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Embedded controllers and digital signal processors are increasingly being used in automotive safety critical control systems. Controller integrity is a significant concern in these systems. Over the past decade, several techniques have been published about controller safety and integrity verification. These techniques include: single processor with watchdog, dual processors, dual core processor, and asymmetric processor (intelligent watchdog). Each of these techniques have benefits, however, many new non-distributed safety-critical systems are applying the asymmetric processor technique to help verify controller integrity. This paper discusses an overview of five controller integrity techniques, and then provides a detailed discussion of an asymmetric processor approach. This paper presents two different options within the asymmetric processor approach.

In this paper, we review existing software safety standards, guidelines, and other software safety documents. Common software safety elements from these documents are identified. We then describe an adaptable software safety process for automotive safety-critical systems based on these common elements. The process specifies high-level requirements and recommended methods for satisfying the requirements. In addition, we describe how the proposed process may be integrated into a proposed system safety process, and how it may be integrated with an existing software development process.

Steer-by-wire and other “by-wire” systems (as defined in the paper) offer many passive and active safety advantages. To help ensure these advantages are achieved, a comprehensive system-safety process should be followed. In this paper, we review standard elements of system safety processes that are widely applied in several industries and describe the main elements of our proposed analysis process for by-wire systems. The process steps include: (i) creating a program plan to act as a blueprint for the process, (ii) performing a variety of hazard analysis and risk assessment tasks as specified in the program plan, (iii) designing and verifying a set of hazard controls that help mitigate risk, and (iv) summarizing the findings. Vehicle manufacturers and suppliers need to work together to create and follow such a process. A distinguishing feature of the process is the explicit linking of hazard controls to the hazards they cover, permitting coverage-based risk assessment.