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Abstract Trust in the digital data from heavy vehicle event data recorders (HVEDRs) is paramount to using the data in legal contests. Ensuring the trust in the HVEDR data requires an examination of the ways the digital information can be attacked, both purposefully and inadvertently. The goal or objective of an attack on HVEDR data will be to have the data omitted in a case. To this end, we developed an attack tree and establish a model for violating the trust needed for HVEDR data. The attack tree provides context for mitigations and also for functional requirements. A trust model is introduced as well as a discussion on what constitutes forensically sound data. The main contribution of this article is an attack tree-based model of both malicious and accidental events contributing to compromised event data recorder (EDR) data. A comprehensive list of mitigations for HVEDR systems results from this analysis.

Abstract This work introduces the concept of a dual-layer specification structure for standards that separate interoperability functions, such as backward compatibility, localization, and deployment, from those essential to reliability, security, and functionality. The latter group of features, which constitute the actual standard, make up the baseline layer for instructions, while all the elements required for interoperability are specified in a second layer, known as a Protocols, Operations, Usage, and Formats (POUF) document. We applied this technique in the development of a standard for Uptane [1], a security framework for over-the-air (OTA) software updates used in many automobiles. This standard is a good candidate for a dual-layer specification because it requires communication between entities, but does not require a specific format for this communication.

Abstract Modern vehicles integrate Internet of Things (IoT) components to bring value-added services to both drivers and passengers. These components communicate with the external world through different types of interfaces including the on-board diagnostics (OBD-II) port, a mandatory interface in all vehicles in the United States and Europe. While this transformation has driven significant advancements in efficiency and safety, it has also opened a door to a wide variety of cyberattacks, as the architectures of vehicles were never designed with external connectivity in mind, and accordingly, security has never been pivotal in the design. As standardized, the OBD-II port allows not only direct access to the internal network of the vehicle but also installing software on the Electronic Control Units (ECUs).