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The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

This document will provide recommendations to vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers in securing the SAE J1939-13 connector interface from the cybersecurity risks posed by the existence of this connector.

This document will provide recommendations to vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers in securing the SAE J1939 network from the cybersecurity risks. It is recognized that not every application of SAE J1939 networks requires the same level of cyber security measures.

The flexible data rate capability in CAN (commonly called CAN FD) is implemented as a transport layer in order to allow for functional safety, cybersecurity, extended transport capability, and backward compatibility with SAE J1939DA.

Connected vehicles can provide data from multiple sensors that monitor both the vehicle and the environment through which the vehicle is passing. The data, when shared, can be used to enhance and optimize transportation operations and management—specifically, traffic flow and infrastructure maintenance. This document describes an interface between vehicle and infrastructure for collecting vehicle/probe data. That data may represent a single point in time or may be accumulated over defined periods of time or distance, or may be triggered based on circumstance. The purpose of this document is to define an interoperable means of collecting the vehicle/probe data in support of the use cases defined herein. There are many additional use cases that may be realized based on the interface defined in this document. Note that vehicle diagnostics are not included within the scope of this document, but diagnostics-related features may be added to probe data in a future supplemental document.

This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, relays, disk drives, LCD matrices, VME circuit cards, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, traceability, reliability, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively). An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly.

Automated driving system (ADS) manufacturers, developers, and operators need to provide clear information on their safety approach to relevant stakeholders. Explainability to diverse audiences helps build trust in statements from these organizations towards the shared value of safety. A defined list of core safety topics can help set expectations when communicating deployment and use-case-specific automated vehicle (AV) safety information. The topics listed in this best practice are implementation-agnostic and broadly applicable. This best practice describes how safety is continuous and connected throughout lifecycle stages and highlights considerations when including safety metrics as part of the communicated information. It lists topics that are considered core, provides a rationale, illustrative examples where applicable, suggestions of content that could be included for the example, and lists references and industry examples for further information.

AVSC Information Report for Change Risk Management AVSC00010202304 provides a process for change risk management for fleet-operated ADS-DVs using level 4 or 5 automation. The document addresses risks resulting from planned and unplanned changes in an ADS-DV design and/or operation. This information report is based on the concept of risk-informed decision-making. Making risk management decisions such as safety and change management, safety analysis, and safety assurance are especially applicable when moving from concept to production intent for the ADS-DV. Change Risk Management (CRM) does not replace best practices or other methods for managing safety anomalies or change management processes. It may instead be viewed as an additional resource that elaborates on how safety anomaly management and change management can be performed.

AVSC Best Practice for Interactions Between ADS-DVs and Vulnerable Road Users (VRUs) AVSC00009202208 establishes common terminology and a baseline understanding of the challenges posed, and framework to evaluate automated driving system-dedicated vehicle (ADS-DV) interactions with VRUs. This best practice can facilitate communication among the industry and public, help calibrate expectations of all traffic participants, and improve broader acceptance of SAE level 4 and level 5 ADS-equipped vehicles.