Search Results

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic.

A ranked list of value exchanges is created based on the impact of cybersecurity on the stakeholder map. System level-losses are identified from high impact value exchanges, which can then be fed into the step 1 of STPA-Sec analysis.

Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.

The recently released SAE J3061 guidebook for cyber-physical vehicle systems provides high-level principles for automotive organizations for identifying and assessing cybersecurity threats and for designing cybersecurity aware systems in close relation to the ISO 26262 standard for the functional safety of road vehicles. ...., infotainment, car-2-car or car-2-infrastructure communication) as well as new advances toward advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) or even autonomous driving functions make cybersecurity another key factor to be taken into account by vehicle suppliers and manufacturers. ...Although these can capitalize on experiences from many other domains, they still have to face several unique challenges when gearing up for specific cybersecurity challenges. A key challenge is related to the increasing interconnection of automotive systems with networks (such as Car2X).

Symbolic code execution is a powerful cybersecurity testing approach that facilitates the systematic exploration of all paths within a program to uncover previously unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities. ...Symbolic code execution is a powerful cybersecurity testing approach that facilitates the systematic exploration of all paths within a program to uncover previously unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities. This is achieved through a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver, which operates on symbolic values for program inputs instead of using their concrete counterparts.

Since the early 1990’s, commercial vehicles have suffered from repeated vulnerability exploitations that resulted in a need for improved automotive cybersecurity. This paper outlines the strategies and challenges of implementing an automotive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to secure intra-vehicle networks. ...This research successfully met the four requirements and demonstrated that using ZT principles in an on-vehicle network greatly improved the cybersecurity posture with manageable impact to system performance and deployment.

While current cybersecurity endeavors in the heavy-duty (HD) vehicle space focus on securing conventional communication technologies such as the controller area network (CAN), there is a notable deficiency in defensive research concerning legacy technologies, particularly those utilized between trucks and trailers. ...To the best of current knowledge, this publication marks the first presentation of cybersecurity defense research on the SAE J1708/J1587 protocol stack.

In-vehicle networks used for inter-ECU communication, most commonly the CAN bus, were not designed with cybersecurity in mind, and as a result, communication by corrupt devices connected to the bus is not authenticated.

Using a wireless medium for tractor-trailer communication will bring new cybersecurity challenges and requirements which requires new development and lifecycle considerations.

The article also focus on innovative approaches that have recently adopted my many cybersecurity professionals for secured operation of ITS involving block-chain, artificial intelligence, and Machine Learning.

Also, all the existing methods for vehicular communication rely on a centralized server which itself invite massive cyber-security threats. These threats and challenges can be addressed by using the Blockchain (BC) technology, where each transaction is logged in a decentralized immutable BC ledger.

With the introduction of Connected Vehicles, it is possible to extend the limited horizon of vehicles on the road by collective perceptions, where vehicles periodically share their information with other vehicles and servers using cloud. Nevertheless, by the time the connected vehicle spread expands, it is critical to understand the validation techniques which can be used to ensure a flawless transfer of data and connectivity. Connected vehicles are mainly characterized by the smartphone application which is provided to the end customers to access the connectivity features in the vehicle. The end result which is delivered to the customer is through the integrated telematics unit in the vehicle which communicates through a communication layer with the cloud platform. The cloud server in turn interacts with the final application layer of the mobile application given to the customer.

Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) may encounter difficulties accommodating environmental uncertainties and system degradations during harsh conditions. However, human experience and onboard intelligence can may help mitigate such cases. Unfortunately, human operators have cognition limits when directly supervising multiple UGVs. Ideally, an automated decision aid can be designed that empowers the human operator to supervise the UGVs. In this paper, we consider a connected UGV platoon under cyber attacks that may disrupt safety and degrade performance. An observer-based resilient control strategy is designed to mitigate the effects of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) cyber attacks. In addition, each UGV generates both internal and external evaluations based on the platoons performance metrics. A cloud-based trust-based information management system collects these evaluations to detect abnormal UGV platoon behaviors.

The ever-increasing complexity and connectivity of driver assist functions pose challenges for both Functional Safety and Cyber Security. Several of these challenges arise not only due to the new functionalities themselves but due to numerous interdependencies between safety and security. Safety and security goals can conflict, safety mechanisms might be intentionally triggered by attackers to impact functionality negatively, or mechanisms can compete for limited resources like processing power or memory to name just some conflict potentials. But there is also the potential for synergies, both in the implementation as well as during the development. For example, both disciplines require mechanisms to check data integrity, are concerned with freedom from interference and require architecture based analyses. So far there is no consensus in the industry on how to best deal with these interdependencies in automotive development projects.

With the rapid development of vehicle intelligent and networking technology, the IT security of automotive systems becomes an important area of research. In addition to the basic vehicle control, intelligent advanced driver assistance systems, infotainment systems will all exchange data with in-vehicle network. Unfortunately, current communication network protocols, including Controller Area Network (CAN), FlexRay, MOST, and LIN have no security services, such as authentication or encryption, etc. Therefore, the vehicle are unprotected against malicious attacks. Since CAN bus is actually the most widely used field bus for in-vehicle communications in current automobiles, the security aspects of CAN bus is focused on. Based on the analysis of the current research status of CAN bus network security, this paper summarizes the CAN bus potential security vulnerabilities and the attack means.

Vehicle manufacturers are suffering from increasing expenses for fixing software issues. This fact is mainly driving their desire to use mobile communication channels for doing Software Updates Over The Air (SOTA). Software updates today are typically done at vehicle service stations by connecting the vehicles’ electronic network via the On Board Diagnostic (OBD) interface to a service computer. These operations are done under the control of trained technicians. SOTA means that the update process must get handled by the driver. Two critical aspects need to get considered when doing SOTA at Electronic Brake Control (EBC) systems. Both will determine the acceptance of SOTA by legal authorities and by the passengers: The safety and security of the vehicle The availability of the vehicle for the passengers The security aspect includes the necessity to protect the vehicle and the manufacturers IP from unwanted attacks.

Autonomous vehicles might one day be able to implement privacy preserving driving patterns which humans may find too difficult to implement. In order to measure the difference between location privacy achieved by humans versus location privacy achieved by autonomous vehicles, this paper measures privacy as trajectory anonymity, as opposed to single location privacy or continuous privacy. This paper evaluates how trajectory privacy for randomized driving patterns could be twice as effective for autonomous vehicles using diverted paths compared to Google Map API generated shortest paths. The result shows vehicles mobility patterns could impact trajectory and location privacy. Moreover, the results show that the proposed metric outperforms both K-anonymity and KDT-anonymity.

Software vulnerability management is one of the most critical and crucial security techniques, which analyzes the automotive software/firmware across the digital cockpit, ADAS, V2X, etc. domains for vulnerabilities, and provides security patches for the concerned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). The process of automotive SW/FW vulnerability management system between the OEMs and vendors happen through a channel of fixing a certain number of vulnerabilities by 1st tier supplier which needs to be verified in front of OEMs for the fixed number and type of patches in there deliverable SW/FW. The gap of verification between for the fixed patches between the OEMs and 1st tier supplier requires a reliable human independent intelligent technique to have a trustworthiness of verification.