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Automotive researchers and industry experts have extensively documented vulnerabilities arising from unauthorized in-vehicle communication through academic research, industry investigations, sponsored events, and learnings from real-world attacks. While current cybersecurity endeavors in the heavy-duty (HD) vehicle space focus on securing conventional communication technologies such as the controller area network (CAN), there is a notable deficiency in defensive research concerning legacy technologies, particularly those utilized between trucks and trailers. In fact, state-of-the-art attacks on these systems have only come to public attention through official disclosures and public presentations as recently as 2020. To address these risks, this paper introduces a system-wide security concept called Legacy Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) for heavy-duty vehicle applications utilizing the SAE J1708/J1587 protocol stack.

2013 and 2014 Ford Flex vehicles and airbag control modules with event data recorders (EDRs) were tested to determine the accuracy of speed and other data in the steady state condition, to evaluate time reporting delays under dynamic braking conditions, and to evaluate the accuracy of the stability control system data that the module records. This recorder is from the Autoliv RC6 family and this is the first known external research conducted on post 49CFR Part 563 Ford EDRs. The vehicle was instrumented with a VBox and a CAN data logger to compare external GPS based speeds to CAN data using the same synchronized time base. The vehicle was driven in steady state, hard braking, figure 8 and yaw conditions. The Airbag Control Module (ACM) was mounted onto a moving linear sled. The CAN bus data from driving was replayed as the sled created recordable events and the EDR data was compared to the reference instrumentation.