On the other hand, the potential risks associated with CAV deployment related to technical vulnerabilities are safety and cybersecurity issues that may arise from flawed hardware and software. Cybersecurity and Digital Trust Issues in Connected and Automated Vehicles elaborates on these topics as unsettled cybersecurity and digital trust issues in CAVs and follows with recommendations to fill in the gaps in this evolving field. ...Cybersecurity and Digital Trust Issues in Connected and Automated Vehicles elaborates on these topics as unsettled cybersecurity and digital trust issues in CAVs and follows with recommendations to fill in the gaps in this evolving field. ...This report also highlights the importance of establishing robust cybersecurity protocols and fostering digital trust in these vehicles to ensure safe and secure deployment in our modern transportation system.
Android applications have historically faced vulnerabilities to man-in-the-middle attacks due to insecure custom SSL/TLS certificate validation implementations. In response, Google introduced the Network Security Configuration (NSC) as a configuration-based solution to improve the security of certificate validation practices. NSC was initially developed to enhance the security of Android applications by providing developers with a framework to customize network security settings. However, recent studies have shown that it is often not being leveraged appropriately to enhance security. Motivated by the surge in vehicular connectivity and the corresponding impact on user security and data privacy, our research pivots to the domain of mobile applications for vehicles. As vehicles increasingly become repositories of personal data and integral nodes in the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem, ensuring their security moves beyond traditional issues to one of public safety and trust.
It is essential to note that cybersecurity threats not only arise from inherent protocol defects but also consider software implementation vulnerabilities.
While current cybersecurity endeavors in the heavy-duty (HD) vehicle space focus on securing conventional communication technologies such as the controller area network (CAN), there is a notable deficiency in defensive research concerning legacy technologies, particularly those utilized between trucks and trailers. ...To the best of current knowledge, this publication marks the first presentation of cybersecurity defense research on the SAE J1708/J1587 protocol stack.
UNECE R155 explicitly references ISO/SAE 21434 and mandates a certified cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a prerequisite for automotive manufacturers to achieve vehicle type approval and sell new vehicle types. ...However, the gap in the CSMS framework is a lack in a standardized system that provides guidance and common criteria for automakers to measure a vehicle’s level of compliance and compute a publicly accepted cybersecurity rating. To help establish increased consumer confidence, OEMs and smart mobility stakeholders could take additional proactive steps to ensure the safety and security of their products. ...This paper addresses the above requirement and discusses the cybersecurity rating framework (CSRF) that could establish a framework for rating vehicle cybersecurity by standardizing the measurement criteria, parameter vectors, process, and tools.
This paper gives a definition of the SDV concept, provides views from different aspects, discusses the progress in vehicle E/E architecture, especially zone-based architecture with centralized computation, and various technologies including High-Performance Computing (HPC) platform, standardized vehicle software architecture, advanced onboard communication, Over-The-Air (OTA) update, and cybersecurity etc. that collectively enable the realization of SDV.
The article also focus on innovative approaches that have recently adopted my many cybersecurity professionals for secured operation of ITS involving block-chain, artificial intelligence, and Machine Learning.
Advanced Autonomous Vehicles (AV) for SAE Level 3 and Level 4 functions will lead to a new understanding of the operation phase in the overall product lifecycle. Regulations such as the EU Implementing Act and the German L4 Act (AFGBV) request a continuous field surveillance, the handling of critical E/E faults and software updates during operation. This is required to enhance the Operational Design Domain (ODD) during operation, offering Functions on Demand (FoD), by increasing software features within these autonomous vehicle systems over the entire digital product lifecycle, and to avoid and reduce downtime by a malfunction of the Autonomous Driving (AD) software stack.
IOOs and ADS developers agree that cost, communications, interoperability, cybersecurity, operation, maintenance, and other issues undercut efforts to deploy a comprehensive connected infrastructure.
Access control enforces security policies for controlling critical resources. For V2X (Vehicle to Everything) autonomous military vehicle fleets, network middleware systems such as ROS (Robotic Operating System) expose system resources through networked publisher/subscriber and client/server paradigms. Without proper access control, these systems are vulnerable to attacks from compromised network nodes, which may perform data poisoning attacks, flood packets on a network, or attempt to gain lateral control of other resources. Access control for robotic middleware systems has been investigated in both ROS1 and ROS2. Still, these implementations do not have mechanisms for evaluating a policy's consistency and completeness or writing expressive policies for distributed fleets. We explore an RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) mechanism layered onto ROS environments that uses local permission caches with precomputed truth tables for fast policy evaluation.
Automotive system functionalities spread over a wide range of sub-domains ranging from non-driving related components to complex autonomous driving related components. The requirements to design and develop these components span across software, hardware, firmware, etc. elements. The successful development of these components to achieve the needs from the stockholders requires accurate understanding and traceability of the requirements of these component systems. The high-level customer requirements transformation into low level granularity requires an efficient requirement engineer. The manual understanding of the customer requirements from the requirement documents are influenced by the context and the knowledge gap of the requirement engineer in understanding and transforming the requirements.
This exercise confirms the necessity of a more restrictive cybersecurity posture in automotive peripherals with access to critical systems, in particular VDAs, and especially when such peripherals present a wireless interface.
With the increasing connectivity and complexity of modern automobiles, cybersecurity has become one of the most important properties of a vehicle. Various strategies have been proposed to enhance automotive cybersecurity. ...Various strategies have been proposed to enhance automotive cybersecurity. Digital twin (DT), regarded as one of the top 10 strategic technology trends by Gartner in 2018 and 2019, establishes digital representations in a virtual world and raises new ideas to benefit real-life objects. ...In this paper, we explored the possibility of using digital twin technology to improve automotive cybersecurity. We designed two kinds of digital twin models, named mirror DT and autonomous DT, and corresponding environments to support cybersecurity design, development, and maintenance in an auto’s lifecycle, as well as technique training.
But unfortunately, automotive cybersecurity researchers hardly produce a comprehensive detection method due to the confidential nature of Controller Area Network (CAN) DBC format files, which is a standard long maintained by car manufacturers.
The new generation vehicles these days are managed by networked controllers. A large portion of the networks is planned with more security which has recently roused researchers to exhibit various attacks against the system. This paper talks about the liabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN) inside In-vehicle communication protocol and a few potentials that could take due advantage of it. Moreover, this paper presents a few security measures proposed in the present examination status to defeat the attacks. In any case, the fundamental objective of this paper is to feature a comprehensive methodology known as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which has been a significant device in getting network data in systems over many years. To the best of our insight, there is no recorded writing on a through outline of IDS execution explicitly in the CAN transport network system.
Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.
The separation of cybersecurity considerations in RMTO is barely considered, as so far, most available research and activities are mainly focused on AV. ...The main focus of this paper is addressing RMTO cybersecurity utilising an adaptable security-by-design approach, although security-by-design is still in the infant state within automotive cybersecurity. ...The main focus of this paper is addressing RMTO cybersecurity utilising an adaptable security-by-design approach, although security-by-design is still in the infant state within automotive cybersecurity. An adaptable security-by-design approach for RMTO covers Security Engineering Life-cycle, Logical Security Layered Concept, and Security Architecture.