calibration.

To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. ...With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.

Additionally, we go beyond the attack vectors listed in UN-R155 - using our own analysis, experience and insights, we explored other attack vectors that will also affect vehicle cybersecurity.

Due to the rapid development in the technological aspect of the autonomous vehicle (AV), there is a compelling need for research in the field vehicle efficiency and emission reduction without affecting the performance, safety and reliability of the vehicle. Electric vehicle (EV) with rechargeable battery has been proved to be a practical solution for the above problem. In order to utilize the maximum capacity of the battery, a proper power management and control mechanism need to be developed such that it does not affect the performance, reliability and safety of vehicle. Different optimization techniques along with deterministic dynamic programming (DDP) approach are used for the power distribution and management control. The battery-operated electric vehicle can be recharged either by plug-in a wired connection or by the inductive mean (i.e. wirelessly) with the help of the electromagnetic field energy.

We also analyze how useful Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CAL) are in this process and how quantitative as well as qualitative metrics can be utilized as evidence.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

Software vulnerability management is one of the most critical and crucial security techniques, which analyzes the automotive software/firmware across the digital cockpit, ADAS, V2X, etc. domains for vulnerabilities, and provides security patches for the concerned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). The process of automotive SW/FW vulnerability management system between the OEMs and vendors happen through a channel of fixing a certain number of vulnerabilities by 1st tier supplier which needs to be verified in front of OEMs for the fixed number and type of patches in there deliverable SW/FW. The gap of verification between for the fixed patches between the OEMs and 1st tier supplier requires a reliable human independent intelligent technique to have a trustworthiness of verification.

Modern automobiles collect around 25 gigabytes of data per hour and autonomous vehicles are expected to generate more than 100 times that number. In comparison, the Apollo Guidance Computer assisting in the moon launches had only a 32-kilobtye hard disk. Without question, the breadth of in-vehicle data has opened new possibilities and challenges. The potential for accessing this data has led many entrepreneurs to claim that data is more valuable than even the vehicle itself. These intrepid data-miners seek to explore business opportunities in predictive maintenance, pay-as-you-drive features, and infrastructure services. Yet, the use of data comes with inherent challenges: accessibility, ownership, security, and privacy. Unsettled Legal Issues Facing Data in Autonomous, Connected, Electric, and Shared Vehicles examines some of the pressing questions on the minds of both industry and consumers. Who owns the data and how can it be used?

Advanced Autonomous Vehicles (AV) for SAE Level 3 and Level 4 functions will lead to a new understanding of the operation phase in the overall product lifecycle. Regulations such as the EU Implementing Act and the German L4 Act (AFGBV) request a continuous field surveillance, the handling of critical E/E faults and software updates during operation. This is required to enhance the Operational Design Domain (ODD) during operation, offering Functions on Demand (FoD), by increasing software features within these autonomous vehicle systems over the entire digital product lifecycle, and to avoid and reduce downtime by a malfunction of the Autonomous Driving (AD) software stack.