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Automotive electronics and enterprise IT are converging and thus open the doors for advanced hacking. With their immediate safety impact, cyberattacks on such systems will endanger passengers. Today, there are various methods of security verification and validation in the automotive industry. However, we realize that vulnerability detection is incomplete and inefficient with classic security testing. In this article, we show how an enhanced Grey-Box Penetration Test (GBPT) needs less test cases while being more effective in terms of coverage and indicating less false positives.

What standardization is needed to ensure that quantum technologies do not pose an unacceptable risk from an automotive cybersecurity perspective? Click here to access the full SAE EDGETM Research Report portfolio.

Abstract The United Nation Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Regulation 155—Cybersecurity and Cybersecurity Management System (UN R155) mandates the development of cybersecurity management systems (CSMS) as part of a vehicle’s lifecycle. ...Due to the focus of R155 and its suggested implementation guideline, ISO/SAE 21434:2021—Road Vehicle Cybersecurity Engineering, mainly centering on the alignment of cybersecurity risk management to the vehicle development lifecycle, there is a gap in knowledge of proscribed activities for validation and verification testing. ...An inherent component of the CSMS is cybersecurity risk management and assessment. Validation and verification testing is a key activity for measuring the effectiveness of risk management, and it is mandated by UN R155 for type approval.

Argus, a global leader in automotive cybersecurity, has upgraded its stand-alone Fleet Protection backend platform and is now providing continuous live monitoring of both automotive and commercial aircraft fleets.

Therefore, engineers should ensure that systems are designed free of unreasonable risks to motor vehicle safety, including those that may result due to existence of potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The automotive industry is making vehicle cybersecurity an organizational priority.

Automotive cybersecurity issues are becoming more prominent than ever. SAE J3061 and ISO/SAE 21434 being drafted also indicate that automotive cybersecurity has been elevated to a position equal to or more important than functional safety. ...SAE J3061 and ISO/SAE 21434 being drafted also indicate that automotive cybersecurity has been elevated to a position equal to or more important than functional safety. ...Security threat analysis helps the development of the early concept phase of automotive cybersecurity. However, the threat analysis based on the traditional attack tree has the disadvantages of multiple subjective factors and low accuracy.

Symbolic code execution is a powerful cybersecurity testing approach that facilitates the systematic exploration of all paths within a program to uncover previously unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities. ...Symbolic code execution is a powerful cybersecurity testing approach that facilitates the systematic exploration of all paths within a program to uncover previously unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities. This is achieved through a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver, which operates on symbolic values for program inputs instead of using their concrete counterparts.

We also analyze how useful Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CAL) are in this process and how quantitative as well as qualitative metrics can be utilized as evidence.

Using a wireless medium for tractor-trailer communication will bring new cybersecurity challenges and requirements which requires new development and lifecycle considerations.

The article also focus on innovative approaches that have recently adopted my many cybersecurity professionals for secured operation of ITS involving block-chain, artificial intelligence, and Machine Learning.

Abstract There are already a number of cybersecurity activities introduced in the development process in the automotive industry. For example, security testing of automotive components is often performed at the late stages of development.

This document defines a standard implementation for strong client authentication and encryption of Wi-Fi-based client connections to onboard Wireless LAN (WLAN) networks. WLAN networks may consist of multi-purpose inflight entertainment system networks operating in the Passenger Information and Entertainment System (PIES) domain, dedicated aircraft cabin wireless networks or localized Aircraft Integrated Data (AID) devices operating in the Aircraft Information Services (AIS) domain. The purpose of this document is to focus on the client devices requiring connections to these networks such as electronic flight bags, flight attendant mobile devices, onboard Internet of Things (IoT) devices, AID devices (acting as clients) and mobile maintenance devices. Passenger devices are not within the focus of this document.

As a promising strategic industry group that is rapidly evolving around the world, autonomous vehicle is entering a critical phase of commercialization from demonstration to end markets. The global automotive industry and governments are facing new common topics and challenges brought by autonomous vehicle, such as how to test, assess, and administrate the autonomous vehicle to ensure their safe running in real traffic situations and proper interactions with other road users. Starting from the facts that the way to autonomous driving is the process of a robot or a machine taking over driving tasks from a human. This paper summarizes the main characteristics of autonomous vehicle which are different from traditional one, then demonstrates the limitations of the existing certification mechanism and related testing methods when applied to autonomous vehicle.

Connected vehicles can provide data from multiple sensors that monitor both the vehicle and the environment through which the vehicle is passing. The data, when shared, can be used to enhance and optimize transportation operations and management—specifically, traffic flow and infrastructure maintenance. This document describes an interface between vehicle and infrastructure for collecting vehicle/probe data. That data may represent a single point in time or may be accumulated over defined periods of time or distance, or may be triggered based on circumstance. The purpose of this document is to define an interoperable means of collecting the vehicle/probe data in support of the use cases defined herein. There are many additional use cases that may be realized based on the interface defined in this document. Note that vehicle diagnostics are not included within the scope of this document, but diagnostics-related features may be added to probe data in a future supplemental document.

Abstract This work introduces the concept of a dual-layer specification structure for standards that separate interoperability functions, such as backward compatibility, localization, and deployment, from those essential to reliability, security, and functionality. The latter group of features, which constitute the actual standard, make up the baseline layer for instructions, while all the elements required for interoperability are specified in a second layer, known as a Protocols, Operations, Usage, and Formats (POUF) document. We applied this technique in the development of a standard for Uptane [1], a security framework for over-the-air (OTA) software updates used in many automobiles. This standard is a good candidate for a dual-layer specification because it requires communication between entities, but does not require a specific format for this communication.

To help address the issue of message authentication on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, researchers at Virginia Tech and Ford Motor Company have developed a proof-of-concept time-evolving watermark-based authentication mechanism that offers robust, cryptographically controlled confirmation of a CAN message's authenticity. This watermark is injected as a common-mode signal on both CAN-HI and CAN-LO bus voltages and has been proven using a low-cost software-defined radio (SDR) testbed. This paper extends prior analysis on the design and proof-of-concept to consider robustness testing over the range of voltages, both steady state drifts and transients, as are commonly witnessed within a vehicle. Overall performance results, along with a dynamic watermark amplitude control, validate the concept as being a practical near-term approach at improving authentication confidence of messages on the CAN bus.

Abstract In this work, we present an approach to support penetration tests by combining safety and security analyses to enhance automotive security testing. Our approach includes a new way to combine safety and threat analyses to derive possible test cases. We reuse outcomes of a performed safety analysis as the input for a threat analysis. We show systematically how to derive test cases, and we present the applicability of our approach by deriving and performing test cases for a penetration test of an automotive electronic control unit (ECU). Therefore, we selected an airbag control unit due to its safety-critical functionality. During the penetration test, the selected control unit was installed on a test bench, and we were able to successfully exploit a discovered vulnerability, causing the detonation of airbags.

This paper will provide an Overview of Automotive Cyber Security Standards related to the Vehicle OBD-II Data Link. The OBD-II Connector Attack Tree is described with respect to the SAE J3138 requirements for Intrusive vs. non-Intrusive Services. A proposed test method for SAE J3138 is described including hardware and software scripting. Finally, example test results are reviewed and compared with a potential threat boundary.

Autonomous vehicles might one day be able to implement privacy preserving driving patterns which humans may find too difficult to implement. In order to measure the difference between location privacy achieved by humans versus location privacy achieved by autonomous vehicles, this paper measures privacy as trajectory anonymity, as opposed to single location privacy or continuous privacy. This paper evaluates how trajectory privacy for randomized driving patterns could be twice as effective for autonomous vehicles using diverted paths compared to Google Map API generated shortest paths. The result shows vehicles mobility patterns could impact trajectory and location privacy. Moreover, the results show that the proposed metric outperforms both K-anonymity and KDT-anonymity.

Abstract Vehicular communications face unique security issues in wireless communications. While new vehicles are equipped with a large set of communication technologies, product life cycles are long and software updates are not widespread. The result is a host of outdated and unpatched technologies being used on the street. This has especially severe security impacts because autonomous vehicles are pushing into the market, which will rely, at least partly, on the integrity of the provided information. We provide an overview of the currently deployed communication systems and their security weaknesses and features to collect and compare widely used security mechanisms. In this survey, we focus on technologies that work in an ad hoc manner. This includes Long-Term Evolution mode 4 (LTE-PC5), Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE), Intelligent Transportation Systems at 5 Gigahertz (ITS-G5), and Bluetooth.