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Multicore processor are well established in classical and tablet personal computers for some year. Such processors use more then one central core for computation and allow to integrate more computational power with smaller costs. However more than 90% of all processors worldwide are not placed in classical IT but are empedded in bigger systems like in modern vehicles or airplanes. Such systems face a very high demand in terms of safety, security an reliability which hinders the use of multicores in such systems. The funded project ARAMiS faces these demands and has the goal to enable the usability of multicore systems in the domains automotive and avionics, as well as later also railway. ARAMiS is the basis for higher traffic safety, traffic efficiency and comfort.

With the introduction of the ISO26262 automotive safety standard there is a burden of proof to show that the processing elements in embedded microcontroller hardware are capable of supporting a certain diagnostic coverage level, depending on the required Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL). The current mechanisms used to provide actual metrics of the Built-in Self Tests (BIST) and Lock Step comparators use Register Transfer Level (RTL) simulations of the internal processing elements which force faults into individual nodes of the design and collect diagnostic coverage results. Although this mechanism is robust, it can only be performed by semiconductor suppliers and is costly. This paper describes a new solution whereby the microcontroller is synthesized into a large Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) with a test controller on the outside.

The ever increasing use of electronics in modern vehicles has not stopped at comfort systems such as power seats and power windows. Every conventional system that requires operating force will eventually be replaced by a self-powered version. One such item is the electromechanical parking brake of the new Audi A8, offering a host of new features. Despite the many options for new functions, it is nevertheless important to keep the driver in mind. Being engineers, one tends to overlook that not all customers share our excitement for gadgets and overly complicated technical features.

The reference pressures are determined in automotive wind tunnels by measurement of pressures and pressure differences at upstream positions along the wind tunnel nozzle. For closed wall wind tunnels usually the so called nozzle method is used, where the volume flux is calculated from a pressure difference measured at the nozzle contour and a calibration factor determined in the empty test section. For open jet wind tunnels a choice is available between nozzle and plenum method. For the plenum method the reference static pressure is taken from the plenum chamber and the dynamic pressure also refers to the plenum conditions. The static reference pressure in closed wall tunnels is calculated by subtracting the dynamic pressure from the total pressure in the settling chamber. In this paper, the definitions and the differences between the two methods are discussed in detail.

ISO 26262 is the actual standard for Functional Safety of automotive E/E (Electric/Electronic) systems. One of the challenges in the application of the standard is the distribution of safety related activities among the participants in the supply chain. In this paper, the concept of a Safety Element out of Context (SEooC) development will be analyzed showing its current problematic aspects and difficulties in implementing such an approach in a concrete typical automotive development flow with different participants (e.g. from OEM, tier 1 to semiconductor supplier) in the supply chain. The discussed aspects focus on the functional safety requirements of generic hardware and software development across the supply chain where the final integration of the developed element is not known at design time and therefore an assumption based mechanism shall be used.

The increased pressure for power, space, and cost reduction in automotive applications together with the availability of high performance, automotive qualified multicore microcontrollers has lead to the ability to engineer Domain Controller ECUs that can host several separate applications in parallel. The standard automotive constraints however still apply, such as use of AUTOSAR operating system, support for legacy code, hosting OEM supplied code and the ability to determine warranty issues and responsibilities between a group of Tier 1 and Tier 2 vendors who all provide Intellectual Property to the final production ECU. Requirements for safety relevant applications add even more complexity, which in most current approaches demand a reconfiguration of all basic software layers and a major effort to redesign parts of the application code to enable co-existence on the same hardware platform. This paper outlines the conflicting requirements of hosting multiple applications.