Search Results

COMVEC™ conference is the only North American event that addresses vehicles and equipment spanning on-highway, off-highway, agricultural, construction, industrial, military, and mining sectors.

Abstract Identity-Anonymized CAN (IA-CAN) protocol is a secure CAN protocol, which provides the sender authentication by inserting a secret sequence of anonymous IDs (A-IDs) shared among the communication nodes. To prevent malicious attacks from the IA-CAN protocol, a secure and robust system error recovery mechanism is required. This article presents a central management method of IA-CAN, named the IA-CAN with a global A-ID, where a gateway plays a central role in the session initiation and system error recovery. Each ECU self-diagnoses the system errors, and (if an error happens) it automatically resynchronizes its A-ID generation by acquiring the recovery information from the gateway. We prototype both a hardware version of an IA-CAN controller and a system for the IA-CAN with a global A-ID using the controller to verify our concept.

Abstract In the automotive domain, the overall complexity of technical components has increased enormously. Formerly isolated, purely mechanical cars are now a multitude of cyber-physical systems that are continuously interacting with other IT systems, for example, with the smartphone of their driver or the backend servers of the car manufacturer. This has huge security implications as demonstrated by several recent research papers that document attacks endangering the safety of the car. However, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no holistic overview or structured description of the complex automotive domain. Without such a big picture, distinct security research remains isolated and is lacking interconnections between the different subsystems. Hence, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the overall security of a car or to identify aspects that have not been sufficiently covered by security analyses.

With the development of vehicle intelligence and the Internet of Vehicles, how to protect the safety of the vehicle network system has become a focus issue that needs to be solved urgently. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is currently a very widely used vehicle-mounted bus, and its security largely determines the degree of vehicle-mounted information security. The CAN bus lacks adequate protection mechanisms and is vulnerable to external attacks such as replay attacks, modifying attacks, and so on. On the basis of the existing work, this paper proposes an authentication method that combines Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA256 and Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) algorithms. This method is based on dynamic identity authentication in challenge/response made and combined with the characteristics of the CAN bus itself as it achieves the identity authentication between the gateway and multiple electronic control units (ECUs).

Abstract In the pursuit of advancing autonomous vehicles (AVs), data-driven algorithms have become pivotal in replacing human perception and decision-making. While deep neural networks (DNNs) hold promise for perception tasks, the potential for catastrophic consequences due to algorithmic flaws is concerning. A well-known incident in 2016, involving a Tesla autopilot misidentifying a white truck as a cloud, underscores the risks and security vulnerabilities. In this article, we present a novel threat model and risk assessment (TARA) analysis on AV data storage, delving into potential threats and damage scenarios. Specifically, we focus on DNN parameter manipulation attacks, evaluating their impact on three distinct algorithms for traffic sign classification and lane assist.

Abstract Connected autonomous vehicles that employ internet connectivity are technologically complex, which makes them vulnerable to cyberattacks. Many cybersecurity researchers, white hat hackers, and black hat hackers have discovered numerous exploitable vulnerabilities in connected vehicles. ...This study expanded the technology acceptance model (TAM) to include cybersecurity and level of trust as determinants of technology acceptance. This study surveyed a diverse sample of 209 licensed US drivers over 18 years old.

Abstract The innovations of vehicle connectivity have been increasing dramatically to enhance the safety and user experience of driving, while the rising numbers of interfaces to the external world also bring security threats to vehicles. Many security countermeasures have been proposed and discussed to protect the systems and services against attacks. To provide an overview of the current states in this research field, we conducted a systematic mapping study (SMS) on the topic area “security countermeasures of in-vehicle communication systems.” A total of 279 papers are identified based on the defined study identification strategy and criteria. We discussed four research questions (RQs) related to the security countermeasures, validation methods, publication patterns, and research trends and gaps based on the extracted and classified data. Finally, we evaluated the validity threats and the whole mapping process.

In the “What’s Next for Aerospace and Defense: A Vision for 2050” study, AIA, New York City-based McKinsey & Company, and other industry partners reveal a comprehensive 30-year, Industry 4.0 forecast of air travel and spaceflight based on improvements in automation and digitization, next-generation materials, alternative energy sources and storage, and increased data throughput.

AVSC Best Practice for Interactions Between ADS-DVs and Vulnerable Road Users (VRUs) AVSC00009202208 establishes common terminology and a baseline understanding of the challenges posed, and framework to evaluate automated driving system-dedicated vehicle (ADS-DV) interactions with VRUs. This best practice can facilitate communication among the industry and public, help calibrate expectations of all traffic participants, and improve broader acceptance of SAE level 4 and level 5 ADS-equipped vehicles.

Abstract Secure boot is a fundamental security primitive for establishing trust in computer systems. For real-time safety applications, the time taken to perform the boot measurement conflicts with the need for near instant availability. To speed up the boot measurement while establishing an acceptable degree of trust, we propose a dual-phase secure boot algorithm that balances the strong requirement for data tamper detection with the strong requirement for real-time availability. A probabilistic boot measurement is executed in the first phase to allow the system to be quickly booted. This is followed by a full boot measurement to verify the first-phase results and generate the new sampled space for the next boot cycle. The dual-phase approach allows the system to be operational within a fraction of the time needed for a full boot measurement while producing a high detection probability of data tampering.

Access control enforces security policies for controlling critical resources. For V2X (Vehicle to Everything) autonomous military vehicle fleets, network middleware systems such as ROS (Robotic Operating System) expose system resources through networked publisher/subscriber and client/server paradigms. Without proper access control, these systems are vulnerable to attacks from compromised network nodes, which may perform data poisoning attacks, flood packets on a network, or attempt to gain lateral control of other resources. Access control for robotic middleware systems has been investigated in both ROS1 and ROS2. Still, these implementations do not have mechanisms for evaluating a policy's consistency and completeness or writing expressive policies for distributed fleets. We explore an RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) mechanism layered onto ROS environments that uses local permission caches with precomputed truth tables for fast policy evaluation.

 Sometimes mandatory, often voluntary, security frameworks are created to provide federal and commercial organizations with an effective roadmap for securing information technology (IT) systems. The goal is to reduce risk levels and prevent or mitigate cyberattacks. To accomplish this task, security frameworks typically provide a series of documented, agreed upon, and understood policies, procedures, and processes necessary to secure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems and data.

Propulsion Fanjet Evolution - the Next Steps Composites Dry Drilling Composites Using Carbon Dioxide Cooling

Why are Aerospace & Defense Companies Embracing Additive Manufacturing? Simplifying Power Design with Modular Architectures The Role of DevSecOps in Modern Edge Systems Making Machines Curious Designing Multi-Channel Microwave Radio Systems Using Optical Interconnects Solving Military Satellite, Radar and 5G Communications Challenges with GaN-on-SiC MMIC Power Amplifiers Advanced Airborne Defensive Laser for Incorporation on Strike Fighter Aircraft A technical and operational analysis of an airborne "hard-kill" Ytterbium fiber laser-based anti-missile system for use on strike fighters. Additive Manufacturing Utilizing a Novel In-Line Mixing System for Design of Functionally Graded Ceramic Composites Exploring the development of a direct ink writing system with multimaterial and in-line mixing capabilities for printing inks composed of high solids-loaded ceramic particulate suspensions.

Clamoring for more entertainment Connected consumers drive demand for bandwidth, though seatback entertainment remains popular. Fighting for life in military markets Airbus Defense & Space is looking to revitalize and ramp up production rates of its military aircraft portfolio.

Hundreds of aerospace executives, engineers, scientists, and academics are gathering in London this week for Aerospace Systems and Technology Conference (ASTC) 2018 from SAE International in Warrendale, Pennsylvania. Discussions during the three-day industry event center on the theme of innovating air mobility. Aerospace thought leaders are at ASTC discussing current challenges, the latest enabling technologies, and future opportunities, including those related to urban air mobility (UAM) and supersonic aircraft.

But unfortunately, automotive cybersecurity researchers hardly produce a comprehensive detection method due to the confidential nature of Controller Area Network (CAN) DBC format files, which is a standard long maintained by car manufacturers.

Abstract The automotive industry intends to create new services that involve sharing vehicle control information via a wide area network. In modern vehicles, an in-vehicle network shares information between more than 70 electronic control units (ECUs) inside a vehicle while it is driven. However, such a complicated system configuration can result in security vulnerabilities. The possibility of cyber-attacks on vehicles via external services has been demonstrated in many research projects. As advances in vehicle systems (e.g., autonomous drive) progress, the number of vulnerabilities to be exploited by cyber-attacks will also increase. Therefore, future vehicles need security measures to detect unknown cyber-attacks. We propose anomaly-based intrusion detection to detect unknown cyber-attacks for the Control Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is popular as a communication protocol for in-vehicle networks.

In adjusting the data flow, this is an option to increase the cybersecurity for a complete system. This addition to the cybersecurity system provides a clear benefit. ...While this is the traditional application experienced, there are other applications relevant to cybersecurity. As part of the blockchain technology, the nodes are responsible for decision-making.