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Training / Education

Introduction to Automated Vehicle Safety Multi-Agent, Functional, SOTIF, and Cybersecurity

2021-11-10
You’ll learn the main attributes of safety as applied to automated vehicles, including the four types of safety: Functional Safety, Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF), Multi-agent safety, and safety involved in cybersecurity attacks. The discussion will enable participants to conceive of the various applicable design aspects of safety, clarify the role of SOTIF, multi-agent safety, and cybersecurity safety and address the development of multi-agent safety using a probabilistic and stochastic framework.
Technical Paper

Wireless Charging for EV/HEV with Prescriptive Analytics, Machine Learning, Cybersecurity and Blockchain Technology: Ongoing and Future Trends

2019-04-02
2019-01-0790
Due to the rapid development in the technological aspect of the autonomous vehicle (AV), there is a compelling need for research in the field vehicle efficiency and emission reduction without affecting the performance, safety and reliability of the vehicle. Electric vehicle (EV) with rechargeable battery has been proved to be a practical solution for the above problem. In order to utilize the maximum capacity of the battery, a proper power management and control mechanism need to be developed such that it does not affect the performance, reliability and safety of vehicle. Different optimization techniques along with deterministic dynamic programming (DDP) approach are used for the power distribution and management control. The battery-operated electric vehicle can be recharged either by plug-in a wired connection or by the inductive mean (i.e. wirelessly) with the help of the electromagnetic field energy.
Magazine

Automotive Engineering: July 7, 2015

2015-07-07
To serve and protect As cars become more connected and automated, cybersecurity concerns are rising. Industry engineers have many tools and techniques and are now deploying encryption and standards to ensure that vehicle controls are not altered or usurped by unauthorized people.
Technical Paper

Intelligent Vehicle Monitoring for Safety and Security

2019-04-02
2019-01-0129
The caveat to these additional capabilities is issues like cybersecurity, complexity, etc. This paper is an exploration into FuSa and CAVs and will present a systematic approach to understand challenges and propose potential framework, Intelligent Vehicle Monitoring for Safety and Security (IVMSS) to handle faults/malfunctions in CAVs, and specifically autonomous systems.
Technical Paper

Secure Vehicular Communication Using Blockchain Technology

2020-04-14
2020-01-0722
Also, all the existing methods for vehicular communication rely on a centralized server which itself invite massive cyber-security threats. These threats and challenges can be addressed by using the Blockchain (BC) technology, where each transaction is logged in a decentralized immutable BC ledger.
Training / Education

Introduction to Highly Automated Vehicles

2020-12-07
Every year, the U.S. on average, experiences more than 34,000 traffic deaths and over 5 million vehicle crashes. While the trend in traffic deaths has been generally downward for the past decade, most of this reduction has been the result of optimizing passive occupant crash protection systems such as seatbelts and airbags. Highly automated vehicle's (HAV's) offer the potential to significantly reduce vehicle crashes by perceiving a dangerous situation before the crash has occurred and supporting the human driver with proactive warnings and in some cases active interventions to avoid or mitigate the crash.
Technical Paper

Securing Connected Vehicles End to End

2014-04-01
2014-01-0300
As vehicles become increasingly connected with the external world, they face a growing range of security vulnerabilities. Researchers, hobbyists, and hackers have compromised security keys used by vehicles' electronic control units (ECUs), modified ECU software, and hacked wireless transmissions from vehicle key fobs and tire monitoring sensors. Malware can infect vehicles through Internet connectivity, onboard diagnostic interfaces, devices tethered wirelessly or physically to the vehicle, malware-infected aftermarket devices or spare parts, and onboard Wi-Fi hotspot. Once vehicles are interconnected, compromised vehicles can also be used to attack the connected transportation system and other vehicles. Securing connected vehicles impose a range of unique new challenges. This paper describes some of these unique challenges and presents an end-to-end cloud-assisted connected vehicle security framework that can address these challenges.
Technical Paper

Trust-Based Control and Scheduling for UGV Platoon under Cyber Attacks

2019-04-02
2019-01-1077
Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) may encounter difficulties accommodating environmental uncertainties and system degradations during harsh conditions. However, human experience and onboard intelligence can may help mitigate such cases. Unfortunately, human operators have cognition limits when directly supervising multiple UGVs. Ideally, an automated decision aid can be designed that empowers the human operator to supervise the UGVs. In this paper, we consider a connected UGV platoon under cyber attacks that may disrupt safety and degrade performance. An observer-based resilient control strategy is designed to mitigate the effects of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) cyber attacks. In addition, each UGV generates both internal and external evaluations based on the platoons performance metrics. A cloud-based trust-based information management system collects these evaluations to detect abnormal UGV platoon behaviors.
Journal Article

Exploiting Channel Distortion for Transmitter Identification for In-Vehicle Network Security

2020-08-18
Abstract Cyberattacks on financial and government institutions, critical infrastructure, voting systems, businesses, modern vehicles, and so on are on the rise. Fully connected autonomous vehicles are more vulnerable than ever to hacking and data theft. This is due to the fact that the industry still relies on controller area network (CAN) protocol for in-vehicle control networks. The CAN protocol lacks basic security features such as message authentication, which makes it vulnerable to a wide range of attacks including spoofing attacks. This article presents a novel method to protect CAN protocol against packet spoofing, replay, and denial of service (DoS) attacks. The proposed method exploits physical uncolonable attributes in the physical channel between transmitting and destination nodes and uses them for linking the received packet to the source.
Journal Article

Cyberattacks and Countermeasures for Intelligent and Connected Vehicles

2019-10-14
Abstract ICVs are expected to make the transportation safer, cleaner, and more comfortable in the near future. However, the trend of connectivity has greatly increased the attack surfaces of vehicles, which makes in-vehicle networks more vulnerable to cyberattacks which then causes serious security and safety issues. In this article, we therefore systematically analyzed cyberattacks and corresponding countermeasures for in-vehicle networks of intelligent and connected vehicles (ICVs). Firstly, we analyzed the security risk of ICVs and proposed an in-vehicle network model from a hierarchical point of view. Then, we discussed possible cyberattacks at each layer of proposed network model.
Standard

Unmanned Systems (UxS) Control Segment (UCS) Architecture: Architecture Description

2020-07-14
CURRENT
AS6512A
This document is the Architecture Description (AD) for the SAE Unmanned Systems (UxS) Control Segment (UCS) Architecture Library Revision A or, simply, the UCS Architecture. The architecture is expressed by a library of SAE publications as referenced herein. The other publications in the UCS Architecture Library Revision A are: AS6513A, AS6518A, AS6522A, and AS6969A.
Magazine

Autonomous Vehicle Engineering: July 2020

2020-07-02
Editorial High noon for high-level autonomy The Navigator A fork in the road for the AV business The Electric, Autonomous Revolution Lifts Off Engineering the new generation of electric and hybrid vertical-take-off-and-landing vehicles at Wisk and Elroy Air. New SAE Standard for Automated-Driving Developers Developed in less than a year, SAE's new J3216 standard will impact traffic management, operations and safety for automated mobility. Making Data Logging, Replay and Prototyping More Efficient High levels of continuity and compatibility are vital to avoid interruptions in the development process - and reduce cost. Radar Death Star ELunewave's 3D-printed spherical antenna makes for fast, 360-degree single-snapshot readings that are claimed to beat the slower sweeps of conventional radar. The Case for FOTA in AV Data Security Firmware over-the-air data transmission helps OEMs drive secure vehicle autonomy.
Technical Paper

Evaluating Trajectory Privacy in Autonomous Vehicular Communications

2019-04-02
2019-01-0487
Autonomous vehicles might one day be able to implement privacy preserving driving patterns which humans may find too difficult to implement. In order to measure the difference between location privacy achieved by humans versus location privacy achieved by autonomous vehicles, this paper measures privacy as trajectory anonymity, as opposed to single location privacy or continuous privacy. This paper evaluates how trajectory privacy for randomized driving patterns could be twice as effective for autonomous vehicles using diverted paths compared to Google Map API generated shortest paths. The result shows vehicles mobility patterns could impact trajectory and location privacy. Moreover, the results show that the proposed metric outperforms both K-anonymity and KDT-anonymity.
Journal Article

A Comprehensive Attack and Defense Model for the Automotive Domain

2019-01-17
Abstract In the automotive domain, the overall complexity of technical components has increased enormously. Formerly isolated, purely mechanical cars are now a multitude of cyber-physical systems that are continuously interacting with other IT systems, for example, with the smartphone of their driver or the backend servers of the car manufacturer. This has huge security implications as demonstrated by several recent research papers that document attacks endangering the safety of the car. However, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no holistic overview or structured description of the complex automotive domain. Without such a big picture, distinct security research remains isolated and is lacking interconnections between the different subsystems. Hence, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the overall security of a car or to identify aspects that have not been sufficiently covered by security analyses.
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