Search Results

Abstract Aircraft cybersecurity efforts have tended to focus at the strategic or tactical levels without a clear connection between the two. ...CSSEP’s process model postulates that security is best achieved by a balance of cybersecurity, cyber resiliency, defensibility, and recoverability and that control is best established by developing security constraints versus attempting to find every vulnerability. ...CSSEP identifies the major functions needed to do effective aircraft cybersecurity and provides a flexible framework as the “missing link” to connect the strategic and tactical levels of aircraft cybersecurity.

In this paper, we outline past, present and future applications of automotive security for engine ECUs. Electronic immobilizers and anti-tuning countermeasures have been used for several years. Recently, OEMs and suppliers are facing more and more powerful attackers, and as a result, have introduced stronger countermeasures based on hardware security. Finally, with the advent of connected cars, it is expected that many things that currently require a physical connection will be done remotely in a near future. This includes remote diagnostics, reprogramming and engine calibration.

Vehicle cybersecurity consists of internal security and external security. Dedicated security hardware will play an important role in car’s internal and external security communication. ...For certain AURIX MCU consisting of HSM, the experiment result shows that cheaper 32-bit HSM’s AES calculating speed is 25 times of 32-bit main controller, so HSM is an effective choice to realize cybersecurity. After comparing two existing methods that realize secure CAN communication, A Modified SECURE CAN scheme is proposed, and differences of the three schemes are analyzed.

Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.

Special guest Kirsten Koepsel, lawyer and engineer specializing in cyber security, talks with SAE International about how this new environment affects the planes and airports we use every day.

SAE International’s two-day course, DO-326A and ED-202A: An Introduction to the New and Mandatory Aviation Cyber-Security Essentials, introduces attendees to industry best practices for real-world aviation cybersecurity risk assessment, development, assurance. ...SAE International’s two-day course, DO-326A and ED-202A: An Introduction to the New and Mandatory Aviation Cyber-Security Essentials, introduces attendees to industry best practices for real-world aviation cybersecurity risk assessment, development, assurance.

Written by Kirsten Koepsel, a lawyer and engineer whose work has focused on aviation cybersecurity, Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Impacting Commercial Aviation addresses the big question facing aircraft manufacturers today: keep the work in house or outsource it? ...Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Impacting Commercial Aviation discusses the differences in requirements depending on the buyer of the aircraft (governmental or not), ranging from delivery delays to risks linked to cybersecurity and the Internet of Things (IoT), including possible problems with faulty sensors and counterfeit parts.

The Aerospace Supply Chain and Cyber Security - Challenges Ahead looks at the current state of commercial aviation and cyber security, how information technology and its attractiveness to cyber attacks is affecting it, and the way supply chains have become a vital part of the industry's cyber-security strategy. More than ever before, commercial aviation relies on information and communications technology.

In conjunction with an increasing number of related laws and regulations (such as UNECE R155 and ISO 21434), these drive security requirements in different domains and areas. 2 In this paper we examine the upcoming trends in EE architectures and investigate the underlying cyber-security threats and corresponding security requirements that lead to potential requirements for “Automotive Embedded Hardware Trust Anchors” (AEHTA).

Innovations in Mobility: Aerospace Digital Summitaerospace mobility leaders convene leverage cutting-edge technology, design, develop safety measures, integrate current regulations, suggest future policies, expand markets, diversify revenue streams.

This document provides background and detailed technical information on existing methods to secure loadable software parts.

The purpose of this document is to facilitate an understanding of aircraft information security and to develop aircraft information security operational concepts. This common understanding is important since a number of subcommittees and working groups within the aeronautical industry are considering aircraft information security. This document also provides an aircraft information security process framework relating to airline operational needs that, when implemented by an airline and its suppliers, will enable the safe and secure dispatch of the aircraft in a timely manner. This framework facilitates development of cost-effective aircraft information security and provides a common language for understanding security needs.

Abstract Despite more and more rigorous defense mechanisms in place for cyber-physical systems, cybercriminals are increasingly attacking systems for benefits using a variety of means including malware, phishing, ransomware, and denial of service. Cyberattacks could not only cause significant economic loss but also disastrous consequences for individuals and organizations. Therefore, it is advantageous to detect and fix potential cyber vulnerabilities before the system is fielded. To this end, this article presents a language, VERDICT, and a novel framework, Cyber Vulnerability Analysis Framework (CyVAF) to (i) define cyber threats and mitigation defenses based on system properties, (ii) detect cyber vulnerabilities of system architecture automatically, and also (iii) suggest mitigation defenses. VERDICT is developed as an annex to the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) but can also be used independently.

Cyber security in the aviation industry, especially in relation to onboard aircraft systems, presents unique challenges in its implementation and management. The cyber threat model is constantly evolving and will continually present new and different challenges to the aircraft operator in responding to new cyber threats without either invoking a lengthy software update and re-certification process or limiting aircraft-to-ground communications to the threatened system or systems. This presentation discusses a number of system architectural options and developing technologies that could be considered to enhance the aircraft cyber protection and defensive capabilities of onboard systems as well as to minimize the effort associated with certification/re-certification. Some of these limit the aircraft?s vulnerabilities or in cyber terms, its ?threat surface?.

As vehicles become increasingly connected with the external world, they face a growing range of security vulnerabilities. Researchers, hobbyists, and hackers have compromised security keys used by vehicles' electronic control units (ECUs), modified ECU software, and hacked wireless transmissions from vehicle key fobs and tire monitoring sensors. Malware can infect vehicles through Internet connectivity, onboard diagnostic interfaces, devices tethered wirelessly or physically to the vehicle, malware-infected aftermarket devices or spare parts, and onboard Wi-Fi hotspot. Once vehicles are interconnected, compromised vehicles can also be used to attack the connected transportation system and other vehicles. Securing connected vehicles impose a range of unique new challenges. This paper describes some of these unique challenges and presents an end-to-end cloud-assisted connected vehicle security framework that can address these challenges.

The aircraft lifecycle involves thousands of transactions and an enormous amount of data being exchanged across the stakeholders in the aircraft ecosystem. This data pertains to various aircraft life cycle stages such as design, manufacturing, certification, operations, maintenance, and disposal of the aircraft. All participants in the aerospace ecosystem want to leverage the data to deliver insight and add value to their customers through existing and new services while protecting their own intellectual property. The exchange of data between stakeholders in the ecosystem is involved and growing exponentially. This necessitates the need for standards on data interoperability to support efficient maintenance, logistics, operations, and design improvements for both commercial and military aircraft ecosystems. A digital thread defines an approach and a system which connects the data flows and represents a holistic view of an asset data across its lifecycle.

This brief User Guide recaps the content of the AS6518B UCS Architectural Model. The purpose of the UCS Architecture Model is to provide the authoritative source for other models and products within the UCS Architecture as shown in the AS6512B UCS Architecture: Architecture Description.

This Recommended Practice defines the technical requirements for a terrestrial-based PNT system to improve vehicle (e.g., unmanned, aerial, ground, maritime) positioning/navigation solutions and ensure critical infrastructure security, complementing GNSS technologies.

Cyber security is becoming increasingly critical in the car industry. Not only the entry points to the external world in the car need to be protected against potential attack, but also the on-board communication in the car require to be protected against attackers who may try to send unauthorized CAN messages. However, the current CAN network was not designed with security in mind. As a result, the extra measures have to be taken to address the key security properties of the secure CAN communication, including data integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and freshness. While integrity and authenticity can be achieved by using a relatively straightforward algorithms such as CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) and Confidentiality can be handled by a symmetric encryption algorithm like AES128 (128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard), it has been recognized to be more challenging to achieve the freshness of CAN message.

This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) provides insights on how to perform a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to determine the Return on Investment (ROI) that would result from implementing a blockchain solution to a new or an existing business process. The word “blockchain” refers to a method of documenting when data transactions occur using a distributed ledger with desired immutable qualities. The scope of the current document is on enterprise blockchain which gives the benefit of standardized cryptography, legal enforceability and regulatory compliance. The document analyzes the complexity involved with this technology, lists some of the different approaches that can be used for conducting a CBA, and differentiates its analysis depending on whether the application uses a public or a private distributed network.