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Model Based Safety techniques have been developed for a number of years, though the models have not been customised to help address the safety considerations/ actions at each refinement level. The work performed in the MISSA Project looked at defining the content of “safety models” for each of the refinement levels. A modelling approach has been defined that provides support for the initial functional hazard analysis, then for the systems architectural definition level and finally for the systems implementation level. The Aircraft functional model is used to apportion qualitative and quantitative requirements, the systems architectural level is used to perform a preliminary systems safety analysis to demonstrate that a system architecture can satisfy qualitative and quantitative requirements.

Safety is one of the most important aspects of which we are concerned with in the field of aerospace-systems development. There are a variety of safety assessment activities that are performed throughout a system's lifecycle. Multiple interrelated safety analysis artifacts are generated from the process. However, requirements and guidance for the synthesis and validation of the results of this analysis are insufficient and are not explicit. In traditional system development processes, certification coordination, safety assessment, requirements validation, and implementation verification are generally treated as supporting processes, which are concurrent and interactively dependent throughout the iterative development of a system. In SAE ARP4754A, these processes are stressed as integral processes with traceability between safety requirements and the dependencies between safety assessment activities highlighted as an important concern.