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This AIR addresses the use of Software tools to supplement or automate human activities in the development of systems, but not the hardware or software items within those systems. If a systems development tool is also used in the scope of hardware or software item development, for that usage it would then become subject to the guidance presented in DO-254 and DO-178B/C, respectively.

This AIR will provide a basic understanding of STPA and how it can be applied to development and safety assessment of civil aircraft. It will explain, by way of an example, the information needed to begin STPA, the expected STPA outputs, and the phases of aircraft development and safety assessment that can be supported by STPA.

MBSE is a relatively new technology. The purpose of this document is to demonstrate how Development Assurance may be applied in an MBSE based development program. This will be performed by utilizing the example in Appendix E of ARP4754B and showing an example of the Development Assurance activities and artifacts in an MBSE context.

Define the equivalent of HW & SW SOIs for Aircraft and System Level

To develop an industry consensus document describing what Common Mode Errors (CME) are with respect to aircraft/system designs, definitions of commonly used terminology, methods to address CME, practical guidance to decide how much detail is appropriate to analyze CME (reasonable chance of happening or hypothetical), and how to determine when mitigations are sufficient. Includes development up to and including type certification. This AIR will address the questions listed in conclusions and recommendations, section 7, of the white paper (Issues Around Current Understanding of Common Mode Errors).

This SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) supplements ARP4754B by identifying the crucial elements to be considered when constructing the development assurance plans described in Chapter 3 (Development Planning) of ARP4754B for integrated systems. This AIR presents a collection of lessons learned from past certification programs involving integrated systems. This AIR is not guidance for system integration technologies.

Generate guidance and example(s) regarding Airworthiness Security inputs to the Aircraft/System Development Processes in ARP 4754B sections 4.2 thru 4.6, and section 6. Also, clarify any essential output(s) from the Aircraft/System Development Processes that the Airworthiness Security Process DO-326A requires as input(s).

This AIR provides a detailed example of the aircraft and systems development for a function of a hypothetical S18 aircraft. In order to present a clear picture, an aircraft function was broken down into a single system. A function was chosen which had sufficient complexity to allow use of all the methodologies, yet was simple enough to present a clear picture of the flow through the process. This function/system was analyzed using the methods and tools described in ARP4754A/ED-79A. The aircraft level function is “Decelerate Aircraft On Ground” and the system is the braking system. The interaction of the braking system functions with the aircraft are identified with the relative importance based on implied aircraft interactions and system availabilities at the aircraft level. This example does not include validation and verification of the aircraft level hazards and interactions with the braking system.