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A review of existing pilot training in the area of in-flight icing reveals many inadequacies. Much of the icing “knowledge” in the pilot community is partial, false, or of no use in making tactical decisions in flight. Complete and accurate information about the limitations of ice protection systems on individual aircraft is not sufficiently communicated to the piloting community. Regulatory guidance on what in-flight icing conditions are prohibited is sufficiently vague so as to allow intentional operations in hazardous conditions. In the absence of accurate icing information pilots often rely on their perspective of past icing encounters which may not be accurate. Wrongly interpreted experiences can reinforce false assumptions about icing. Truly effective in-flight icing training must be operationally oriented and help the student to assess immediate hazards and select between tactical options.

This paper discusses improved concepts which will be required for training and demonstration of performance with new and evolving automated aircraft systems. Computer-based training devices, as well as procedures trainers, will be used to teach the required skills and procedures. Proper training will be demonstrated by simulator performance, primarily through the use of Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenarios.

The process of decison making is poorly understood in our aviation environment. Accidents may demonstrate instances where incorrect decisions were made but current investigative techniques do not necessarily give a clear understanding of why such decisions were made. The elements of the decision making process need to be better understood so proper attention may be given to pilot training and developing operational procedures. A study of the Aviation Safety Reporting System data base was conducted to gain a better understanding of the actual operational impact of decision making.

The purpose of this paper is to review factors related to extended range operations with twin-engine transport aircraft (ETOPS) from the viewpoint of the pilot. The review relies on the years of experience of pilots from around the world for operational insight and interpretations of historic, current, and forecast events. In particular, technical issues are addressed, present-day operations are critiqued, and recommendations are made. It is hoped that this paper will provide the reader with a real-world look at bookbound rules and regulations, computer-generated statistics about rare events, and advertised equipment reliabilities.

Commercial transport aircraft will, for the foreseeable future, require highly skilled human pilots. This requirement is based on broad legal, fiscal, and physiological precedents mandated in the form of Federal Aviation Regulations. The commercial pilot's goal is, and always has been, the safe operation and completion of the planned flight. The pilot's role is to utilize any or all of the resources available to achieve this goal as effectively and efficiently as possible. To achieve the goal of safe flight, the pilot requires a vast set of tools and resources. Aviation system complexity, operating costs, political and economic pressures, public interest, and pilot capabilities all demand nothing less than optimized system design solutions. Aircraft design must be based on clear, concise principles developed from, and centered upon, the requirements and capabilities of the pilot. Aviation system design must be centered upon the pilot-air traffic controller team.

No adequate method presently exists for commercial flight crews to reliably predict or detect the presence of microburst activity prior to encountering the disturbance itself. While most shears do not exceed the performance capabilities of the aircraft, because of inadequate instrumentation they may exceed the performance capabilities of the crew. An integrated instrument display would enable a pilot to rapidly detect the onset of a shear and provide optimum guidance to fly the airplane to the very limit of its performance envelope thereafter. Such a display must provide information concerning either airspeed or angle of attack as well as altitude above terrain. We believe the availability of such an optimum flightpath display would have prevented many of the catastrophic microburst-induced windshear accidents. Until such information is provided, windshear accidents will continue to occur.

Data from 1999 regarding events involving smoke, fumes, and in-flight fire was analyzed. It suggests that these events are sometimes unreported or under-reported. Many of these events resulted in unscheduled landings. Fire or high temperature events frequently occur in areas of the aircraft that present a high hazard potential and indicates that current designs and procedures do not give the crew the ability to locate the source of the smoke. There is a need for further effort in the areas of incident data collection, improved prevention efforts, and means to quickly detect and isolate the ignition sources involved.