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Standard

Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems

2016-01-14
CURRENT
J3061_201601
This recommended practice provides guidance on vehicle Cybersecurity and was created based off of, and expanded on from, existing practices which are being implemented or reported in industry, government and conference papers. ...Other proprietary Cybersecurity development processes and standards may have been established to support a specific manufacturer’s development processes, and may not be comprehensively represented in this document, however, information contained in this document may help refine existing in-house processes, methods, etc. ...This recommended practice establishes a set of high-level guiding principles for Cybersecurity as it relates to cyber-physical vehicle systems. This includes: Defining a complete lifecycle process framework that can be tailored and utilized within each organization’s development processes to incorporate Cybersecurity into cyber-physical vehicle systems from concept phase through production, operation, service, and decommissioning.
Technical Paper

Cyber-security for Engine ECUs: Past, Present and Future

2015-09-01
2015-01-1998
In this paper, we outline past, present and future applications of automotive security for engine ECUs. Electronic immobilizers and anti-tuning countermeasures have been used for several years. Recently, OEMs and suppliers are facing more and more powerful attackers, and as a result, have introduced stronger countermeasures based on hardware security. Finally, with the advent of connected cars, it is expected that many things that currently require a physical connection will be done remotely in a near future. This includes remote diagnostics, reprogramming and engine calibration.
Technical Paper

Mitigating Unknown Cybersecurity Threats in Performance Constrained Electronic Control Units

2018-04-03
2018-01-0016
Traditional Cybersecurity solutions fall short in meeting automotive ECU constraints such as zero false positives, intermittent connectivity, and low performance impact. ...We integrated Autonomous Security on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) system to evaluate the feasibility of mitigating Cybersecurity risks against potential threats. We identified key metrics that should be measured, such as level of security, ease of integration and system performance impact.
Technical Paper

Research on Vehicle Cybersecurity Based on Dedicated Security Hardware and ECDH Algorithm

2017-09-23
2017-01-2005
Vehicle cybersecurity consists of internal security and external security. Dedicated security hardware will play an important role in car’s internal and external security communication. ...For certain AURIX MCU consisting of HSM, the experiment result shows that cheaper 32-bit HSM’s AES calculating speed is 25 times of 32-bit main controller, so HSM is an effective choice to realize cybersecurity. After comparing two existing methods that realize secure CAN communication, A Modified SECURE CAN scheme is proposed, and differences of the three schemes are analyzed.
Standard

Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems

2021-09-27
WIP
J3061
This recommended practice provides guidance on vehicle Cybersecurity and was created based off of, and expanded on from, existing practices which are being implemented or reported in industry, government and conference papers. ...Other proprietary Cybersecurity development processes and standards may have been established to support a specific manufacturer’s development processes, and may not be comprehensively represented in this document, however, information contained in this document may help refine existing in-house processes, methods, etc. ...This recommended practice establishes a set of high-level guiding principles for Cybersecurity as it relates to cyber-physical vehicle systems. This includes: • Defining a complete lifecycle process framework that can be tailored and utilized within each organization’s development processes to incorporate Cybersecurity into cyber-physical vehicle systems from concept phase through production, operation, service, and decommissioning. • Providing information on some common existing tools and methods used when designing, verifying and validating cyber-physical vehicle systems. • Providing basic guiding principles on Cybersecurity for vehicle systems. • Providing the foundation for further standards development activities in vehicle Cybersecurity.
Journal Article

Towards a Blockchain Framework for Autonomous Vehicle System Integrity

2021-05-05
Ensuring cybersecurity in an ECU network is challenging as there is no centralized authority in the vehicle to provide security as a service. ...While progress has been made to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities, many of these approaches have focused on enterprise, software-centric systems and require more computational resources than typically available for onboard vehicular devices.
Standard

CAN FD Data Link Layer

2021-07-16
CURRENT
J1939-22_202107
The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.
Technical Paper

Threat/Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment: A Framework to Align the Functional Safety and Security Process in Automotive Domain

2021-04-06
2021-01-0148
The underlying systems are susceptible to safety and cybersecurity attacks as the involved ECUs are interconnected. The security attacks can lead to disrupting the safe operation of the vehicle while causing injury to the passengers. ...Consequently, the functional safety requirements and cybersecurity requirements can be aligned with each other. In this article, a case study of the application of the THARA framework is presented through the risk analysis of safety and security threats applicable to the rearview camera (RVC) feature of the vehicle.
Technical Paper

Optimizing CAN Bus Security with In-Place Cryptography

2019-01-16
2019-01-0098
In-vehicle networks used for inter-ECU communication, most commonly the CAN bus, were not designed with cybersecurity in mind, and as a result, communication by corrupt devices connected to the bus is not authenticated.
Standard

CAN FD Data Link Layer

2021-03-22
HISTORICAL
J1939-22_202103
The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.
Technical Paper

Securing Connected Vehicles End to End

2014-04-01
2014-01-0300
As vehicles become increasingly connected with the external world, they face a growing range of security vulnerabilities. Researchers, hobbyists, and hackers have compromised security keys used by vehicles' electronic control units (ECUs), modified ECU software, and hacked wireless transmissions from vehicle key fobs and tire monitoring sensors. Malware can infect vehicles through Internet connectivity, onboard diagnostic interfaces, devices tethered wirelessly or physically to the vehicle, malware-infected aftermarket devices or spare parts, and onboard Wi-Fi hotspot. Once vehicles are interconnected, compromised vehicles can also be used to attack the connected transportation system and other vehicles. Securing connected vehicles impose a range of unique new challenges. This paper describes some of these unique challenges and presents an end-to-end cloud-assisted connected vehicle security framework that can address these challenges.
Journal Article

Zero-Day Attack Defenses and Test Framework for Connected Mobility ECUs

2021-04-06
2021-01-0141
Recent developments in the commercialization of mobility services have brought unprecedented connectivity to the automotive sector. While the adoption of connected features provides significant benefits to vehicle owners, adversaries may leverage zero-day attacks to target the expanded attack surface and make unauthorized access to sensitive data. Protecting new generations of automotive controllers against malicious intrusions requires solutions that do not depend on conventional countermeasures, which often fall short when pitted against sophisticated exploitation attempts. In this paper, we describe some of the latent risks in current automotive systems along with a well-engineered multi-layer defense strategy. Further, we introduce a novel and comprehensive attack and performance test framework which considers state-of-the-art memory corruption attacks, countermeasures and evaluation methods.
Technical Paper

The Study of Secure CAN Communication for Automotive Applications

2017-03-28
2017-01-1658
Cyber security is becoming increasingly critical in the car industry. Not only the entry points to the external world in the car need to be protected against potential attack, but also the on-board communication in the car require to be protected against attackers who may try to send unauthorized CAN messages. However, the current CAN network was not designed with security in mind. As a result, the extra measures have to be taken to address the key security properties of the secure CAN communication, including data integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and freshness. While integrity and authenticity can be achieved by using a relatively straightforward algorithms such as CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) and Confidentiality can be handled by a symmetric encryption algorithm like AES128 (128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard), it has been recognized to be more challenging to achieve the freshness of CAN message.
Journal Article

Simple Cryptographic Key Management Scheme of the Electronic Control Unit in the Lifecycle of a Vehicle

2020-12-31
Abstract Connecting vehicles to various network services increases the risk of in-vehicle cyberattacks. For automotive industries, the supply chain for assembling a vehicle consists of many different organizations such as component suppliers, system suppliers, and car manufacturers (CMs). Moreover, once a vehicle has shipped from the factory of the CM, resellers, dealers, and owners of the vehicle may add and replace the optional authorized and third-party equipment. Such equipment may have serious security vulnerabilities that may be targeted by a malicious attacker. The key management system of a vehicle must be applicable to all use cases. We propose a novel key management system adaptable to the electronic control unit (ECU) lifecycle of a vehicle. The scope of our system is not only the vehicle product line but also the third-party vendors of automotive accessories and vehicle maintenance facilities, including resellers, dealers, and vehicle users.
Journal Article

Accelerated Secure Boot for Real-Time Embedded Safety Systems

2019-07-08
Abstract Secure boot is a fundamental security primitive for establishing trust in computer systems. For real-time safety applications, the time taken to perform the boot measurement conflicts with the need for near instant availability. To speed up the boot measurement while establishing an acceptable degree of trust, we propose a dual-phase secure boot algorithm that balances the strong requirement for data tamper detection with the strong requirement for real-time availability. A probabilistic boot measurement is executed in the first phase to allow the system to be quickly booted. This is followed by a full boot measurement to verify the first-phase results and generate the new sampled space for the next boot cycle. The dual-phase approach allows the system to be operational within a fraction of the time needed for a full boot measurement while producing a high detection probability of data tampering.
Journal Article

Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection Using the Density Estimation of Reception Cycle Periods for In-Vehicle Networks

2018-05-16
Abstract The automotive industry intends to create new services that involve sharing vehicle control information via a wide area network. In modern vehicles, an in-vehicle network shares information between more than 70 electronic control units (ECUs) inside a vehicle while it is driven. However, such a complicated system configuration can result in security vulnerabilities. The possibility of cyber-attacks on vehicles via external services has been demonstrated in many research projects. As advances in vehicle systems (e.g., autonomous drive) progress, the number of vulnerabilities to be exploited by cyber-attacks will also increase. Therefore, future vehicles need security measures to detect unknown cyber-attacks. We propose anomaly-based intrusion detection to detect unknown cyber-attacks for the Control Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is popular as a communication protocol for in-vehicle networks.
Journal Article

Secure Boot Revisited: Challenges for Secure Implementations in the Automotive Domain

2020-08-13
Abstract Secure boot, although known for more than 20 years, frequent attacks from hackers that show numerous ways to bypass the security mechanism, including electronic control units (ECUs) of the automotive industry. This paper investigates the major causes of security weaknesses of secure boot implementations. Based on penetration test experiences, we start from an attacker’s perspective to identify and outline common implementation weaknesses. Then, from a Tier-One perspective, we analyze challenges in the research and development process of ECUs between original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and suppliers that amplify the probability of such weakness. The paper provides recommendations to increase the understanding of implementing secure boot securely on both sides and derives a set of reference requirements as a starting point for secure boot ECU requirements.
Technical Paper

Reliability-Oriented Distributed Test Strategy for FOTA/SOTA Enabled Edge Device

2021-09-22
2021-26-0476
In order to enhance customer experience [5] and to reduce time to market, the manufacturers are constantly in need of being able to update software/firmware of the Electronic Control units (ECU) when the vehicle is in field operations. The updates could be a bug fix or a new feature release. Until the recent years, the updation of software/firmware used to be done using a physical hardwired connection to the Vehicle in a workshop. However, with the element of connectivity being added to the vehicle, the updation of software can be done remotely and wirelessly over the air using a feature called Flash over the air (FOTA) [2] and Software over the air (SOTA) [2]. In order to safeguard the telematics [3] ECU from tampering or hacking, the manufacturers are doing away with the ports on the underlying hardware through which manual flashing used to be done. This means that, the only option available to flash or update the ECU is using FOTA/SOTA.
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