It delivers details on key subject areas including: • SAE International Standard J3061; the cybersecurity guidebook for cyber-physical vehicle systems • The differences between automotive and commercial vehicle cybersecurity. • Forensics for identifying breaches in cybersecurity. • Platooning and fleet implications. • Impacts and importance of secure systems for today and for the future. ...This book provides a thorough view of cybersecurity to encourage those in the commercial vehicle industry to be fully aware and concerned that their fleet and cargo could be at risk to a cyber-attack. ...It delivers details on key subject areas including: • SAE International Standard J3061; the cybersecurity guidebook for cyber-physical vehicle systems • The differences between automotive and commercial vehicle cybersecurity. • Forensics for identifying breaches in cybersecurity. • Platooning and fleet implications. • Impacts and importance of secure systems for today and for the future.
Here, we discuss the On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) regulations for next generation BEV/HEV, its vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats that come with hacking. We propose three cybersecurity attack detection and defense methods: Cyber-Attack detection algorithm, Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Method and, Feistel Cipher Block Method. ...These control methods autonomously diagnose a cybersecurity problem in a vehicle’s onboard system using an OBD interface, such as OBD-II when a fault caused by a cyberattack is detected, All of this is achieved in an internal communication network structure.
The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic.
In this paper, we outline past, present and future applications of automotive security for engine ECUs. Electronic immobilizers and anti-tuning countermeasures have been used for several years. Recently, OEMs and suppliers are facing more and more powerful attackers, and as a result, have introduced stronger countermeasures based on hardware security. Finally, with the advent of connected cars, it is expected that many things that currently require a physical connection will be done remotely in a near future. This includes remote diagnostics, reprogramming and engine calibration.
This exercise confirms the necessity of a more restrictive cybersecurity posture in automotive peripherals with access to critical systems, in particular VDAs, and especially when such peripherals present a wireless interface.
Abstract Trust in the digital data from heavy vehicle event data recorders (HVEDRs) is paramount to using the data in legal contests. Ensuring the trust in the HVEDR data requires an examination of the ways the digital information can be attacked, both purposefully and inadvertently. The goal or objective of an attack on HVEDR data will be to have the data omitted in a case. To this end, we developed an attack tree and establish a model for violating the trust needed for HVEDR data. The attack tree provides context for mitigations and also for functional requirements. A trust model is introduced as well as a discussion on what constitutes forensically sound data. The main contribution of this article is an attack tree-based model of both malicious and accidental events contributing to compromised event data recorder (EDR) data. A comprehensive list of mitigations for HVEDR systems results from this analysis.
The VCE Laboratory testbeds are connected with an Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud-based Cyber-security Labs as a Service (CLaaS) system, which allows students and researchers to access the testbeds from any place that has a secure internet connection. ...VCE students are assigned predefined virtual machines to perform designated cyber-security experiments. The CLaaS system has low administrative overhead associated with experiment setup and management. ...VCE Laboratory CLaaS experiments have been developed for demonstrating man-in-the-middle cyber-security attacks from actual compromised hardware or software connected with the TestCube.
A ranked list of value exchanges is created based on the impact of cybersecurity on the stakeholder map. System level-losses are identified from high impact value exchanges, which can then be fed into the step 1 of STPA-Sec analysis.
Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.
The scope of the document is to define the cyber-security best practices to reduce interference with normal vehicle operation, or to minimize risk as to unauthorized access of the vehicle's control, diagnostic, or data storage system; access by equipment (i.e., permanently or semi-permanently installed diagnostic communication device, also known as dongle, etc.) which is either permanently or semi-permanently connected to the vehicle's OBD diagnostic connector, either SAE J1939-13, SAE J1962, or other future protocol; or hardwired directly to the in-vehicle network.
Legacy electronic control units are, nowadays, required to implement cybersecurity measures, but they often do not have all the elements that are necessary to realize industry-standard cybersecurity controls. ...Legacy electronic control units are, nowadays, required to implement cybersecurity measures, but they often do not have all the elements that are necessary to realize industry-standard cybersecurity controls. For example, they may not have hardware cryptographic accelerators, segregated areas of memory for storing keys, or one-time programmable memory areas. ...While the UDS service $27 (Security Access) has a reputation for poor cybersecurity, there is nothing inherent in the way it operates which prevents a secure access-control from being implemented.
The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.