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Abstract Trust in the digital data from heavy vehicle event data recorders (HVEDRs) is paramount to using the data in legal contests. Ensuring the trust in the HVEDR data requires an examination of the ways the digital information can be attacked, both purposefully and inadvertently. The goal or objective of an attack on HVEDR data will be to have the data omitted in a case. To this end, we developed an attack tree and establish a model for violating the trust needed for HVEDR data. The attack tree provides context for mitigations and also for functional requirements. A trust model is introduced as well as a discussion on what constitutes forensically sound data. The main contribution of this article is an attack tree-based model of both malicious and accidental events contributing to compromised event data recorder (EDR) data. A comprehensive list of mitigations for HVEDR systems results from this analysis.

Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.

Quotes from COMVEC 2018 Industry leaders spoke extensively about all things autonomous-ADAS, big data, connectivity, cybersecurity, machine learning-at the annual SAE event. Here's some of what they had to say. Fuel-cell Class 8-take 2.0 With a longer-range and more-refined fuel cell-powered heavy-duty truck, Toyota aims to eventually eliminate emissions from trucks serving increasingly congested California ports. ...Editorial Bring innovation, disruption in-house Adding 3D printing to design, manufacturing processes Upstream devoted to truck cybersecurity threats Jacobs employs cylinder deactivation in HD engines to lower CO2, NOx Emissions reductions continue to disrupt CV industry Mercedes doubles down on electric vans and buses, considers fuel cells Off-road bus from Torsus transports to hard-to-reach places Q&A Perkins pursues plug-and-play connectivity

Defending the heavy-vehicle cyber domain Cybersecurity experts explained at SAE COMVEC 2021 how they're preparing the next generation of thwarters to protect increasingly electrified, connected and automated trucks.

Using a wireless medium for tractor-trailer communication will bring new cybersecurity challenges and requirements which requires new development and lifecycle considerations.

Connected commercial vehicles bring cybersecurity to the fore Connectivity, automation and electrification will largely drive vehicle developments in the coming years, according to experts presenting at the revamped SAE COMVEC 17.

The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

This document will provide recommendations to vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers in securing the SAE J1939-13 connector interface from the cybersecurity risks posed by the existence of this connector.

This document will provide recommendations to vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers in securing the SAE J1939 network from the cybersecurity risks. It is recognized that not every application of SAE J1939 networks requires the same level of cyber security measures.

The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

This document describes a set of recommended actions to take to increase the likelihood of safe vehicle operation when a device (external test equipment, data collection device, etc.) whose normal operation has been compromised by a source external to the vehicle is connected to the vehicle’s diagnostic system. The term “diagnostic system” is intended to be a generic way to reference all the different ways that diagnostic commands might be injected into the system. The guidance in this document is intended to improve security without significantly impacting the ability for franchised dealer or independent aftermarket external test tools to perform legitimate diagnosis and maintenance functions. The goal is that intrusive services are only allowed to be performed when the vehicle is in a Safe State such that even if the intrusive service were to be initiated with adversarial intent the consequences of such a service would still be acceptable.

Cyber assurance of heavy trucks is a major concern with new designs as well as with supporting legacy systems. Many cyber security experts and analysts are used to working with traditional information technology (IT) networks and are familiar with a set of technologies that may not be directly useful in the commercial vehicle sector. To help connect security researchers to heavy trucks, a remotely accessible testbed has been prototyped for experimentation with security methodologies and techniques to evaluate and improve on existing technologies, as well as developing domain-specific technologies. The testbed relies on embedded Linux-based node controllers that can simulate the sensor inputs to various heavy vehicle electronic control units (ECUs). The node controller also monitors and affects the flow of network information between the ECUs and the vehicle communications backbone.

This SAE Recommended Practice defines the Expanded Diagnostic Protocol (EDP), the requirements for the SAE J1978 OBD II Scan Tool for supporting the EDP protocol, and associated requirements for diagnosis and service information to be provided by motor vehicle manufacturers. Appendix A includes worked examples of the use of the protocol.

This SAE Recommended Practice defines the Expanded Diagnostic Protocol (EDP), the requirements for the SAE J1978 OBD II Scan Tool for supporting the EDP protocol, and associated requirements for diagnosis and service information to be provided by motor vehicle manufacturers. Appendix A includes worked examples of the use of the protocol.