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This document describes guidelines, methods and tools used to perform the ongoing safety assessment process for transport airplanes in commercial service (hereafter, airplane). The process described herein is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is associated with showing compliance with the regulations, and also with assuring a company that it meets its own internal standards. The methods outlined herein identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess ongoing safety. This document does not address the economic decision-making associated with the safety management process. While this decision-making is an integral part of the safety management process, this document addresses only the ongoing safety assessment process. To put it succinctly, this document addresses the “Is it safe?” part of safety management. It does not address the “How much does it cost?” part of the safety management.

This AIR provides a detailed example of the aircraft and systems development for a function of a hypothetical S18 aircraft. In order to present a clear picture, an aircraft function was broken down into a single system. A function was chosen which had sufficient complexity to allow use of all the methodologies, yet was simple enough to present a clear picture of the flow through the process. This function/system was analyzed using the methods and tools described in ARP4754A/ED-79A. The aircraft level function is “Decelerate Aircraft On Ground” and the system is the braking system. The interaction of the braking system functions with the aircraft are identified with the relative importance based on implied aircraft interactions and system availabilities at the aircraft level. This example does not include validation and verification of the aircraft level hazards and interactions with the braking system.

This AIR provides a detailed example of the aircraft and systems development for a function of a hypothetical S18 aircraft. In order to present a clear picture, an aircraft function was broken down into a single system. A function was chosen which had sufficient complexity to allow use of all the methodologies, yet was simple enough to present a clear picture of the flow through the process. This function/system was analyzed using the methods and tools described in ARP4754A/ED-79A. The aircraft level function is “Decelerate Aircraft On Ground” and the system is the braking system. The interaction of the braking system functions with the aircraft are identified with the relative importance based on implied aircraft interactions and system availabilities at the aircraft level. This example does not include validation and verification of the aircraft level hazards and interactions with the braking system.

This document discusses the development of aircraft systems taking into account the overall aircraft operating environment and functions. This includes validation of requirements and verification of the design implementation for certification and product assurance. It provides practices for showing compliance with the regulations and serves to assist a company in developing and meeting its own internal standards by considering the guidelines herein. The guidelines in this document were developed in the context of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14CFR) Part 25 and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specification (CS) CS-25. It may be applicable to other regulations, such as Parts 23, 27, 29, 33, and 35 (CS-23, CS-27, CS-29, CS-E, CS-P). This document addresses the development cycle for aircraft and systems that implement aircraft functions.

This document describes guidelines and methods of performing the safety assessment for certification of civil aircraft. It is primarily associated with showing compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309. The methods outlined here identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to show compliance. A subset of this material may be applicable to non-25.1309 equipment. The concept of Aircraft Level Safety Assessment is introduced and the tools to accomplish this task are outlined. The overall aircraft operating environment is considered. When aircraft derivatives or system changes are certified, the processes described herein are usually applicable only to the new designs or to existing designs that are affected by the changes. In the case of the implementation of existing designs in a new derivation, alternate means such as service experience may be used to show compliance.