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Keys to Creating a Cybersecurity Process from the J3061 Process Framework

This allows an organization to develop an internal cybersecurity process consistent with its other processes in order to build cybersecurity robustness into their cyber- physical systems. ...This seminar will define key concepts in cybersecurity and discuss what a cybersecurity process consists of and why one is needed for the development of cyber-physical vehicle systems.

Permanently or Semi-Permanently Installed Diagnostic Communication Devices, Security Guidelines

The scope of the document is to define the cyber-security best practices to reduce interference with normal vehicle operation, or to minimize risk as to unauthorized access of the vehicle's control, diagnostic, or data storage system; access by equipment (i.e., permanently or semi-permanently installed diagnostic communication device, also known as dongle, etc.) which is either permanently or semi-permanently connected to the vehicle's OBD diagnostic connector, either SAE J1939-13, SAE J1962, or other future protocol; or hardwired directly to the in-vehicle network.
Technical Paper

Information Security Risk Management of Vehicles

The results of this work is allowed to identify a number of cybersecurity threats of the automated security-critical automotive systems, which reduces the efficiency of operation, road safety and system safety. ...According to the evaluating criterion of board electronics, the presence of poorly-protected communication channels, the 75% of the researched modern vehicles do not meet the minimum requirements of cybersecurity due to the danger of external blocking of vital systems. The revealed vulnerabilities of the security-critical automotive systems lead to the necessity of developing methods for mechanical and electronic protection of the modern vehicle. ...The law of normal distribution of the mid-points of the expert evaluation of the cyber-security of a modern vehicle has been determined. Based on the system approach, ranking of the main cybersecurity treats is performed.
Technical Paper

Hypervisor Implementation in Vehicle Networks

The hypervisor offers many benefits to the vehicle architecture, both operationally and with cybersecurity. The proposed mitigant provides the structure to partition the various VMs. This allows for the different functions to be managed within their own distinct VM. ...While the cybersecurity applications are numerous, there are also the operational benefits. The hypervisor is designed to not only manage the VMs, but also to increase the efficiency of these via resource management.
Technical Paper

Optimizing CAN Bus Security with In-Place Cryptography

In-vehicle networks used for inter-ECU communication, most commonly the CAN bus, were not designed with cybersecurity in mind, and as a result, communication by corrupt devices connected to the bus is not authenticated.

SAE J1939 Network Security

This document will provide recommendations to vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers in securing the SAE J1939-13 connector interface from the cybersecurity risks posed by the existence of this connector.


This report sets forth guidance for IP-based onboard networks and systems residing in the Airline Information Services (AIS) and Passenger Information and Entertainment Services (PIES) Domains by establishing a common set of security related data elements and format(s) that are produced by aircraft systems, suitable for use by airline IT and/or avionic supplier analytical ground tools.
Journal Article

Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection Using the Density Estimation of Reception Cycle Periods for In-Vehicle Networks

Abstract The automotive industry intends to create new services that involve sharing vehicle control information via a wide area network. In modern vehicles, an in-vehicle network shares information between more than 70 electronic control units (ECUs) inside a vehicle while it is driven. However, such a complicated system configuration can result in security vulnerabilities. The possibility of cyber-attacks on vehicles via external services has been demonstrated in many research projects. As advances in vehicle systems (e.g., autonomous drive) progress, the number of vulnerabilities to be exploited by cyber-attacks will also increase. Therefore, future vehicles need security measures to detect unknown cyber-attacks. We propose anomaly-based intrusion detection to detect unknown cyber-attacks for the Control Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is popular as a communication protocol for in-vehicle networks.
Technical Paper

Research on CAN Network Security Aspects and Intrusion Detection Design

With the rapid development of vehicle intelligent and networking technology, the IT security of automotive systems becomes an important area of research. In addition to the basic vehicle control, intelligent advanced driver assistance systems, infotainment systems will all exchange data with in-vehicle network. Unfortunately, current communication network protocols, including Controller Area Network (CAN), FlexRay, MOST, and LIN have no security services, such as authentication or encryption, etc. Therefore, the vehicle are unprotected against malicious attacks. Since CAN bus is actually the most widely used field bus for in-vehicle communications in current automobiles, the security aspects of CAN bus is focused on. Based on the analysis of the current research status of CAN bus network security, this paper summarizes the CAN bus potential security vulnerabilities and the attack means.
Technical Paper

Proposal of HILS-Based In-Vehicle Network Security Verification Environment

We propose a security-testing framework to analyze attack feasibilities for automotive control software by integrating model-based development with model checking techniques. Many studies have pointed out the vulnerabilities in the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is widely used in in-vehicle network systems. However, many security attacks on automobiles did not explicitly consider the transmission timing of CAN packets to realize vulnerabilities. Additionally, in terms of security testing for automobiles, most existing studies have only focused on the generation of the testing packets to realize vulnerabilities, but they did not consider the timing of invoking a security testing. Therefore, we focus on the transmit timing of CAN packets to realize vulnerabilities. In our experiments, we have demonstrated the classification of feasible attacks at the early development phase by integrating the model checking techniques into a virtualized environment.
Journal Article

Cyberattacks and Countermeasures for Intelligent and Connected Vehicles

Abstract ICVs are expected to make the transportation safer, cleaner, and more comfortable in the near future. However, the trend of connectivity has greatly increased the attack surfaces of vehicles, which makes in-vehicle networks more vulnerable to cyberattacks which then causes serious security and safety issues. In this article, we therefore systematically analyzed cyberattacks and corresponding countermeasures for in-vehicle networks of intelligent and connected vehicles (ICVs). Firstly, we analyzed the security risk of ICVs and proposed an in-vehicle network model from a hierarchical point of view. Then, we discussed possible cyberattacks at each layer of proposed network model.

The Car Hacker's Handbook: A Guide for the Penetration Tester

Modern cars are more computerized than ever, with the aim to make driving more convenient. But vehicle technologies haven’t kept pace with today’s more hostile security environment, leaving millions vulnerable to attack. This handbook will give you a deeper understanding of the computer systems and embedded software in modern vehicles. It begins by examining vulnerabilities and providing detailed explanations of communications over the CAN bus and between devices and systems. With an understanding of a vehicle’s communication network, you’ll learn how to intercept data and perform specific hacks to track vehicles, unlock doors, glitch engines, flood communication, and more.
Journal Article

Safe and Secure Software Updates Over The Air for Electronic Brake Control Systems

Vehicle manufacturers are suffering from increasing expenses for fixing software issues. This fact is mainly driving their desire to use mobile communication channels for doing Software Updates Over The Air (SOTA). Software updates today are typically done at vehicle service stations by connecting the vehicles’ electronic network via the On Board Diagnostic (OBD) interface to a service computer. These operations are done under the control of trained technicians. SOTA means that the update process must get handled by the driver. Two critical aspects need to get considered when doing SOTA at Electronic Brake Control (EBC) systems. Both will determine the acceptance of SOTA by legal authorities and by the passengers: The safety and security of the vehicle The availability of the vehicle for the passengers The security aspect includes the necessity to protect the vehicle and the manufacturers IP from unwanted attacks.
Journal Article

Vulnerability of FlexRay and Countermeasures

Abstract The importance of in-vehicle network security has increased with an increase in automated and connected vehicles. Hence, many attacks and countermeasures have been proposed to secure the controller area network (CAN), which is an existent in-vehicle network protocol. At the same time, new protocols-such as FlexRay and Ethernet-which are faster and more reliable than CAN have also been proposed. European OEMs have adopted FlexRay as a control network that can perform the fundamental functions of a vehicle. However, there are few studies regarding FlexRay security. In particular, studies on attacks against FlexRay are limited to theoretical studies or simulation-based experiments. Hence, the vulnerability of FlexRay is unclear. Understanding this vulnerability is necessary for the application of countermeasures and improving the security of future vehicles. In this article, we highlight the vulnerability of FlexRay found in the experiments conducted on a real FlexRay network.