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Crashes involving Cummins powered heavy vehicles can damage the electronic control module (ECM) containing heavy vehicle event data recorder (HVEDR) records. When ECMs are broken and data cannot be extracted using vehicle diagnostics tools, more invasive and low-level techniques are needed to forensically preserve and decode HVEDR data. A technique for extracting non-volatile memory contents using non-destructive board level techniques through the available in-circuit debugging port is presented. Additional chip level data extraction techniques can also provide access to the HVEDR data. Once the data is obtained and preserved in a forensically sound manner, the binary record is decoded to reveal typical HVDER data like engine speed, vehicle speed, accelerator pedal position, and other status data. The memory contents from the ECM can be written to a surrogate and decoded with traditional maintenance and diagnostic software.

Practical encryption is an important tool in improving the cybersecurity posture of vehicle data loggers and engineering tools. However, low-cost embedded systems struggle with reliably capturing and encrypting all frames on the vehicle networks. In this paper, implementations of symmetric and asymmetric algorithms were used to perform envelope encryption of session keys with symmetric encryption algorithms while logging vehicle controller area network (CAN) traffic. Maintaining determinism and minimizing latency are primary considerations when implementing cryptographic solutions in an embedded system. To satisfy the timing requirements for vehicle systems, the memory-mapped Cryptographic Acceleration Unit (mmCAU) on the NXP K66 processor enabled 6.4Mb/sec symmetric encryption rates, which enables logging of multiple channels at 100% bus load. Using AES-128 in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode provides the encryption for data confidentiality.

Concepts of forensic soundness as they are currently understood in the field of digital forensics are related to the digital data on heavy vehicle electronic control modules (ECMs). An assessment for forensic soundness addresses: 1) the integrity of the data, 2) the meaning of the data, 3) the processes for detecting or predicting errors, 4) transparency of the operation, and 5) the expertise of the practitioners. The integrity of the data can be verified using cryptographic hash functions. Interpreting and understanding the meaning of the data is based on standards or manufacturer software. Comparison of interpreted ECM data to external reference measurements is reviewed from the current literature. Meaning is also extracted from interpreting hexadecimal data based on the J1939 and J1587 standards. Error detection and mitigation strategies are discussed in the form of sensor simulators to eliminate artificial fault codes.

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic. We show, however, that MitM attacks can be realized without direct tampering of any CAN hardware. Our demonstration leverages how diagnostic applications based on RP1210 are vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle attacks. Test results show SAE J1939 communications, including single frame and multi-framed broadcast and on-request messages, are susceptible to data manipulation attacks where a shim DLL is used as a Machine-In-The-Middle. The demonstration shows these attacks can manipulate data that may mislead vehicle operators into taking the wrong actions.