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In-vehicle communication faces increasing bandwidth demands, which can no longer be met by today's MOST150, FlexRay or CAN networks. In recent years, Fast Ethernet has gained a lot of momentum in the automotive world, because it promises to bridge the bandwidth gap. A first step in this direction is the introduction of Ethernet as an On Board Diagnostic (OBD) interface for production vehicles. The next potential use cases include the use of Ethernet in Driver Assistance Systems and in the infotainment domain. However, for many of these use cases, the Fast Ethernet solution is too slow to move the huge amount of data between the Domain Controllers, ADAS Systems, Safety Computer and Chassis Controller in an adequate way. The result is the urgent need for a network technology beyond the Fast Ethernet solution. The question is: which innovation will provide enough bandwidth for domain controllers, fast flashing routines, video data, MOST-replacement and internal ECU buses?

A main challenge when developing next generation architectures for automated driving ECUs is to guarantee reliable functionality. Today’s fail safe systems will not be able to handle electronic failures due to the missing “mechanical” fallback or the intervening driver. This means, fail operational based on redundancy is an essential part for improving the functional safety, especially in safety-related braking and steering systems. The 2-out-of-2 Diagnostic Fail Safe (2oo2DFS) system is a promising approach to realize redundancy with manageable costs. In this contribution, we evaluate the reliability of this concept for a symmetric and an asymmetric Electronic Power Steering (EPS) ECU. For this, we use a Markov chain model as a typical method for analyzing the reliability and Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) in majority redundancy approaches. As a basis, the failure rates of the used components and the microcontroller are considered.

Advanced safety features and new services in connected cars depend on the security of the underlying vehicle functions. Due to the interconnection with the outside world and as a result of being an embedded system a modern vehicle is exposed to both, malicious activities as faced by traditional IT world systems as well as physical attacks. This introduces the need for utilizing hardware-assisted security measures to prevent both kinds of attacks. In this paper we present a survey of the different classes of hardware security devices and depict their different functional range and application. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by conducting a case study on an exemplary implementation of a function-on-demand use case. In particular, our example outlines how to apply the different hardware security approaches in practice to address real-world security topics. We conclude with an assessment of today’s hardware security devices.

The infrastructure in modern cars is a heterogeneous and historically grown network of different field buses coupling different electronic control units (ECUs) from different sources. In the past years, the amount of ECUs in the network has rapidly grown due to the mushrooming of new functions which historically were mostly implemented on a one-ECU-per-function basis resulting in up to a hundred ECUs in fully equipped luxury cars. Additionally, new functions like parking assist systems or advanced chassis control functions are getting increasingly complex and require more computing power. These two facts add up to a complex challenge in development. The current trend to host several functions in single ECUs as integration platforms is one attempt to address this challenge. This trend is supported by the increased computing power of current and upcoming multi-core microcontrollers.

Introduction The introduction of Ethernet and Gigabit Ethernet [2] as the main invehicle network infrastructure is the technical foundation for different new functionalities such as piloted driving, minimizing the CO2- footprint and others. The high data rate of such systems influences also the used microcontrollers due the fact that a big amount of data has to be transferred, encrypted, etc. Figure 1 Motivation - Vehicles will become connected to uncontrolled networks The usage of Ethernet as the in-vehicle-network enables the possibility that future road vehicles are going to be connected with other vehicles and information systems to improve system functionality. These previously closed automotive systems will be opened up for external access (see Figure 1). This can be Car2X connectivity or connection to personal devices. Allowing vehicle systems to communicate with other systems that are not within their physical boundaries impose a previously non-existing security problem.

In recent years, we see more and more ECUs integrating a huge number of application software components. This process mostly results from the increasing amount of so called in-house software in various fields like electric-drive, chassis and driver assistance systems. The software development for these systems is partially moved from the supplier to the car manufacturers. Another important trend is the introduction of new network architectures intending to meet the growing communication requirements. For such ECUs the software integration scenarios become more complicated, as more quality of service requirements with regards to timing, safety and security need to be considered [2]. Multi-core microcontrollers offer even more potential variants for integration scenarios. Understanding the interaction between the different software components, not only from a functional, but also from a timing view, is a key success factor for modern electronic systems [6,7,8,9].

The current automotive electronic and electrical (EE) architecture has reached a scalability limit and in order to adapt to the new and upcoming requirements, novel automotive EE architectures are currently being investigated to support: a) an Ethernet backbone, b) consolidation of hardware capabilities leading to a centralized architecture from an existing distributed architecture, c) optimization of wiring to reduce cost, and d) adaptation of service-oriented software architectures. These requirements lead to the development of Zonal EE architectures as a possible solution that require appropriate adaptation of used security mechanisms and the corresponding utilized hardware trust anchors. 1 The current architecture approaches (ECU internal and in-vehicle networking) are being pushed to their limits, simultaneously, the current embedded security solutions also seem to reveal their limitations due to an increase in connectivity.

The trend towards even more sophisticated driver assistance systems and growing automation of driving sets new requirements for the robustness and availability of the involved automotive systems. In case of an error, today it is still sufficient that safety related systems just fail safe or silent to prevent safety related influence of the driving stability resulting in a functional deactivation. But the reliance on passive mechanical fallbacks in which the human driver taking over control, being inevitable in such a scenario, is expected to get more and more insufficient along with a rising degree of driving automation as the driver will be given longer reaction time. The advantage of highly or even fully automated driving is that the driver can focus on other tasks than controlling the car and monitoring it’s behavior and environment.