The development of highly automated driving functions (AD) recently rises the demand for so called Fail-Operational systems for native driving functions like steering and braking of vehicles. Fail-Operational systems shall guarantee the availability of driving functions even in presence of failures. This can also mean a degradation of system performance or limiting a system’s remaining operating period. In either case, the goal is independency from a human driver as a permanently situation-aware safety fallback solution to provide a certain level of autonomy. In parallel, the connectivity of modern vehicles is increasing rapidly and especially in vehicles with highly automated functions, there is a high demand for connected functions, Infotainment (web conference, Internet, Shopping) and Entertainment (Streaming, Gaming) to entertain the passengers, who should no longer occupied with driving tasks.
Consequently, rise of this technological trend is bringing forth safety and cybersecurity challenges in form of new threats, hazards and vulnerabilities. As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions. ...As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions.
It is essential to note that cybersecurity threats not only arise from inherent protocol defects but also consider software implementation vulnerabilities.
The VCE Laboratory testbeds are connected with an Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud-based Cyber-security Labs as a Service (CLaaS) system, which allows students and researchers to access the testbeds from any place that has a secure internet connection. ...VCE students are assigned predefined virtual machines to perform designated cyber-security experiments. The CLaaS system has low administrative overhead associated with experiment setup and management. ...VCE Laboratory CLaaS experiments have been developed for demonstrating man-in-the-middle cyber-security attacks from actual compromised hardware or software connected with the TestCube.
Since the early 1990’s, commercial vehicles have suffered from repeated vulnerability exploitations that resulted in a need for improved automotive cybersecurity. This paper outlines the strategies and challenges of implementing an automotive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to secure intra-vehicle networks. ...This research successfully met the four requirements and demonstrated that using ZT principles in an on-vehicle network greatly improved the cybersecurity posture with manageable impact to system performance and deployment.
UNECE R155 explicitly references ISO/SAE 21434 and mandates a certified cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a prerequisite for automotive manufacturers to achieve vehicle type approval and sell new vehicle types. ...However, the gap in the CSMS framework is a lack in a standardized system that provides guidance and common criteria for automakers to measure a vehicle’s level of compliance and compute a publicly accepted cybersecurity rating. To help establish increased consumer confidence, OEMs and smart mobility stakeholders could take additional proactive steps to ensure the safety and security of their products. ...This paper addresses the above requirement and discusses the cybersecurity rating framework (CSRF) that could establish a framework for rating vehicle cybersecurity by standardizing the measurement criteria, parameter vectors, process, and tools.
This paper gives a definition of the SDV concept, provides views from different aspects, discusses the progress in vehicle E/E architecture, especially zone-based architecture with centralized computation, and various technologies including High-Performance Computing (HPC) platform, standardized vehicle software architecture, advanced onboard communication, Over-The-Air (OTA) update, and cybersecurity etc. that collectively enable the realization of SDV.
Advanced Autonomous Vehicles (AV) for SAE Level 3 and Level 4 functions will lead to a new understanding of the operation phase in the overall product lifecycle. Regulations such as the EU Implementing Act and the German L4 Act (AFGBV) request a continuous field surveillance, the handling of critical E/E faults and software updates during operation. This is required to enhance the Operational Design Domain (ODD) during operation, offering Functions on Demand (FoD), by increasing software features within these autonomous vehicle systems over the entire digital product lifecycle, and to avoid and reduce downtime by a malfunction of the Autonomous Driving (AD) software stack.
Access control enforces security policies for controlling critical resources. For V2X (Vehicle to Everything) autonomous military vehicle fleets, network middleware systems such as ROS (Robotic Operating System) expose system resources through networked publisher/subscriber and client/server paradigms. Without proper access control, these systems are vulnerable to attacks from compromised network nodes, which may perform data poisoning attacks, flood packets on a network, or attempt to gain lateral control of other resources. Access control for robotic middleware systems has been investigated in both ROS1 and ROS2. Still, these implementations do not have mechanisms for evaluating a policy's consistency and completeness or writing expressive policies for distributed fleets. We explore an RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) mechanism layered onto ROS environments that uses local permission caches with precomputed truth tables for fast policy evaluation.
This exercise confirms the necessity of a more restrictive cybersecurity posture in automotive peripherals with access to critical systems, in particular VDAs, and especially when such peripherals present a wireless interface.
The new generation vehicles these days are managed by networked controllers. A large portion of the networks is planned with more security which has recently roused researchers to exhibit various attacks against the system. This paper talks about the liabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN) inside In-vehicle communication protocol and a few potentials that could take due advantage of it. Moreover, this paper presents a few security measures proposed in the present examination status to defeat the attacks. In any case, the fundamental objective of this paper is to feature a comprehensive methodology known as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which has been a significant device in getting network data in systems over many years. To the best of our insight, there is no recorded writing on a through outline of IDS execution explicitly in the CAN transport network system.
The separation of cybersecurity considerations in RMTO is barely considered, as so far, most available research and activities are mainly focused on AV. ...The main focus of this paper is addressing RMTO cybersecurity utilising an adaptable security-by-design approach, although security-by-design is still in the infant state within automotive cybersecurity. ...The main focus of this paper is addressing RMTO cybersecurity utilising an adaptable security-by-design approach, although security-by-design is still in the infant state within automotive cybersecurity. An adaptable security-by-design approach for RMTO covers Security Engineering Life-cycle, Logical Security Layered Concept, and Security Architecture.
Using a wireless medium for tractor-trailer communication will bring new cybersecurity challenges and requirements which requires new development and lifecycle considerations.
Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.
CAN bus network proved to be efficient and dynamic for small compact cars as well as heavy-duty vehicles (HDV). However, HDVs are more susceptible to malicious attacks due to lack of security in their intra-vehicle communication protocols. SAE proposed a new standard named J1939-91C for CAN-FD networks which provides methods for establishing trust and securing mutual messages with optional encryption. J1939-91C ensures message authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality by implementing complex cryptographic operations including hash functions and random key generation. In this paper, the three main phases of J1939-91C, i.e., Network Formation, Rekeying, and Message Exchange, are simulated and tested on Electronic Control Units (ECUs) supporting CAN-FD network. Numerous test vectors were generated and validated to support SAE J1939-91C. The mentioned vectors were produced by simulating different encryption and hashing algorithms with variable message and key lengths.
The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic.
Cybersecurity (CS) is crucial and significantly important in every product that is connected to the network/internet. ...Hence making it very important to guarantee that every single connected device shall have cybersecurity measures implemented to ensure the safety of the entire system. Looking into the forecasted worldwide growth in the electric vehicles (EV’s) segment, CS researchers have recently identified several vulnerabilities that exist in EV’s, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) devices, communications to EVs, and upstream services, such as EVSE vendor cloud services, third party systems, and grid operators. ...Additional processes have been defined in the process reference and assessment model for the CS engineering in order to incorporate the cybersecurity related processes in the ASPICE scope. This paper aims at providing a model & brief overview to establish a correlation between the ASPICE, ISO/SAE 21434 and the ISO 26262 functional safety (FS) standards for development of a secured cybersecurity software with all the considerations that an organization can undertake.
As a result of the ever-increasing application of cyber-physical components in the automotive industry, cybersecurity has become an urgent topic. Adapting technologies and communication protocols like Ethernet and WiFi in connected vehicles yields many attack scenarios. ...Consequently, ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155 (2021) define a standard and regulatory framework for automotive cybersecurity, Both documents follow a risk management-based approach and require a threat modeling methodology for risk analysis and identification. ...Initially, we transform cybersecurity guidelines to attack trees, and then we use their formal interpretations to assess the vehicle’s design.