Certain standard parts in the aerospace industry require qualification as a prerequisite to manufacturing, signifying that the manufacturer’s capacity to produce parts consistent with the performance specifications has been audited by a neutral third-party auditor, key customer, and/or group of customers. In at least some cases, a certifying authority provides manufacturers with certificates of qualification which they can then present to prospective customers, and/or lists qualified suppliers in a Qualified Parts List or Qualified Supplier List available from that qualification authority. If this list is in an infrequently updated and/or inconsistently styled format as might be found in a print or PDF document, potential customers wishing to integrate qualification information into their supplier tracking systems must use a potentially error-prone manual process that could lead to later reliance on out-of-date or even forged data.
Abstract Identity-Anonymized CAN (IA-CAN) protocol is a secure CAN protocol, which provides the sender authentication by inserting a secret sequence of anonymous IDs (A-IDs) shared among the communication nodes. To prevent malicious attacks from the IA-CAN protocol, a secure and robust system error recovery mechanism is required. This article presents a central management method of IA-CAN, named the IA-CAN with a global A-ID, where a gateway plays a central role in the session initiation and system error recovery. Each ECU self-diagnoses the system errors, and (if an error happens) it automatically resynchronizes its A-ID generation by acquiring the recovery information from the gateway. We prototype both a hardware version of an IA-CAN controller and a system for the IA-CAN with a global A-ID using the controller to verify our concept.
Abstract In the automotive domain, the overall complexity of technical components has increased enormously. Formerly isolated, purely mechanical cars are now a multitude of cyber-physical systems that are continuously interacting with other IT systems, for example, with the smartphone of their driver or the backend servers of the car manufacturer. This has huge security implications as demonstrated by several recent research papers that document attacks endangering the safety of the car. However, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no holistic overview or structured description of the complex automotive domain. Without such a big picture, distinct security research remains isolated and is lacking interconnections between the different subsystems. Hence, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the overall security of a car or to identify aspects that have not been sufficiently covered by security analyses.
Abstract Connected vehicles and intelligent transportation systems are currently evolving into highly interconnected digital environments. Due to the interconnectivity of different systems and complex communication flows, a joint risk analysis for combining safety and security from a system perspective does not yet exist. We introduce a novel method for joint risk assessment in the automotive sector as a combination of the Diamond Model, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR). These methods have been sequentially composed, which results in a comprehensive risk management approach to information security in an intelligent transport system (ITS). The Diamond Model serves to identify and structurally describe threats and scenarios, the widely accepted FMEA provides threat analysis by identifying possible error combinations, and FAIR provides a quantitative estimation of probabilities for the frequency and magnitude of risk events.
With the development of vehicle intelligence and the Internet of Vehicles, how to protect the safety of the vehicle network system has become a focus issue that needs to be solved urgently. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is currently a very widely used vehicle-mounted bus, and its security largely determines the degree of vehicle-mounted information security. The CAN bus lacks adequate protection mechanisms and is vulnerable to external attacks such as replay attacks, modifying attacks, and so on. On the basis of the existing work, this paper proposes an authentication method that combines Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA256 and Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) algorithms. This method is based on dynamic identity authentication in challenge/response made and combined with the characteristics of the CAN bus itself as it achieves the identity authentication between the gateway and multiple electronic control units (ECUs).
Abstract Automotive software is increasingly complex and critical to safe vehicle operation, and related embedded systems must remain up to date to ensure long-term system performance. Update mechanisms and data modification tools introduce opportunities for malicious actors to compromise these cyber-physical systems, and for trusted actors to mistakenly install incompatible software versions. A distributed and stratified “black box” audit trail for automotive software and data provenance is proposed to assure users, service providers, and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of vehicular software integrity and reliability. The proposed black box architecture is both layered and diffuse, employing distributed hash tables (DHT), a parity system and a public blockchain to provide high resilience, assurance, scalability, and efficiency for automotive and other high-assurance systems.
As a promising strategic industry group that is rapidly evolving around the world, autonomous vehicle is entering a critical phase of commercialization from demonstration to end markets. The global automotive industry and governments are facing new common topics and challenges brought by autonomous vehicle, such as how to test, assess, and administrate the autonomous vehicle to ensure their safe running in real traffic situations and proper interactions with other road users. Starting from the facts that the way to autonomous driving is the process of a robot or a machine taking over driving tasks from a human. This paper summarizes the main characteristics of autonomous vehicle which are different from traditional one, then demonstrates the limitations of the existing certification mechanism and related testing methods when applied to autonomous vehicle.
Connectivity and autonomy in vehicles promise improved efficiency, safety and comfort. The increasing use of embedded systems and the cyber element bring with them many challenges regarding cyberattacks which can seriously compromise driver and passenger safety. Beyond penetration testing, assessment of the security vulnerabilities of a component must be done through the design phase of its life cycle. This paper describes the development of a benchtop testbed which allows for the assurance of safety and security of components with all capabilities from Model-in-loop to Software-in-loop to Hardware-in-loop testing. Environment simulation is obtained using the AV simulator, CARLA which provides realistic scenarios and sensor information such as Radar, Lidar etc. MATLAB runs the vehicle, powertrain and control models of the vehicle allowing for the implementation and testing of customized models and algorithms.