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Functionalities such as automated driving, connectivity and cyber-security have gained increasing importance over the past few years. The importance of these functionalities will continue to grow as these cutting-edge technologies mature and market acceptance increases.

With the development of vehicle intelligence and the Internet of Vehicles, how to protect the safety of the vehicle network system has become a focus issue that needs to be solved urgently. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is currently a very widely used vehicle-mounted bus, and its security largely determines the degree of vehicle-mounted information security. The CAN bus lacks adequate protection mechanisms and is vulnerable to external attacks such as replay attacks, modifying attacks, and so on. On the basis of the existing work, this paper proposes an authentication method that combines Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA256 and Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) algorithms. This method is based on dynamic identity authentication in challenge/response made and combined with the characteristics of the CAN bus itself as it achieves the identity authentication between the gateway and multiple electronic control units (ECUs).

The separation of cybersecurity consideration in RMTO in comparison to AV has barely been touched upon, as most available research and consideration has mainly been focused on AV. ...Though security-by-design is still in the infant state within the automotive cybersecurity. For our development, an adaptable security-by-design approach for RMTO will cover Security Engineering Lifecycle, Logical Security Layered Concept, and Security Architecture. ...A Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) of the RMTO as defined in the international automotive cybersecurity standard ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE WP29 would be carried out and a formalization of the highest level of threats discovered in the RMTO system with a corresponding mitigation action.

This increases the attractiveness of an attack on vehicles and thus introduces new risks for vehicle cybersecurity. Thus, just as safety became a critical part of the development in the late 20th century, the automotive domain must now consider cybersecurity as an integral part of the development of modern vehicles. ...Thus, just as safety became a critical part of the development in the late 20th century, the automotive domain must now consider cybersecurity as an integral part of the development of modern vehicles. Aware of this fact, the automotive industry has, therefore, recently taken multiple efforts in designing and producing safe and secure connected and automated vehicles. ...As the domain geared up for the cybersecurity challenges, they leveraged experiences from many other domains, but must face several unique challenges.

Safety-critical embedded software has to satisfy stringent quality requirements. One such requirement, imposed by all contemporary safety standards, is that no critical run-time errors must occur. Runtime errors can be caused by undefined or unspecified behavior of the programming language; examples are buffer overflows or data races. They may cause erroneous or erratic behavior, induce system failures, and constitute security vulnerabilities. A sound static analyzer reports all such defects in the code, or proves their absence. Sound static program analysis is a verification technique recommended by ISO/FDIS 26262 for software unit verification and for the verification of software integration. In this article we propose an analysis methodology that has been implemented with the static analyzer Astrée. It supports quick turn-around times and gives highly precise whole-program results.

Ransomware is not a new method of malware infection. This historically had been experienced in the enterprise in nearly every industry. This has been especially problematic in the medical and manufacturing fields. As the attackers saturate the specifically targeted industries, the attackers will expand their target industries. One of these which has not been significantly explored by the ransomware groups are the embedded systems and automobile environment. This set of targets is massive and provides for a vast attack potential. While this has not experienced this attack methodology at length, the research and efforts are creeping towards this as a natural extension of the business. The research focusses on the history of ransomware, uses in the enterprise, possible attack vectors with ground vehicles, and defenses to be explored and implemented to secure automobiles, fleets, and the industries.

Several external networks like telematics, and SOTA and many in-vehicle networks by gateways and domain controllers have been increasingly introduced. However, these trends may potentially make many critical data opened, attacked and modified by hackers. These days, vehicle security has been significantly required as these vehicle security threats are related to the human life like drivers and pedestrians. Threat modeling is process of secure software development lifecycle which is developed by Microsoft. It is a systematic approach for analyzing the potential threat in software and identifying the security risk associated with software. Through threat modeling, security risk is be mitigated and eliminated. In vehicle software System, one of vulnerability can affect critical problem about safety. An approach from experience and hacking cases is not enough for analyzing the potential threat and preparing new hacking attack.

Strategies designed to deal with these challenges differ in the way in which added duties are assigned and cybersecurity topics are integrated into the already existing process steps. Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. ...Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. A cybersecurity development approach is frequently perceived as introducing impediments, that bear the risk of cybersecurity measures receiving a lower priority to reduce inconvenience. ...For an established development process and a team accustomed to this process, adding cybersecurity features to the product initially means inconvenience and reduced productivity without perceivable benefits.

Automated Driving (AD) is foreseen to be one of the major social and technological challenges in the coming years. Many manufacturers are developing new models with cutting-edge functionalities, which are not included in the scope of the current regulatory framework. Apart from demonstrating their know-how and expertise about AD, their willingness to sell their AD models in the European market is accelerating the rule-making system. However, which is the roadmap for the European regulatory framework? Policy makers and regulatory bodies are pushing their boundaries at all levels (national and international) in order to introduce modifications in existing regulations. These regulations will enable the introduction of these new functionalities into the market. Without decreasing the standards of safety and security, the implementation of a clear and harmonized regulatory framework and approval process is extremely needed.

To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. ...With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.

This paper is the second in the series of documents designed to record the progress of a series of SAE documents - SAE J2836™, J2847, J2931, & J2953 - within the Plug-In Electric Vehicle (PEV) Communication Task Force. This follows the initial paper number 2010-01-0837, and continues with the test and modeling of the various PLC types for utility programs described in J2836/1™ & J2847/1. This also extends the communication to an off-board charger, described in J2836/2™ & J2847/2 and includes reverse energy flow described in J2836/3™ and J2847/3. The initial versions of J2836/1™ and J2847/1 were published early 2010. J2847/1 has now been re-opened to include updates from comments from the National Institute of Standards Technology (NIST) Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP), Smart Grid Architectural Committee (SGAC) and Cyber Security Working Group committee (SCWG).

With the introduction of Connected Vehicles, it is possible to extend the limited horizon of vehicles on the road by collective perceptions, where vehicles periodically share their information with other vehicles and servers using cloud. Nevertheless, by the time the connected vehicle spread expands, it is critical to understand the validation techniques which can be used to ensure a flawless transfer of data and connectivity. Connected vehicles are mainly characterized by the smartphone application which is provided to the end customers to access the connectivity features in the vehicle. The end result which is delivered to the customer is through the integrated telematics unit in the vehicle which communicates through a communication layer with the cloud platform. The cloud server in turn interacts with the final application layer of the mobile application given to the customer.

Driven by the growing internet and remote connectivity of automobiles, combined with the emerging trend to automated driving, the importance of security for automotive systems is massively increasing. Although cyber security is a common part of daily routines in the traditional IT domain, necessary security mechanisms are not yet widely applied in the vehicles. At first glance, this may not appear to be a problem as there are lots of solutions from other domains, which potentially could be re-used. But substantial differences compared to an automotive environment have to be taken into account, drastically reducing the possibilities for simple reuse. Our contribution is to address automotive electronics engineers who are confronted with security requirements. Therefore, it will firstly provide some basic knowledge about IT security and subsequently present a selection of automotive specific security use cases.

In this paper, we outline past, present and future applications of automotive security for engine ECUs. Electronic immobilizers and anti-tuning countermeasures have been used for several years. Recently, OEMs and suppliers are facing more and more powerful attackers, and as a result, have introduced stronger countermeasures based on hardware security. Finally, with the advent of connected cars, it is expected that many things that currently require a physical connection will be done remotely in a near future. This includes remote diagnostics, reprogramming and engine calibration.

With the increased need for cybersecurity in automotive systems due to the development of more advanced technologies and corresponding increased threat vectors, coupled with the upcoming International Organization for Standardization and the Society for Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 cybersecurity standard for automotive systems and cybersecurity regulations in The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UNECE WP.29), it is becoming increasingly important for auto manufacturers and suppliers to have a clear and common understanding and agreement of cybersecurity metrics for the development and deployment of vehicles. ...Cybersecurity for automotive systems is challenging, and one of the major challenges is how to measure this specific system property. ...With the increased need for cybersecurity in automotive systems due to the development of more advanced technologies and corresponding increased threat vectors, coupled with the upcoming International Organization for Standardization and the Society for Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 cybersecurity standard for automotive systems and cybersecurity regulations in The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UNECE WP.29), it is becoming increasingly important for auto manufacturers and suppliers to have a clear and common understanding and agreement of cybersecurity metrics for the development and deployment of vehicles.

ISO/SAE 21434 [1] Final International Standard was released September 2021 to great fanfare and is the most prominent standard in Automotive Cybersecurity. As members of the Joint Working Group (JWG) the authors spent 5 years developing the 84 pages of precise wording acceptable to hundreds of contributors. ...The application to Agile may require interpreting the standard from another angle, which could involve reordering the sequence of activities and work products, breaking down the acceptable criteria of some work products to allow rapid iterations, and verifications of meta data or intermediate work products. In cybersecurity engineering, Agile has its unique strength compared to the V-model method, as its cyclical nature is better aligned with best practices for Cybersecurity Frameworks. ...In cybersecurity engineering, Agile has its unique strength compared to the V-model method, as its cyclical nature is better aligned with best practices for Cybersecurity Frameworks.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

Automotive system functionalities spread over a wide range of sub-domains ranging from non-driving related components to complex autonomous driving related components. The requirements to design and develop these components span across software, hardware, firmware, etc. elements. The successful development of these components to achieve the needs from the stockholders requires accurate understanding and traceability of the requirements of these component systems. The high-level customer requirements transformation into low level granularity requires an efficient requirement engineer. The manual understanding of the customer requirements from the requirement documents are influenced by the context and the knowledge gap of the requirement engineer in understanding and transforming the requirements.

Software vulnerability management is one of the most critical and crucial security techniques, which analyzes the automotive software/firmware across the digital cockpit, ADAS, V2X, etc. domains for vulnerabilities, and provides security patches for the concerned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). The process of automotive SW/FW vulnerability management system between the OEMs and vendors happen through a channel of fixing a certain number of vulnerabilities by 1st tier supplier which needs to be verified in front of OEMs for the fixed number and type of patches in there deliverable SW/FW. The gap of verification between for the fixed patches between the OEMs and 1st tier supplier requires a reliable human independent intelligent technique to have a trustworthiness of verification.

As an important part of intelligent driving vehicles and intelligent networked transportation systems, environmental perception technology can provide important decision-making basis for the overall planning of intelligent driving vehicles and transportation systems. This paper reviews the current research on environment perception technology in the current intelligent networked transportation system, and analyzes four key research directions and related progress of environmental sensing technologies, including single sensor device, high-precision map, multi-sensor information fusion and vehicle-road collaboration. On the basis of analyzing and summarizing existing related research, this article elaborates the development trend and key directions of future environmental perception technology, including the integration of deep learning, vehicle-road integration, information security and multi-dimensional perception technology related development directions.