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Abstract Aircraft cybersecurity efforts have tended to focus at the strategic or tactical levels without a clear connection between the two. ...CSSEP’s process model postulates that security is best achieved by a balance of cybersecurity, cyber resiliency, defensibility, and recoverability and that control is best established by developing security constraints versus attempting to find every vulnerability. ...CSSEP identifies the major functions needed to do effective aircraft cybersecurity and provides a flexible framework as the “missing link” to connect the strategic and tactical levels of aircraft cybersecurity.

Abstract Trust in the digital data from heavy vehicle event data recorders (HVEDRs) is paramount to using the data in legal contests. Ensuring the trust in the HVEDR data requires an examination of the ways the digital information can be attacked, both purposefully and inadvertently. The goal or objective of an attack on HVEDR data will be to have the data omitted in a case. To this end, we developed an attack tree and establish a model for violating the trust needed for HVEDR data. The attack tree provides context for mitigations and also for functional requirements. A trust model is introduced as well as a discussion on what constitutes forensically sound data. The main contribution of this article is an attack tree-based model of both malicious and accidental events contributing to compromised event data recorder (EDR) data. A comprehensive list of mitigations for HVEDR systems results from this analysis.

Automotive cybersecurity issues are becoming more prominent than ever. SAE J3061 and ISO/SAE 21434 being drafted also indicate that automotive cybersecurity has been elevated to a position equal to or more important than functional safety. ...SAE J3061 and ISO/SAE 21434 being drafted also indicate that automotive cybersecurity has been elevated to a position equal to or more important than functional safety. ...Security threat analysis helps the development of the early concept phase of automotive cybersecurity. However, the threat analysis based on the traditional attack tree has the disadvantages of multiple subjective factors and low accuracy.

Abstract Despite more and more rigorous defense mechanisms in place for cyber-physical systems, cybercriminals are increasingly attacking systems for benefits using a variety of means including malware, phishing, ransomware, and denial of service. Cyberattacks could not only cause significant economic loss but also disastrous consequences for individuals and organizations. Therefore, it is advantageous to detect and fix potential cyber vulnerabilities before the system is fielded. To this end, this article presents a language, VERDICT, and a novel framework, Cyber Vulnerability Analysis Framework (CyVAF) to (i) define cyber threats and mitigation defenses based on system properties, (ii) detect cyber vulnerabilities of system architecture automatically, and also (iii) suggest mitigation defenses. VERDICT is developed as an annex to the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) but can also be used independently.

Abstract Heavy vehicles are essential for the modern economy, delivering critical food, supplies, and freight throughout the world. Connected heavy vehicles are also driven by embedded computers that utilize internal communication using common standards. However, some implementations of the standards leave an opening for a malicious actor to abuse the system. One such abuse case is a cyber-attack known as the “Address Claim Attack.” Proposed in 2018, this attack uses a single network message to disable all communication to and from a target electronic control unit, which may have a detrimental effect on operating the vehicle. This article demonstrates the viability of the attack and then describes the implementation of a solution to prevent this attack in real time without requiring any intervention from the manufacturer of the target devices. The defense technique uses a bit-banged Controller Area Network (CAN) filter to detect the attack.

Abstract With the recent advancement in technologies, researchers worldwide have a growing interest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The last few years have been significant in terms of its global awareness, adoption, and applications across industries. In UAV-aided wireless networks, there are some limitations in terms of power consumption, data computation, data processing, endurance, and security. So, the idea of UAVs and Edge or Fog computing together deals with the limitations and provides intelligence at the network’s edge, which makes it more valuable to use in emergency applications. Fog computing distributes data in a decentralized way and blockchain also works on the principle of decentralization. Blockchain, as a decentralized database, uses cryptographic methods including hash functions and public key encryption to secure the user information. It is a prominent solution to secure the user’s information in blocks and maintain privacy.

Abstract This work introduces the concept of a dual-layer specification structure for standards that separate interoperability functions, such as backward compatibility, localization, and deployment, from those essential to reliability, security, and functionality. The latter group of features, which constitute the actual standard, make up the baseline layer for instructions, while all the elements required for interoperability are specified in a second layer, known as a Protocols, Operations, Usage, and Formats (POUF) document. We applied this technique in the development of a standard for Uptane [1], a security framework for over-the-air (OTA) software updates used in many automobiles. This standard is a good candidate for a dual-layer specification because it requires communication between entities, but does not require a specific format for this communication.

Abstract Threat identification and security analysis have become mandatory steps in the engineering design process of high-assurance systems, where successful cyberattacks can lead to hazardous property damage or loss of lives. This article describes a novel approach to perform security analysis on embedded systems modeled at the architectural level. The tool, called Security Threat Evaluation and Mitigation (STEM), associates threats from the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) library with components and connections and suggests potential defense patterns from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53 security standard. This article also provides an illustrative example based on a drone package delivery system modeled in AADL.

Abstract Identity-Anonymized CAN (IA-CAN) protocol is a secure CAN protocol, which provides the sender authentication by inserting a secret sequence of anonymous IDs (A-IDs) shared among the communication nodes. To prevent malicious attacks from the IA-CAN protocol, a secure and robust system error recovery mechanism is required. This article presents a central management method of IA-CAN, named the IA-CAN with a global A-ID, where a gateway plays a central role in the session initiation and system error recovery. Each ECU self-diagnoses the system errors, and (if an error happens) it automatically resynchronizes its A-ID generation by acquiring the recovery information from the gateway. We prototype both a hardware version of an IA-CAN controller and a system for the IA-CAN with a global A-ID using the controller to verify our concept.

Abstract Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication is a vehicular communication technology to reduce traffic accidents and congestion. To protect V2V communication, multiple security standards have been developed. This article provides an overview of the China V2V security draft standard and compares it to the American IEEE1609.2 V2V standard and to the Security Credential Management System (SCMS). The article provides an overview of the Chinese cryptographic algorithms used in the China V2V standard, and points out differences in the certificate format, such as the lack of implicit certificates in the China V2V standard. The China V2V PKI architecture is similar to the American SCMS, however, the Chinese system utilizes a set of Root Certificate Authorities (CA) that are trusted via an out-of-band channel whereas the American SCMS supports elector-based addition and revocation of Root CAs.

Abstract The innovations of vehicle connectivity have been increasing dramatically to enhance the safety and user experience of driving, while the rising numbers of interfaces to the external world also bring security threats to vehicles. Many security countermeasures have been proposed and discussed to protect the systems and services against attacks. To provide an overview of the current states in this research field, we conducted a systematic mapping study (SMS) on the topic area “security countermeasures of in-vehicle communication systems.” A total of 279 papers are identified based on the defined study identification strategy and criteria. We discussed four research questions (RQs) related to the security countermeasures, validation methods, publication patterns, and research trends and gaps based on the extracted and classified data. Finally, we evaluated the validity threats and the whole mapping process.

Abstract Vehicular communications face unique security issues in wireless communications. While new vehicles are equipped with a large set of communication technologies, product life cycles are long and software updates are not widespread. The result is a host of outdated and unpatched technologies being used on the street. This has especially severe security impacts because autonomous vehicles are pushing into the market, which will rely, at least partly, on the integrity of the provided information. We provide an overview of the currently deployed communication systems and their security weaknesses and features to collect and compare widely used security mechanisms. In this survey, we focus on technologies that work in an ad hoc manner. This includes Long-Term Evolution mode 4 (LTE-PC5), Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE), Intelligent Transportation Systems at 5 Gigahertz (ITS-G5), and Bluetooth.

Abstract In the pursuit of advancing autonomous vehicles (AVs), data-driven algorithms have become pivotal in replacing human perception and decision-making. While deep neural networks (DNNs) hold promise for perception tasks, the potential for catastrophic consequences due to algorithmic flaws is concerning. A well-known incident in 2016, involving a Tesla autopilot misidentifying a white truck as a cloud, underscores the risks and security vulnerabilities. In this article, we present a novel threat model and risk assessment (TARA) analysis on AV data storage, delving into potential threats and damage scenarios. Specifically, we focus on DNN parameter manipulation attacks, evaluating their impact on three distinct algorithms for traffic sign classification and lane assist.