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The scope of the document is to define the cyber-security best practices to reduce interference with normal vehicle operation, or to minimize risk as to unauthorized access of the vehicle's control, diagnostic, or data storage system; access by equipment (i.e., permanently or semi-permanently installed diagnostic communication device, also known as dongle, etc.) which is either permanently or semi-permanently connected to the vehicle's OBD diagnostic connector, either SAE J1939-13, SAE J1962, or other future protocol; or hardwired directly to the in-vehicle network.

This document provides background and detailed technical information on existing methods to secure loadable software parts.

This document describes a set of recommended actions to take to increase the likelihood of safe vehicle operation when a device (external test equipment, data collection device, etc.) whose normal operation has been compromised by a source external to the vehicle is connected to the vehicle’s diagnostic system. The term “diagnostic system” is intended to be a generic way to reference all the different ways that diagnostic commands might be injected into the system. The guidance in this document is intended to improve security without significantly impacting the ability for franchised dealer or independent aftermarket external test tools to perform legitimate diagnosis and maintenance functions. The goal is that intrusive services are only allowed to be performed when the vehicle is in a Safe State such that even if the intrusive service were to be initiated with adversarial intent the consequences of such a service would still be acceptable.

This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, relays, disk drives, LCD matrices, VME circuit cards, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, traceability, reliability, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively). An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly.

This SAE Recommended Practice defines the Expanded Diagnostic Protocol (EDP), the requirements for the SAE J1978 OBD II Scan Tool for supporting the EDP protocol, and associated requirements for diagnosis and service information to be provided by motor vehicle manufacturers. Appendix A includes worked examples of the use of the protocol.

This SAE Recommended Practice defines the Expanded Diagnostic Protocol (EDP), the requirements for the SAE J1978 OBD II Scan Tool for supporting the EDP protocol, and associated requirements for diagnosis and service information to be provided by motor vehicle manufacturers. Appendix A includes worked examples of the use of the protocol.

This SAE Recommended Practice establishes a uniform practice for protecting vehicle components from "unauthorized" access through a vehicle data link connector (DLC). The document defines a security system for motor vehicle and tool manufacturers. It will provide flexibility to tailor systems to the security needs of the vehicle manufacturer. The vehicle modules addressed are those that are capable of having solid state memory contents accessed or altered through the data link connector. Improper memory content alteration could potentially damage the electronics or other vehicle modules; risk the vehicle compliance to government legislated requirements; or risk the vehicle manufacturer's security interests. This document does not imply that other security measures are not required nor possible.

Development of a new Industry Standard related to GIDEP Reporting.

This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing electronic components in equipment for the military and commercial aerospace markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. Examples of electronic components, as described in this document, include resistors, capacitors, diodes, integrated circuits, hybrids, application specific integrated circuits, wound components, and relays. It is critical for the Plan owner to review and understand the design, materials, configuration control, and qualification methods of all “as-received” electronic components, and their capabilities with respect to the application; identify risks, and where necessary, take additional action to mitigate the risks. The technical requirements are in Clause 3 of this standard, and the administrative requirements are in Clause 4.

This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document.

This SAE Aerospace Information Report will be a compilation of system safety engineering and management terms and definitions covering concepts used across multiple products and disciplines

Provides standard guidance on major tasks and activities and how to implement and manage Functional Safety and software system safety aspects of Model Based System Engineering (MBSE). Process focus is on safety-critical functions (SCF) of complex software intensive systems being modeled and depicted graphically as part of MBSE and software engineering to ensure safety engineering aspects are tracked and captured as part of models to enhance safety documentation and produce objective safety evidence.

The federal government and industry have moved to concurrent acquisition and development processes using integrated process teams (IPTs). These processes are supported by timely, accurate, cross functional access to data within an integrated data environment (IDE) enabled by advances in information technology (IT). Since the advent of acquisition reform in 1994, Data Management (DM) practices have evolved from being directed by a prescriptive set of standards and procedures to use of the guidance in a principles-based standard -- ANSI/EIA 859.

GEIA Handbook 859 provides implementation guidance for ANSI/EIA 859, with discussions of applications of the standard's principles, tools, examples, and case studies. Handbook 859 is organized according to the lifecycle of data management and covers activities from the pre-RFP stage through records disposition.

This document describes a process for use by ADHP integrators of EEE parts and sub-assemblies (items) that have been targeted for other applications. This document does not describe specific tests to be conducted, sample sizes to be used, nor results to be obtained; instead, it describes a process to define and accomplish application-specific qualification; that provides confidence to both the ADHP integrators, and the integrators’ customers, that the item will performs its function(s) reliably in the ADHP application.

This document will address measures pertaining to and directly associated with the maintainability and reliability of FSTDs throughout their entire life cycle, from initial specification and design to de-commissioning. Although the primary emphasis of this document is on full flight simulators (with motion and visual systems), it should be applicable in part or total to all FSTDs.

This document outlines a standard practice for conducting system safety. In some cases, these principles may be captured in other standards that apply to specific commodities such as commercial aircraft and automobiles. For example, those manufacturers that produce commercial aircraft should use SAE ARP4754 or SAE ARP4761 (see Section 2 below) to meet FAA or other regulatory agency system safety-related requirements. The system safety practice as defined herein provides a consistent means of evaluating identified risks. Mishap risk should be identified, evaluated, and mitigated to a level as low as reasonably practicable. The mishap risk should be accepted by the appropriate authority and comply with federal (and state, where applicable) laws and regulations, executive orders, treaties, and agreements. Program trade studies associated with mitigating mishap risk should consider total life cycle cost in any decision.