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The accuracy of the Restraint Control Module (RCM) Event Data Recorder (EDR) was tested on a 2010 Ford Flex during both straight line steady state and maximum ABS braking. Six runs were made starting from 48 kph (30 mph), six runs starting from 80 kph (50 mph), and six runs starting from 113 kph (70 mph). Nondeployment events were artificially induced after a period of steady state driving followed by maximum braking for the last 2.5 seconds prior to creating the event, intended to simulate braking just prior to a crash. Following each run data was collected from the RCM EDR using the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval system. A Racelogic VBOX SL3 20 Hz differential GPS speed data recorder also served as a data acquisition system for vehicle CAN bus speed, accelerator position, RPM, and brake tape switch data. Graphs of RCM speed/brake/accel pedal data versus VBOX speed and other data over time are presented.

Autonomous truck and trailer configurations face challenges when operating in reverse due to the lack of sensing on the trailer. It is anticipated that sensor packages will be installed on existing trailers to extend autonomous operations while operating in reverse in uncontrolled environments, like a customer's loading dock. Power Line Communication (PLC) between the trailer and the tractor cannot support high bandwidth and low latency communication. This paper explores the impact of using Ethernet or a wireless medium for commercial trailer-tractor communication on the lifecycle and operation of trailer electronic control units (ECUs) from a Systems Engineering perspective to address system requirements, integration, and security. Additionally, content-based and host-based networking approaches for in-vehicle communication, such as Named Data Networking (NDN) and IP-based networking are compared.

First responders and traffic crash investigators collect and secure evidence necessary to determine the cause of a crash. As vehicles with advanced autonomous features become more common on the road, inevitably they will be involved in such incidents. Thus, traditional data collection requirements may need to be augmented to accommodate autonomous technology and the connectivity associated with autonomous and semi-autonomous driving features. The objective of this paper is to understand the data from a fielded autonomous system and to motivate the development of requirements for autonomous vehicle data collection. The issue of data ownership and access will be discussed. Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

Crashes involving Cummins powered heavy vehicles can damage the electronic control module (ECM) containing heavy vehicle event data recorder (HVEDR) records. When ECMs are broken and data cannot be extracted using vehicle diagnostics tools, more invasive and low-level techniques are needed to forensically preserve and decode HVEDR data. A technique for extracting non-volatile memory contents using non-destructive board level techniques through the available in-circuit debugging port is presented. Additional chip level data extraction techniques can also provide access to the HVEDR data. Once the data is obtained and preserved in a forensically sound manner, the binary record is decoded to reveal typical HVDER data like engine speed, vehicle speed, accelerator pedal position, and other status data. The memory contents from the ECM can be written to a surrogate and decoded with traditional maintenance and diagnostic software.

Practical encryption is an important tool in improving the cybersecurity posture of vehicle data loggers and engineering tools. However, low-cost embedded systems struggle with reliably capturing and encrypting all frames on the vehicle networks. In this paper, implementations of symmetric and asymmetric algorithms were used to perform envelope encryption of session keys with symmetric encryption algorithms while logging vehicle controller area network (CAN) traffic. Maintaining determinism and minimizing latency are primary considerations when implementing cryptographic solutions in an embedded system. To satisfy the timing requirements for vehicle systems, the memory-mapped Cryptographic Acceleration Unit (mmCAU) on the NXP K66 processor enabled 6.4Mb/sec symmetric encryption rates, which enables logging of multiple channels at 100% bus load. Using AES-128 in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode provides the encryption for data confidentiality.

Concepts of forensic soundness as they are currently understood in the field of digital forensics are related to the digital data on heavy vehicle electronic control modules (ECMs). An assessment for forensic soundness addresses: 1) the integrity of the data, 2) the meaning of the data, 3) the processes for detecting or predicting errors, 4) transparency of the operation, and 5) the expertise of the practitioners. The integrity of the data can be verified using cryptographic hash functions. Interpreting and understanding the meaning of the data is based on standards or manufacturer software. Comparison of interpreted ECM data to external reference measurements is reviewed from the current literature. Meaning is also extracted from interpreting hexadecimal data based on the J1939 and J1587 standards. Error detection and mitigation strategies are discussed in the form of sensor simulators to eliminate artificial fault codes.

Cyber assurance of heavy trucks is a major concern with new designs as well as with supporting legacy systems. Many cyber security experts and analysts are used to working with traditional information technology (IT) networks and are familiar with a set of technologies that may not be directly useful in the commercial vehicle sector. To help connect security researchers to heavy trucks, a remotely accessible testbed has been prototyped for experimentation with security methodologies and techniques to evaluate and improve on existing technologies, as well as developing domain-specific technologies. The testbed relies on embedded Linux-based node controllers that can simulate the sensor inputs to various heavy vehicle electronic control units (ECUs). The node controller also monitors and affects the flow of network information between the ECUs and the vehicle communications backbone.

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic. We show, however, that MitM attacks can be realized without direct tampering of any CAN hardware. Our demonstration leverages how diagnostic applications based on RP1210 are vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle attacks. Test results show SAE J1939 communications, including single frame and multi-framed broadcast and on-request messages, are susceptible to data manipulation attacks where a shim DLL is used as a Machine-In-The-Middle. The demonstration shows these attacks can manipulate data that may mislead vehicle operators into taking the wrong actions.