Search Results

The purpose of this SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) is to provide guidance for aircraft engine and propeller systems (hereafter referred to as propulsion systems) certification for cybersecurity. Compliance for cybersecurity requires that the engine control, propeller control, monitoring system, and all auxiliary equipment systems and networks associated with the propulsion system (such as nacelle systems, overspeed governors, and thrust reversers) be protected from intentional unauthorized electronic interactions (IUEI) that may result in an adverse effect on the safety of the propulsion system or the airplane.

This over view of the subject analyzes automotive cybersecurity threats that are gaining attention worldwide and the apparent ways industries are responding to them.

Its extensive application of data networks, including enhanced external digital communication, forced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for the first time, to set “Special Conditions” for cybersecurity. In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. ...In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. The resulting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) resolutions, US and European Union (EU) legislations, FAA and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, and the DO-326/ED-202 set of standards are already the de-facto, and soon becoming the official, standards for legislation, regulation, and best practices, with the FAA already mandating it to a constantly growing extent for a few years now—and EASA adopting the set in its entirety in July 2020.

Automotive electronics and enterprise IT are converging and thus open the doors for advanced hacking. With their immediate safety impact, cyberattacks on such systems will endanger passengers. Today, there are various methods of security verification and validation in the automotive industry. However, we realize that vulnerability detection is incomplete and inefficient with classic security testing. In this article, we show how an enhanced Grey-Box Penetration Test (GBPT) needs less test cases while being more effective in terms of coverage and indicating less false positives.

This course will introduce participants to industry best practices for real-world aviation cyber-security risk-assessment, development & assurance. Participants will learn the information necessary to help minimize DO-326/ED-202-set compliance risks and costs, while also optimizing cyber-security levels for the development, deployment and in-service phases Topics such as aircraft security aspects of safety, systems-approach to security, security planning, the airworthiness security process, and security effectiveness assurance will be covered.

To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. ...With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.

Abstract The United Nation Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Regulation 155—Cybersecurity and Cybersecurity Management System (UN R155) mandates the development of cybersecurity management systems (CSMS) as part of a vehicle’s lifecycle. ...Due to the focus of R155 and its suggested implementation guideline, ISO/SAE 21434:2021—Road Vehicle Cybersecurity Engineering, mainly centering on the alignment of cybersecurity risk management to the vehicle development lifecycle, there is a gap in knowledge of proscribed activities for validation and verification testing. ...An inherent component of the CSMS is cybersecurity risk management and assessment. Validation and verification testing is a key activity for measuring the effectiveness of risk management, and it is mandated by UN R155 for type approval.

Therefore, engineers should ensure that systems are designed free of unreasonable risks to motor vehicle safety, including those that may result due to existence of potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The automotive industry is making vehicle cybersecurity an organizational priority.

Abstract Automotive cybersecurity is steadily becoming a key factor in the worldwide adoption of connected and self-driving vehicles.

Symbolic code execution is a powerful cybersecurity testing approach that facilitates the systematic exploration of all paths within a program to uncover previously unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities. ...Symbolic code execution is a powerful cybersecurity testing approach that facilitates the systematic exploration of all paths within a program to uncover previously unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities. This is achieved through a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver, which operates on symbolic values for program inputs instead of using their concrete counterparts.

We also analyze how useful Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CAL) are in this process and how quantitative as well as qualitative metrics can be utilized as evidence.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

Abstract There are already a number of cybersecurity activities introduced in the development process in the automotive industry. For example, security testing of automotive components is often performed at the late stages of development.

This document defines a standard implementation for strong client authentication and encryption of Wi-Fi-based client connections to onboard Wireless LAN (WLAN) networks. WLAN networks may consist of multi-purpose inflight entertainment system networks operating in the Passenger Information and Entertainment System (PIES) domain, dedicated aircraft cabin wireless networks or localized Aircraft Integrated Data (AID) devices operating in the Aircraft Information Services (AIS) domain. The purpose of this document is to focus on the client devices requiring connections to these networks such as electronic flight bags, flight attendant mobile devices, onboard Internet of Things (IoT) devices, AID devices (acting as clients) and mobile maintenance devices. Passenger devices are not within the focus of this document.

With the rapid development of vehicle intelligent and networking technology, the IT security of automotive systems becomes an important area of research. In addition to the basic vehicle control, intelligent advanced driver assistance systems, infotainment systems will all exchange data with in-vehicle network. Unfortunately, current communication network protocols, including Controller Area Network (CAN), FlexRay, MOST, and LIN have no security services, such as authentication or encryption, etc. Therefore, the vehicle are unprotected against malicious attacks. Since CAN bus is actually the most widely used field bus for in-vehicle communications in current automobiles, the security aspects of CAN bus is focused on. Based on the analysis of the current research status of CAN bus network security, this paper summarizes the CAN bus potential security vulnerabilities and the attack means.

As a promising strategic industry group that is rapidly evolving around the world, autonomous vehicle is entering a critical phase of commercialization from demonstration to end markets. The global automotive industry and governments are facing new common topics and challenges brought by autonomous vehicle, such as how to test, assess, and administrate the autonomous vehicle to ensure their safe running in real traffic situations and proper interactions with other road users. Starting from the facts that the way to autonomous driving is the process of a robot or a machine taking over driving tasks from a human. This paper summarizes the main characteristics of autonomous vehicle which are different from traditional one, then demonstrates the limitations of the existing certification mechanism and related testing methods when applied to autonomous vehicle.

Connected vehicles can provide data from multiple sensors that monitor both the vehicle and the environment through which the vehicle is passing. The data, when shared, can be used to enhance and optimize transportation operations and management—specifically, traffic flow and infrastructure maintenance. This document describes an interface between vehicle and infrastructure for collecting vehicle/probe data. That data may represent a single point in time or may be accumulated over defined periods of time or distance, or may be triggered based on circumstance. The purpose of this document is to define an interoperable means of collecting the vehicle/probe data in support of the use cases defined herein. There are many additional use cases that may be realized based on the interface defined in this document. Note that vehicle diagnostics are not included within the scope of this document, but diagnostics-related features may be added to probe data in a future supplemental document.

Abstract In the automotive domain, the overall complexity of technical components has increased enormously. Formerly isolated, purely mechanical cars are now a multitude of cyber-physical systems that are continuously interacting with other IT systems, for example, with the smartphone of their driver or the backend servers of the car manufacturer. This has huge security implications as demonstrated by several recent research papers that document attacks endangering the safety of the car. However, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no holistic overview or structured description of the complex automotive domain. Without such a big picture, distinct security research remains isolated and is lacking interconnections between the different subsystems. Hence, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the overall security of a car or to identify aspects that have not been sufficiently covered by security analyses.

Abstract With the adoption of Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology, security and privacy of vehicles are paramount. To avoid tracking while preserving vehicle/driver’s privacy, modern vehicular public key infrastructure provision vehicles with multiple short-term pseudonym certificates. However, provisioning a large number of pseudonym certificates can lead to an enormous growth of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) during its revocation process. One possible approach to avoid such CRL growth is by relying on activation code (AC)-based solutions. In such solutions, the vehicles are provisioned with batches of encrypted certificates, which are decrypted periodically via the ACs (broadcasted by the back-end system). When the system detects a revoked vehicle, it simply does not broadcast the respective vehicle’s AC. As a result, revoked vehicles do not receive their respective AC and are prevented from decrypting their certificates.

To help address the issue of message authentication on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, researchers at Virginia Tech and Ford Motor Company have developed a proof-of-concept time-evolving watermark-based authentication mechanism that offers robust, cryptographically controlled confirmation of a CAN message's authenticity. This watermark is injected as a common-mode signal on both CAN-HI and CAN-LO bus voltages and has been proven using a low-cost software-defined radio (SDR) testbed. This paper extends prior analysis on the design and proof-of-concept to consider robustness testing over the range of voltages, both steady state drifts and transients, as are commonly witnessed within a vehicle. Overall performance results, along with a dynamic watermark amplitude control, validate the concept as being a practical near-term approach at improving authentication confidence of messages on the CAN bus.