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This document establishes techniques for validating that a mission store complies with the interface requirements contained in MIL-STD-1760 Revision D.

This document specifies the CLARA interfaces of the CLAR Truth Data Generator as shown in Figure 1. The solid bold arrows are defined in Table 1 and Table 2. The dashed arrows from the CLAR Coefficient Generator and Truth Database to the CLAR Data Space Generator indicate a feedback loop and are defined in the CLAR Data Space Generator ICD (Reference 1). The dashed arrow from the Truth Database to the CLAR Coefficient Generator is defined in the CLAR Coefficient Generator ICD (Reference 2). The objective for the CLAR Truth Data Generator is to produce impact data sets to be used in the CLAR Coefficient Generator first to score and form LAR boundaries, and then to generate coefficients. A model of the weapon system that predicts weapon delivery performance to a predefined accuracy is to be used for this purpose. The model can be the Six-Degree-Of-Freedom (6DOF) equations of motion or another mathematical representation that meets the objective for the weapon system LAR.

This document specifies the CLARA interfaces of the CLAR Truth Data Generator as shown in Figure 1. The solid bold arrows are defined in Table 1 and Table 2. The dashed arrows from the CLAR Coefficient Generator and Truth Database to the CLAR Data Space Generator indicate a feedback loop and are defined in the CLAR Data Space Generator ICD (Reference 1). The dashed arrow from the Truth Database to the CLAR Coefficient Generator is defined in the CLAR Coefficient Generator ICD (Reference 2). The objective for the CLAR Truth Data Generator is to produce impact data sets to be used in the CLAR Coefficient Generator first to score and form LAR boundaries, and then to generate coefficients. A model of the weapon system that predicts weapon delivery performance to a predefined accuracy is to be used for this purpose. The model can be the Six-Degree-Of-Freedom (6DOF) equations of motion or another mathematical representation that meets the objective for the weapon system LAR.

CLARA identifies four functions: Data Space Generator, Truth Data Generator, Coefficient Generator, and Reconstructor. Together these four functions standardize the solution to the LAR problem.

CLARA identifies four functions: Data Space Generator, Truth Data Generator, Coefficient Generator, and Reconstructor. Together these four functions standardize the solution to the LAR problem.

The technical architecture defined in this document outlines mandatory, emerging, and needed standards to provide interoperability at key interfaces in the aircraft/store system (including an associated NATO Network Enabled Capability environment), as required to support a future plug-and-play aircraft/store integration capability. These standards relate to services and protocols associated with the subject interfaces. Modeling standards to facilitate the Model Driven Architecture® (MDA®) approach to system definition and implementation are also included. Note that the status of referenced standards as reflected in this document is as of August 2007, and document users should check to see if there has been a subsequent change of status relative to applicable standards.

The technical architecture defined in this document outlines mandatory, emerging, and needed standards to provide interoperability at key interfaces in the aircraft/store system (including an associated NATO Network Enabled Capability environment), as required to support a future plug-and-play aircraft/store integration capability. These standards relate to services and protocols associated with the subject interfaces. Modeling standards to facilitate the Model Driven Architecture® (MDA®) approach to system definition and implementation are also included. Note that the status of referenced standards as reflected in this document is as of August 2007, and document users should check to see if there has been a subsequent change of status relative to applicable standards.

This SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) will examine network aspects of open and shorted stubs, line reflections and bus loading due to network changes. Single network level is assumed, that is, no carriage store hierarchical levels. However, two passive network coupling variants called "branched bus" and "branched stub" will be introduced that possibly could be used in a stores management network. This report assumes familiarity with MIL-STD-1553B.

This SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) will examine network aspects of open and shorted stubs, line reflections and bus loading due to network changes. Single network level is assumed, that is, no carriage store hierarchical levels. However, two passive network coupling variants called "branched bus" and "branched stub" will be introduced that possibly could be used in a stores management network. This report assumes familiarity with MIL-STD-1553B.

This SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) will examine network aspects of open and shorted stubs, line reflections and bus loading due to network changes. Single network level is assumed, that is, no carriage store hierarchical levels. However, two passive network coupling variants called "branched bus" and "branched stub" will be introduced that possibly could be used in a stores management network. This report assumes familiarity with MIL-STD-1553B.

The information presented in this AIR is intended to provide designers of armed unmanned systems with guidelines that may be applied to ensure safe integration and operation of weapons on unmanned platforms. The guidelines have been developed from experiences gained in the design and operation of weapons on manned aircraft that have been accepted by relevant safety authorities in the USA and Europe and proven effective over many years. Whilst the guidelines have been developed from experience with aircraft operations, the concepts are considered equally applicable to non-aircraft systems, such as those used on the surface or undersea environments. This document does not attempt to define or describe a comprehensive safety program for unmanned systems. System Safety is a system characteristic and a non-functional requirement. It has to be addressed at each level of system design, system integration and during each phase of system operation.

The information presented in this AIR is intended to provide designers of armed unmanned systems with guidelines that may be applied to ensure safe integration and operation of weapons on unmanned platforms. The guidelines have been developed from experiences gained in the design and operation of weapons on manned aircraft that have been accepted by relevant safety authorities in the USA and Europe and proven effective over many years. Whilst the guidelines have been developed from experience with aircraft operations, the concepts are considered equally applicable to non-aircraft systems, such as those used on the surface or undersea environments. This document does not attempt to define or describe a comprehensive safety program for unmanned systems. System Safety is a system characteristic and a non-functional requirement. It has to be addressed at each level of system design, system integration and during each phase of system operation.

CLARA identifies four functions: Data Space Generator, Truth Data Generator, Coefficient Generator, and Reconstructor. Together these four functions standardize the solution to the LAR problem. This ICD defines the logical interfaces of the four functions.

This interface standard applies to fuzes used in airborne weapons that use a 3-in fuze well. It defines: Physical envelope of the fuze well at the interface with the fuze. Load bearing surfaces of the fuze well. Physical envelope of the fuze and its connector. Mechanical features (e.g., clocking feature). Connector type, size, location and orientation. Retaining ring and its mechanical features (e.g., thread, tool interface). Physical envelope of the retaining ring at the interface with the fuze. Physical space available for installation tools. Torque that the installation tool shall be capable of providing. This standard does not address: Materials used or their properties. Protective finish. Physical environment of the weapon. Explosive interface or features (e.g., insensitive munitions (IM) mitigation). Charging tube. Torque on the retaining ring or loads on the load bearing surfaces.

This interface standard applies to fuzes used in airborne weapons that use a 3-in fuze well. It defines: Physical envelope of the fuze well at the interface with the fuze. Load bearing surfaces of the fuze well. Physical envelope of the fuze and its connector. Mechanical features (e.g., clocking feature). Connector type, size, location and orientation. Retaining ring and its mechanical features (e.g., thread, tool interface). Physical envelope of the retaining ring at the interface with the fuze. Physical space available for installation tools. Torque that the installation tool shall be capable of providing. This standard does not address: Materials used or their properties. Protective finish. Physical environment of the weapon. Explosive interface or features (e.g., insensitive munitions (IM) mitigation). Charging tube. Torque on the retaining ring or loads on the load bearing surfaces.

This interface standard applies to fuzes used in airborne weapons that use a 3-Inch Fuze Well. It defines: a Physical envelope of the fuze well at the interface with the fuze. b Load bearing surfaces of the fuze well. c Physical envelope of the fuze and its connector. d Mechanical features (e.g. clocking feature). e Connector type, size, location and orientation. f Retaining ring and its mechanical features (e.g. thread, tool interface). g Physical envelope of the retaining ring at the interface with the fuze. h Physical space available for installation tools. i Torque that the installation tool shall be capable of providing. This standard does not address: j Materials used or their properties. k Protective finish. l Physical environment of the weapon. m Explosive interface or features (e.g. insensitive munitions (IM) mitigation). n Charging tube. o Torque on the retaining ring or loads on the load bearing surfaces.

This standard only defines interconnect, electrical and logical (functional) requirements for the interface between a Micro Munition and the Host. The physical and mechanical interface between the Micro Munition and Host is undefined. Individual programs will define the relevant requirements for physical and mechanical interfaces in the Interface Control Document (ICD) or system specifications. It is acknowledged that this does not guarantee full interoperability of Interface for Micro Munitions (IMM) interfaces until further standardization is achieved.

This Common Interface Control Plan (CICP) establishes the methodology for developing, controlling, and managing the technical interfaces between and within systems. An interface defines the interaction at a defined point between entities to achieve a combined system capability. A common interface defines the shared interaction between multiple systems on either side of the interface. The document is not intended to directly control any other aspects of program management, such as matters of contractual, financial, or those of an intellectual property rights nature. Members in the interface control process include: procurement authorities, design authorities, and other related agencies as defined in the specific System Interface Control Plan (SICP). For the purposes of this plan, only the terms Procuring Organization and Producing Organization will be used.

This Common Interface Control Plan (CICP) establishes the methodology for developing, controlling and managing the technical interfaces between and within systems. The document is not intended to directly control any other aspects of program management, such as matters of contractual, financial or those of an intellectual property rights nature. Members in the interface control process include: procurement authorities, design authorities and other related agencies as defined in the specific System Interface Control Plan (SICP). For the purposes of this plan only the terms Procuring Organization and Producing Organization will be used.