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Automotive engineering processes are dynamic, iterative and driven by changes. Reasons for changes on development artifacts are manifold, but the result is a new evolution step which may influence all, some, or just a single development artifact. Consequently, research on impact analysis put forth approaches to assess the adverse effects of changes. However, understanding and implementing functional changes and its consequences in the safety domain is often aggravated by dependencies between different types of development artifacts, scattered in various (tool) formats. Safety properties may change depending on the type of a modification. Thereby, connected analyses like fault trees, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and safety concepts cannot be reused easily if the artifacts on which they are based on are affected by changes. In this paper we suggest a new difference analysis approach which allows a (semi-)automated comparison of safety work products based on models.

This paper proposes end-to-end protection mechanisms to be added to a generic FlexRay network in order to achieve fault detection and integrity levels sufficient for a SIL3 fail safe communication system. The mechanisms are derived from the random hardware failure modes to be considered for communication controllers according to IEC 61508. Mechanisms provided by the FlexRay protocol are pointed out. Additional features necessary to fulfil the requirements are discussed. It is shown how to calculate the failure rate probabilities of the CRC used as a safety code with respect to EN 50159.