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Abstract In the pursuit of advancing autonomous vehicles (AVs), data-driven algorithms have become pivotal in replacing human perception and decision-making. While deep neural networks (DNNs) hold promise for perception tasks, the potential for catastrophic consequences due to algorithmic flaws is concerning. A well-known incident in 2016, involving a Tesla autopilot misidentifying a white truck as a cloud, underscores the risks and security vulnerabilities. In this article, we present a novel threat model and risk assessment (TARA) analysis on AV data storage, delving into potential threats and damage scenarios. Specifically, we focus on DNN parameter manipulation attacks, evaluating their impact on three distinct algorithms for traffic sign classification and lane assist.

Abstract Automotive software is increasingly complex and critical to safe vehicle operation, and related embedded systems must remain up to date to ensure long-term system performance. Update mechanisms and data modification tools introduce opportunities for malicious actors to compromise these cyber-physical systems, and for trusted actors to mistakenly install incompatible software versions. A distributed and stratified “black box” audit trail for automotive software and data provenance is proposed to assure users, service providers, and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of vehicular software integrity and reliability. The proposed black box architecture is both layered and diffuse, employing distributed hash tables (DHT), a parity system and a public blockchain to provide high resilience, assurance, scalability, and efficiency for automotive and other high-assurance systems.

Abstract With the recent advancement in technologies, researchers worldwide have a growing interest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The last few years have been significant in terms of its global awareness, adoption, and applications across industries. In UAV-aided wireless networks, there are some limitations in terms of power consumption, data computation, data processing, endurance, and security. So, the idea of UAVs and Edge or Fog computing together deals with the limitations and provides intelligence at the network’s edge, which makes it more valuable to use in emergency applications. Fog computing distributes data in a decentralized way and blockchain also works on the principle of decentralization. Blockchain, as a decentralized database, uses cryptographic methods including hash functions and public key encryption to secure the user information. It is a prominent solution to secure the user’s information in blocks and maintain privacy.

Abstract Secure boot is a fundamental security primitive for establishing trust in computer systems. For real-time safety applications, the time taken to perform the boot measurement conflicts with the need for near instant availability. To speed up the boot measurement while establishing an acceptable degree of trust, we propose a dual-phase secure boot algorithm that balances the strong requirement for data tamper detection with the strong requirement for real-time availability. A probabilistic boot measurement is executed in the first phase to allow the system to be quickly booted. This is followed by a full boot measurement to verify the first-phase results and generate the new sampled space for the next boot cycle. The dual-phase approach allows the system to be operational within a fraction of the time needed for a full boot measurement while producing a high detection probability of data tampering.

Abstract Over the past forty years, the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) technology has grown in both sophistication and volume in the automotive sector, and modern vehicles may comprise hundreds of ECUs. ECUs typically communicate via a bus-based network architecture to collectively support a broad range of safety-critical capabilities, such as obstacle avoidance, lane management, and adaptive cruise control. However, this technology evolution has also brought about risks: if ECU firmware is compromised, then vehicle safety may be compromised. Recent experiments and demonstrations have shown that ECU firmware is not only poorly protected but also that compromised firmware may pose safety risks to occupants and bystanders.

Abstract Testing and verifying the security of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) under cyber-physical attacks is a critical challenge for ensuring their safety and reliability. Proposed in this article is a novel testing framework based on a model of computation that generates scenarios and attacks in a closed-loop manner, while measuring the safety of the unit under testing (UUT), using a verification vector. The framework was applied for testing the performance of two cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) controllers under false data injection (FDI) attacks. Serving as the baseline controller is one of a traditional design, while the proposed controller uses a resilient design that combines a model and learning-based algorithm to detect and mitigate FDI attacks in real-time.

Abstract Letter from the Co-editors

Abstract Designers of automotive systems find themselves pulled in an impossible number of directions. Systems must use the most advanced security features, but at the same time run on low-cost and resource-constrained hardware. Ultimately, an engineering trade-off will eventually be made regarding how encryption and key management is used on these systems, potentially leaving them vulnerable to attack. In this paper, we detail the applicability of side-channel power analysis and fault injection on automotive electronic systems, showing how these dangerous techniques can be used to break an otherwise secure system. We build a small example network using AES-CCM to implement an encrypted, authenticated CAN protocol. We demonstrate how open-source hardware and software can easily recover the encryption keys from some of these nodes with side-channel power analysis, and we recover a full firmware image from one device with a fault-injection attack using the same tools.

Abstract Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication is a vehicular communication technology to reduce traffic accidents and congestion. To protect V2V communication, multiple security standards have been developed. This article provides an overview of the China V2V security draft standard and compares it to the American IEEE1609.2 V2V standard and to the Security Credential Management System (SCMS). The article provides an overview of the Chinese cryptographic algorithms used in the China V2V standard, and points out differences in the certificate format, such as the lack of implicit certificates in the China V2V standard. The China V2V PKI architecture is similar to the American SCMS, however, the Chinese system utilizes a set of Root Certificate Authorities (CA) that are trusted via an out-of-band channel whereas the American SCMS supports elector-based addition and revocation of Root CAs.

Abstract Connecting vehicles to various network services increases the risk of in-vehicle cyberattacks. For automotive industries, the supply chain for assembling a vehicle consists of many different organizations such as component suppliers, system suppliers, and car manufacturers (CMs). Moreover, once a vehicle has shipped from the factory of the CM, resellers, dealers, and owners of the vehicle may add and replace the optional authorized and third-party equipment. Such equipment may have serious security vulnerabilities that may be targeted by a malicious attacker. The key management system of a vehicle must be applicable to all use cases. We propose a novel key management system adaptable to the electronic control unit (ECU) lifecycle of a vehicle. The scope of our system is not only the vehicle product line but also the third-party vendors of automotive accessories and vehicle maintenance facilities, including resellers, dealers, and vehicle users.

Abstract Aircraft cybersecurity efforts have tended to focus at the strategic or tactical levels without a clear connection between the two. ...CSSEP’s process model postulates that security is best achieved by a balance of cybersecurity, cyber resiliency, defensibility, and recoverability and that control is best established by developing security constraints versus attempting to find every vulnerability. ...CSSEP identifies the major functions needed to do effective aircraft cybersecurity and provides a flexible framework as the “missing link” to connect the strategic and tactical levels of aircraft cybersecurity.

Ensuring cybersecurity in an ECU network is challenging as there is no centralized authority in the vehicle to provide security as a service. ...While progress has been made to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities, many of these approaches have focused on enterprise, software-centric systems and require more computational resources than typically available for onboard vehicular devices.

Abstract Vehicular communications face unique security issues in wireless communications. While new vehicles are equipped with a large set of communication technologies, product life cycles are long and software updates are not widespread. The result is a host of outdated and unpatched technologies being used on the street. This has especially severe security impacts because autonomous vehicles are pushing into the market, which will rely, at least partly, on the integrity of the provided information. We provide an overview of the currently deployed communication systems and their security weaknesses and features to collect and compare widely used security mechanisms. In this survey, we focus on technologies that work in an ad hoc manner. This includes Long-Term Evolution mode 4 (LTE-PC5), Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE), Intelligent Transportation Systems at 5 Gigahertz (ITS-G5), and Bluetooth.

Abstract With the adoption of Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology, security and privacy of vehicles are paramount. To avoid tracking while preserving vehicle/driver’s privacy, modern vehicular public key infrastructure provision vehicles with multiple short-term pseudonym certificates. However, provisioning a large number of pseudonym certificates can lead to an enormous growth of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) during its revocation process. One possible approach to avoid such CRL growth is by relying on activation code (AC)-based solutions. In such solutions, the vehicles are provisioned with batches of encrypted certificates, which are decrypted periodically via the ACs (broadcasted by the back-end system). When the system detects a revoked vehicle, it simply does not broadcast the respective vehicle’s AC. As a result, revoked vehicles do not receive their respective AC and are prevented from decrypting their certificates.