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Journal Article

Vehicle Safety Communications - Applications: System Design & Objective Testing Results

2011-04-12
2011-01-0575
The USDOT and the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership-Vehicle Safety Communications 2 (CAMP-VSC2) Consortium (Ford, GM, Honda, Mercedes, and Toyota) initiated, in December 2006, a three-year collaborative effort in the area of wireless-based safety applications under the Vehicle Safety Communications-Applications (VSC-A) Project. The VSC-A Project developed and tested communications-based vehicle safety systems to determine if Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) at 5.9 GHz, in combination with vehicle positioning, would improve upon autonomous vehicle-based safety systems and/or enable new communications-based safety applications.
Journal Article

Vehicle Safety Communications - Applications: Multiple On-Board Equipment Testing

2011-04-12
2011-01-0586
The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) and the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership-Vehicle Safety Communications 2 (CAMP-VSC2) Consortium (Ford, General Motors, Honda, Mercedes-Benz, and Toyota) initiated, in December 2006, a three-year collaborative effort in the area of wireless-based safety applications under the Vehicle Safety Communications-Applications (VSC-A) Project. The VSC-A Project developed and tested Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications-based safety systems to determine if Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) at 5.9 GHz, in combination with vehicle positioning, would improve upon autonomous vehicle-based safety systems and/or enable new communications-based safety applications.
Journal Article

“Verify-on-Demand” - A Practical and Scalable Approach for Broadcast Authentication in Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication

2011-04-12
2011-01-0584
In general for Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication, message authentication is performed on every received wireless message by conducting verification for a valid signature, and only messages that have been successfully verified are processed further. In V2V safety communication, there are a large number of vehicles and each vehicle transmits safety messages frequently; therefore the number of received messages per second would be large. Thus authentication of each and every received message, for example based on the IEEE 1609.2 standard, is computationally very expensive and can only be carried out with expensive dedicated cryptographic hardware. An interesting observation is that most of these routine safety messages do not result in driver warnings or control actions since we expect that the safety system would be designed to provide warnings or control actions only when the threat of collision is high.
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