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A framework is defined that includes requirements for cybersecurity processes and a common language for communicating and managing cybersecurity risk. ...This document specifies engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding concept, product development, production, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of electrical and electronic (E/E) systems in road vehicles, including their components and interfaces. ...This document does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity.

A framework is defined that includes requirements for cybersecurity processes and a common language for communicating and managing cybersecurity risk. ...This document specifies requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding engineering for concept, development, production, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning for road vehicle electrical and electronic (E/E) systems, including their components and interfaces. ...This document does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity.

This document will define architecture, design, and implementation requirements for vehicle key management security. This would of course include KMS interfaces, but would also include the ecosystem constraints, e.g., recommendations for hardening the OEM and Tier-1 backend systems (using role-based separation modeled on Uptane) to avoid single points of failure in key generation and key storage systems.

The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

This document will provide recommendations to vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers in securing the SAE J1939-13 connector interface from the cybersecurity risks posed by the existence of this connector.

This document will provide recommendations to vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers in securing the SAE J1939 network from the cybersecurity risks. It is recognized that not every application of SAE J1939 networks requires the same level of cyber security measures.

The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

The purpose of this document is to facilitate an understanding of aircraft information security and to develop aircraft information security operational concepts. This common understanding is important since a number of subcommittees and working groups within the aeronautical industry are considering aircraft information security. This document also provides an aircraft information security process framework relating to airline operational needs that, when implemented by an airline and its suppliers, will enable the safe and secure dispatch of the aircraft in a timely manner. This framework facilitates development of cost-effective aircraft information security and provides a common language for understanding security needs.

This SAE Recommended Practice establishes a uniform practice for protecting vehicle components from "unauthorized" access through a vehicle data link connector (DLC). The document defines a security system for motor vehicle and tool manufacturers. It will provide flexibility to tailor systems to the security needs of the vehicle manufacturer. The vehicle modules addressed are those that are capable of having solid state memory contents accessed or altered through the data link connector. Improper memory content alteration could potentially damage the electronics or other vehicle modules; risk the vehicle compliance to government legislated requirements; or risk the vehicle manufacturer's security interests. This document does not imply that other security measures are not required nor possible.

This brief User Guide recaps the content of the AS6518B UCS Architectural Model. The purpose of the UCS Architecture Model is to provide the authoritative source for other models and products within the UCS Architecture as shown in the AS6512B UCS Architecture: Architecture Description.

This Recommended Practice defines the technical requirements for a terrestrial-based PNT system to improve vehicle (e.g., unmanned, aerial, ground, maritime) positioning/navigation solutions and ensure critical infrastructure security, complementing GNSS technologies.

This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) provides insights on how to perform a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to determine the Return on Investment (ROI) that would result from implementing a blockchain solution to a new or an existing business process. The word “blockchain” refers to a method of documenting when data transactions occur using a distributed ledger with desired immutable qualities. The scope of the current document is on enterprise blockchain which gives the benefit of standardized cryptography, legal enforceability and regulatory compliance. The document analyzes the complexity involved with this technology, lists some of the different approaches that can be used for conducting a CBA, and differentiates its analysis depending on whether the application uses a public or a private distributed network.

This SAE Information Report J2931/7 establishes the security requirements for digital communication between Plug-In Electric Vehicles (PEV), the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) and the utility, ESI, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and/or Home Area Network (HAN).

This document describes a set of recommended actions to take to increase the likelihood of safe vehicle operation when a device (external test equipment, data collection device, etc.) whose normal operation has been compromised by a source external to the vehicle is connected to the vehicle’s diagnostic system. The term “diagnostic system” is intended to be a generic way to reference all the different ways that diagnostic commands might be injected into the system. The guidance in this document is intended to improve security without significantly impacting the ability for franchised dealer or independent aftermarket external test tools to perform legitimate diagnosis and maintenance functions. The goal is that intrusive services are only allowed to be performed when the vehicle is in a Safe State such that even if the intrusive service were to be initiated with adversarial intent the consequences of such a service would still be acceptable.

This SAE Information Report J2836 establishes the instructions for the documents required for the variety of potential functions for PEV communications, energy transfer options, interoperability and security. This includes the history, current status and future plans for migrating through these documents created in the Hybrid Communication and Interoperability Task Force, based on functional objective (e.g., (1) if I want to do V2G with an off-board inverter, what documents and items within them do I need, (2) What do we intend for V3 of SAE J2953, …).

This interface document SAE J2286 revises the requirements for file formats as were originally described in SAE J1924. This document describes Interface 1 (I/F 1) in SAE J2461. This document does not imply the use of a specific hardware interface, but may be used with other hardware interfaces such as SAE J1939, ISO 15765 or ISO 14229. The requirements of SAE J2286 supersede the requirements defined by SAE J1924.

This interface document SAE J2286 revises the requirements for file formats as described in SAE J1924. This document describes Interface 1 (I/F 1) in SAE J2214. This document does not imply the use of a specific hardware interface, but may be used with other hardware interfaces such as SAE J1939. The requirements of SAE J2286 supersede the requirements defined by SAE J1924.

This SAE Recommended Practice defines the Expanded Diagnostic Protocol (EDP), the requirements for the SAE J1978 OBD II Scan Tool for supporting the EDP protocol, and associated requirements for diagnosis and service information to be provided by motor vehicle manufacturers. Appendix A includes worked examples of the use of the protocol.