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Technical Paper

Creating a Lunar EVA Work Envelope

2009-07-12
2009-01-2569
A work envelope has been defined for weightless Extravehicular Activity (EVA) based on the Space Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), but there is no equivalent for planetary operations. The weightless work envelope is essential for planning all EVA tasks because it determines the location of removable parts, making sure they are within reach and visibility of the suited crew member. In addition, using the envelope positions the structural hard points for foot restraints that allow placing both hands on the job and provides a load path for reacting forces. EVA operations are always constrained by time. Tasks are carefully planned to ensure the crew has enough breathing oxygen, cooling water, and battery power. Planning first involves computers using a virtual work envelope to model tasks, next suited crew members in a simulated environment refine the tasks.
Technical Paper

The Lithium Hydroxide Management Plan for Removing Carbon Dioxide from the Space Shuttle while Docked to the International Space Station

2003-07-07
2003-01-2491
The Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH) management plan to control carbon dioxide (CO2) for the Shuttle while docked to the International Space Station (ISS) reduces the mass and volume needed to be launched. For missions before Flight UF-1/STS-108, the Shuttle and ISS each removed their own CO2 during the docked time period. To control the CO2 level, the Shuttle used LiOH canisters and the ISS used the Vozdukh or the Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) with the Vozdukh being the primary ISS device for CO2 removal. Analysis predicted that both the Shuttle and Station atmospheres could be controlled using the Station resources with only the Vozdukh and the CDRA. If the LiOH canisters were not needed for the CO2 control on the Shuttle during the docked periods, then the mass and volume from these LiOH canisters normally launched on the Shuttle could be replaced with other cargo.
Technical Paper

Requirements and Potential for Enhanced EVA Information Interfaces

2003-07-07
2003-01-2413
NASA has long recognized the advantages of providing improved information interfaces to EVA astronauts and has pursued this goal through a number of development programs over the past decade. None of these activities or parallel efforts in industry and academia has so far resulted in the development of an operational system to replace or augment the current extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) Display and Controls Module (DCM) display and cuff checklist. Recent advances in display, communications, and information processing technologies offer exciting new opportunities for EVA information interfaces that can better serve the needs of a variety of NASA missions. Hamilton Sundstrand Space Systems International (HSSSI) has been collaborating with Simon Fraser University and others on the NASA Haughton Mars Project and with researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Boeing, and Symbol Technologies in investigating these possibilities.
Technical Paper

International Space Station Environmental Control and Life Support Emergency Response Verification for Node 1

2008-06-29
2008-01-2136
The International Space Station (ISS) Node 1 Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) System is comprised of five subsystems: Atmosphere Control and Supply (ACS), Atmosphere Revitalization (AR), Fire Detection and Suppression (FDS), Temperature and Humidity Control (THC), and Water Recovery and Management (WRM). This paper provides a summary of the Node 1 Emergency Response capability, which includes nominal and off-nominal FDS operation, off-nominal ACS operation, and off-nominal THC operation. These subsystems provide the capability to help aid the crew members during an emergency cabin depressurization, a toxic spill, or a fire. The paper will also provide a discussion of the detailed Node 1 ECLS Element Verification methodologies for operation of the Node 1 Emergency Response hardware utilized during the Node 1 Element Qualification phase.
Technical Paper

Early Human Testing of Advanced Life Support Systems, Phase I

1995-07-01
951490
The Crew and Thermal Systems Division (CTSD) at NASA's Johnson Space Center under the support of the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications is conducting the Early Human Testing Initiave (EHTI) project with the goal of validating regenerative life support technologies through a series of integrated tests with human subjects. The EHTI project is organized into three distinct phases, each with progressively more complex integration of biological and physicochemical (P/C) life support technologies. The goal of Phase I is to conduct a 15-day one-person test to verify the performance of an air revitalization system based on higher plants with physicochemical systems as complements and backups. The test will be performed in CTSD's Variable Pressure Growth Chamber (VPGC), a tightly closed controlled-environment test chamber configured with approximately 11 m2 of area for plant growth.
Technical Paper

A Helmet Mounted Display Demonstration unit for a Space Station Application

1989-07-01
891583
An advanced development helmet mounted display (HMD) was designed and fabricated under NASA-Johnson Space Center (NASA/JSC) contract, NAS 9-17543, by Hamilton Standard Division of United Technologies, Windsor Locks, CT. The work was initiated in December 1985 and culminated in June 1988 with the delivery of an extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) HMD demonstration unit as an alternative to the current low-resolution, chest-mounted display and cuff-mounted checklists. Important design goals achieved with this HMD include the use of transmissive liquid crystal display (LCD) image sources with fairly high resolution (i.e., text, graphics, and video compatible), binocular viewing with total image overlap, virtual image projection, low profile packaging, low power design, and demonstration of voice control of the HMD data.
Technical Paper

Methodology and Assumptions of Contingency Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS) Calculations Using ISS Environmental and Life Support Systems

2006-07-17
2006-01-2061
The current International Space Station (ISS) Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) system is designed to support an ISS crew size of three people. The capability to expand that system to support nine crew members during a Contingency Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS) scenario has been evaluated. This paper describes how the ISS ECLS systems may be operated for supporting CSCS, and the durations expected for the oxygen supply and carbon dioxide control subsystems.
Technical Paper

Airborne Dust in Space Vehicles and Habitats

2006-07-17
2006-01-2152
Airborne dust, suspended inside a space vehicle or in future celestial habitats, can present a serious threat to crew health if it is not controlled. During some Apollo missions to the moon, lunar dust brought inside the capsule caused eye irritation and breathing difficulty to the crew when they launched from the moon and reacquired “microgravity.” During Shuttle flights reactive and toxic dusts such as lithium hydroxide have created a risk to crew health, and fine particles from combustion events can be especially worrisome. Under nominal spaceflight conditions, airborne dusts and particles tend to be larger than on earth because of the absence of gravity settling. Aboard the ISS, dusts are effectively managed by high efficiency filters, although floating dust in newly-arrived modules can be a nuisance.
Technical Paper

Updating the Tools Used to Estimate Space Radiation Exposures for Operations: Codes, Models, and Interfaces

2002-07-15
2002-01-2457
In order to estimate the exposure to a crew in space, there are three essential steps to be performed: first, the ambient radiation environment at the vehicle must be characterized; second, the mass distribution properties of the vehicle, including the crewmembers themselves must be developed, and third a model of the interactions of space radiations with matter must be employed in order to characterize the radiation field at the dose point of interest. The Space Radiation Analysis Group (SRAG) at the NASA, Johnson Space Center carries the primary responsibility for the operational radiation protection support function associated with manned space flight. In order to provide support during the various planning, execution, and analysis/recording phase activities associated with a given mission, tools have been developed to allow rapid, repeatable calculations of exposure on orbit.
Technical Paper

Anatomical Modeling Considerations for Calculating Organ Exposures in Space

2000-07-10
2000-01-2412
Typical calculations of radiation exposures in space approximate the composition of the human body by a single material, typically Aluminum or water. A further approximation is made with regard to body size by using a single anatomical model to represent people of all sizes. A comparison of calculations of organ dose and dose-equivalent is presented. Calculations are first performed approximating body materials by water equivalent thickness', and then using a more accurate representation of materials present in the body. In each case of material representation, a further comparison is presented of calculations performed modeling people of different sizes.
Technical Paper

Micrometeoroid Penetration Hazards Assessment for the Shuttle EMU

1999-07-12
1999-01-1963
Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) penetration hazards have been a concern for the large number of EVA’s (Extravehicular Activities) expected during the assembly and operation of the International Space Station (ISS). Earlier studies have shown large uncertainties in estimated spacesuit penetration risks. This paper reports the results of recent tests and analyses that have significantly expanded the Shuttle EMU (Extravehicular Mobility Unit) hypervelocity penetration database and clarified our understanding of the associated risks. The results of testing have been used to develop improved estimates of the cumulative risk of penetration during EVA's through the first ten years after the beginning of ISS construction. These analyses have shown that the risks of MMOD penetration during EVA will be somewhat less than the risk of a critical penetration of the ISS itself over the same ten-year period.
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