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Generate guidance and example(s) regarding Airworthiness Security inputs to the Aircraft/System Development Processes in ARP 4754B sections 4.2 thru 4.6, and section 6. Also, clarify any essential output(s) from the Aircraft/System Development Processes that the Airworthiness Security Process DO-326A requires as input(s).

This AIR provides a detailed example of the aircraft and systems development for a function of a hypothetical S18 aircraft. In order to present a clear picture, an aircraft function was broken down into a single system. A function was chosen which had sufficient complexity to allow use of all the methodologies, yet was simple enough to present a clear picture of the flow through the process. This function/system was analyzed using the methods and tools described in ARP4754A/ED-79A. The aircraft level function is “Decelerate Aircraft On Ground” and the system is the braking system. The interaction of the braking system functions with the aircraft are identified with the relative importance based on implied aircraft interactions and system availabilities at the aircraft level. This example does not include validation and verification of the aircraft level hazards and interactions with the braking system.

MBSE is a relatively new technology. The purpose of this document is to demonstrate how Development Assurance may be applied in an MBSE based development program. This will be performed by utilizing the example in Appendix E of ARP4754B and showing an example of the Development Assurance activities and artifacts in an MBSE context.

Define the equivalent of HW & SW SOIs for Aircraft and System Level

This SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) supplements ARP4754B by identifying the crucial elements to be considered when constructing the development assurance plans described in Chapter 3 (Development Planning) of ARP4754B for integrated systems. This AIR presents a collection of lessons learned from past certification programs involving integrated systems. This AIR is not guidance for system integration technologies.

The purpose of this SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) is to provide a high-level set of principles to support aerospace projects required to use a formal development assurance process, such as ARP4754/ED-79 (at latest revision), to show regulatory compliance. Examples of projects where a formal development assurance process is needed are those that have significant functional interactions or whose products cannot be fully analyzed or tested. Development assurance techniques reduce the likelihood of undetected errors that could have safety impacts in the operation of the product. Design and analysis techniques traditionally applied to deterministic risks or to conventional, non-complex systems may not provide adequate safety coverage for more complex systems. This document does not mandate specific processes to meet each development assurance principle.

To develop an industry consensus document describing what Common Mode Errors (CME) are with respect to aircraft/system designs, definitions of commonly used terminology, methods to address CME, practical guidance to decide how much detail is appropriate to analyze CME (reasonable chance of happening or hypothetical), and how to determine when mitigations are sufficient. Includes development up to and including type certification. This AIR will address the questions listed in conclusions and recommendations, section 7, of the white paper (Issues Around Current Understanding of Common Mode Errors).

This SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) supplements ARP4754A by identifying the crucial elements to be considered when constructing the development assurance plans described in Chapter 3 (Development Planning) of ARP4754A for integrated systems. This AIR presents a collection of lessons learned from past certification programs involving integrated systems. This AIR is not guidance for system integration technologies.

ARP1834 provides general guidance for the selection, approach to, and performance of various kinds of F/FA of digital systems and equipment. Its prime objective is to present several industry-acceptable, cost-effective methods for identifying, analyzing, and documenting digital-equipment failure modes and their effects. The analysis techniques and considerations presented here are directed to digital-equipment hardware faults and failures exclusively. ARP1834 is not intended as an exhaustive treatment of the enormously complex process involved in the analytical failure evaluation of complete digital systems, nor as a universally applicable, definitive listing of the necessary and sufficient steps and actions for such evaluation. ARP4761 provides updated methods and processes for use on civil aircraft safety assessment. When analyzing these types of systems, ARP4761 should be used in lieu of this ARP.

This document provides guidance in performing Failure/Fault Analyses in relatively low complexity systems. Methodologies and processes are presented and described for accomplishing Failure/Fault Analyses. ARP4761 provides updated methods and processes for use on civil aircraft safety assessment. When analyzing these types of systems, ARP4761 should be used in lieu of this ARP.

This AIR will provide a basic understanding of STPA and how it can be applied to development and safety assessment of civil aircraft. It will explain, by way of an example, the information needed to begin STPA, the expected STPA outputs, and the phases of aircraft development and safety assessment that can be supported by STPA.

This document describes guidelines, methods and tools used to perform the ongoing safety assessment process for transport airplanes in commercial service (hereafter, airplane). The process described herein is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is associated with showing compliance with the regulations, and also with assuring a company that it meets its own internal standards. The methods outlined herein identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess ongoing safety. This document does not address the economic decision-making associated with the safety management process. While this decision-making is an integral part of the safety management process, this document addresses only the ongoing safety assessment process. To put it succinctly, this document addresses the “Is it safe?” part of safety management. It does not address the “How much does it cost?” part of the safety management.

This AIR addresses the use of Software tools to supplement or automate human activities in the development of systems, but not the hardware or software items within those systems. If a systems development tool is also used in the scope of hardware or software item development, for that usage it would then become subject to the guidance presented in DO-254 and DO-178B/C, respectively.

This document discusses the development of aircraft systems taking into account the overall aircraft operating environment and functions. This includes validation of requirements and verification of the design implementation for certification and product assurance. It provides practices for showing compliance with the regulations and serves to assist a company in developing and meeting its own internal standards by considering the guidelines herein. The guidelines in this document were developed in the context of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14CFR) Part 25 and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specification (CS) CS-25. It may be applicable to other regulations, such as Parts 23, 27, 29, 33, and 35 (CS-23, CS-27, CS-29, CS-E, CS-P). This document addresses the development cycle for aircraft and systems that implement aircraft functions.

ARP1834 provides general guidance for the selection, approach to, and performance of various kinds of F/FA of digital systems and equipment. Its prime objective is to present several industry-acceptable, cost-effective methods for identifying, analyzing, and documenting digital-equipment failure modes and their effects. The analysis techniques and considerations presented here are directed to digital-equipment hardware faults and failures exclusively. ARP1834 is not intended as an exhaustive treatment of the enormously complex process involved in the analytical failure evaluation of complete digital systems, nor as a universally applicable, definitive listing of the necessary and sufficient steps and actions for such evaluation. ARP4761 provides updated methods and processes for use on civil aircraft safety assessment. When analyzing these types of systems, ARP4761 should be used in lieu of this ARP.

This document provides guidance in performing Failure/Fault Analyses in relatively low complexity systems. Methodologies and processes are presented and described for accomplishing Failure/Fault Analyses. ARP4761 provides updated methods and processes for use on civil aircraft safety assessment. When analyzing these types of systems, ARP4761 should be used in lieu of this ARP.

This document describes guidelines and methods of performing the safety assessment for certification of civil aircraft. It is primarily associated with showing compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309. The methods outlined here identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to show compliance. A subset of this material may be applicable to non-25.1309 equipment. The concept of Aircraft Level Safety Assessment is introduced and the tools to accomplish this task are outlined. The overall aircraft operating environment is considered. When aircraft derivatives or system changes are certified, the processes described herein are usually applicable only to the new designs or to existing designs that are affected by the changes. In the case of the implementation of existing designs in a new derivation, alternate means such as service experience may be used to show compliance.

ARP 1834 provides general guidance for the selection, approach to, and performance of various kinds of F/FA of digital systems and equipment. Its prime objective is to present several industry-acceptable, cost-effective methods for identifying, analyzing, and documenting digital-equipment failure modes and their effects. The analysis techniques and considerations presented here are directed to digital-equipment hardware faults and failures exclusively. ARP 1834 is not intended as an exhaustive treatment of the enormously complex process involved in the analytical failure evaluation of complete digital systems, nor as a universally applicable, definitive listing of the necessary and sufficient steps and actions for such evaluation.

FMECA is normally accomplished before, and provides basic information to, a reliability prediction. FMECA should be initiated as an integral part of the early design process of system functional assemblies and should be periodically updated to reflect design changes. An updated FMECA should be a major consideration in the design reviews, inspections and certifications.