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Functionalities such as automated driving, connectivity and cyber-security have gained increasing importance over the past few years. The importance of these functionalities will continue to grow as these cutting-edge technologies mature and market acceptance increases.

With the development of vehicle intelligence and the Internet of Vehicles, how to protect the safety of the vehicle network system has become a focus issue that needs to be solved urgently. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is currently a very widely used vehicle-mounted bus, and its security largely determines the degree of vehicle-mounted information security. The CAN bus lacks adequate protection mechanisms and is vulnerable to external attacks such as replay attacks, modifying attacks, and so on. On the basis of the existing work, this paper proposes an authentication method that combines Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA256 and Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) algorithms. This method is based on dynamic identity authentication in challenge/response made and combined with the characteristics of the CAN bus itself as it achieves the identity authentication between the gateway and multiple electronic control units (ECUs).

Since the early 1990’s, commercial vehicles have suffered from repeated vulnerability exploitations that resulted in a need for improved automotive cybersecurity. This paper outlines the strategies and challenges of implementing an automotive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to secure intra-vehicle networks. ...This research successfully met the four requirements and demonstrated that using ZT principles in an on-vehicle network greatly improved the cybersecurity posture with manageable impact to system performance and deployment.

But unfortunately, automotive cybersecurity researchers hardly produce a comprehensive detection method due to the confidential nature of Controller Area Network (CAN) DBC format files, which is a standard long maintained by car manufacturers.

In adjusting the data flow, this is an option to increase the cybersecurity for a complete system. This addition to the cybersecurity system provides a clear benefit. ...While this is the traditional application experienced, there are other applications relevant to cybersecurity. As part of the blockchain technology, the nodes are responsible for decision-making.

Strategies designed to deal with these challenges differ in the way in which added duties are assigned and cybersecurity topics are integrated into the already existing process steps. Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. ...Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. A cybersecurity development approach is frequently perceived as introducing impediments, that bear the risk of cybersecurity measures receiving a lower priority to reduce inconvenience. ...For an established development process and a team accustomed to this process, adding cybersecurity features to the product initially means inconvenience and reduced productivity without perceivable benefits.

Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.

To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. ...With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.

As well, functional safety and cybersecurity constraints will increase. Electrification implies replacing energy from thermal sources with electricity from the wall and will include enhanced integration between sub-systems and components, along with higher speed in real time controls.

In this paper, we outline past, present and future applications of automotive security for engine ECUs. Electronic immobilizers and anti-tuning countermeasures have been used for several years. Recently, OEMs and suppliers are facing more and more powerful attackers, and as a result, have introduced stronger countermeasures based on hardware security. Finally, with the advent of connected cars, it is expected that many things that currently require a physical connection will be done remotely in a near future. This includes remote diagnostics, reprogramming and engine calibration.

With the increased need for cybersecurity in automotive systems due to the development of more advanced technologies and corresponding increased threat vectors, coupled with the upcoming International Organization for Standardization and the Society for Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 cybersecurity standard for automotive systems and cybersecurity regulations in The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UNECE WP.29), it is becoming increasingly important for auto manufacturers and suppliers to have a clear and common understanding and agreement of cybersecurity metrics for the development and deployment of vehicles. ...Cybersecurity for automotive systems is challenging, and one of the major challenges is how to measure this specific system property. ...With the increased need for cybersecurity in automotive systems due to the development of more advanced technologies and corresponding increased threat vectors, coupled with the upcoming International Organization for Standardization and the Society for Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 cybersecurity standard for automotive systems and cybersecurity regulations in The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UNECE WP.29), it is becoming increasingly important for auto manufacturers and suppliers to have a clear and common understanding and agreement of cybersecurity metrics for the development and deployment of vehicles.

UNECE R155 explicitly references ISO/SAE 21434 and mandates a certified cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a prerequisite for automotive manufacturers to achieve vehicle type approval and sell new vehicle types. ...However, the gap in the CSMS framework is a lack in a standardized system that provides guidance and common criteria for automakers to measure a vehicle’s level of compliance and compute a publicly accepted cybersecurity rating. To help establish increased consumer confidence, OEMs and smart mobility stakeholders could take additional proactive steps to ensure the safety and security of their products. ...This paper addresses the above requirement and discusses the cybersecurity rating framework (CSRF) that could establish a framework for rating vehicle cybersecurity by standardizing the measurement criteria, parameter vectors, process, and tools.

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic.

Cybersecurity (CS) is crucial and significantly important in every product that is connected to the network/internet. ...Hence making it very important to guarantee that every single connected device shall have cybersecurity measures implemented to ensure the safety of the entire system. Looking into the forecasted worldwide growth in the electric vehicles (EV’s) segment, CS researchers have recently identified several vulnerabilities that exist in EV’s, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) devices, communications to EVs, and upstream services, such as EVSE vendor cloud services, third party systems, and grid operators. ...Additional processes have been defined in the process reference and assessment model for the CS engineering in order to incorporate the cybersecurity related processes in the ASPICE scope. This paper aims at providing a model & brief overview to establish a correlation between the ASPICE, ISO/SAE 21434 and the ISO 26262 functional safety (FS) standards for development of a secured cybersecurity software with all the considerations that an organization can undertake.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

Software vulnerability management is one of the most critical and crucial security techniques, which analyzes the automotive software/firmware across the digital cockpit, ADAS, V2X, etc. domains for vulnerabilities, and provides security patches for the concerned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). The process of automotive SW/FW vulnerability management system between the OEMs and vendors happen through a channel of fixing a certain number of vulnerabilities by 1st tier supplier which needs to be verified in front of OEMs for the fixed number and type of patches in there deliverable SW/FW. The gap of verification between for the fixed patches between the OEMs and 1st tier supplier requires a reliable human independent intelligent technique to have a trustworthiness of verification.

In the past, aircraft network design did not demand for information security considerations. The aircraft systems were simple, obscure, proprietary and, most importantly for security, the systems have been either physically isolated or they have been connected by directed communication links. The union of the aircraft systems thus formed a federated network. These properties are in sharp contrast with today’s system designs, which rest upon platform-based solutions with shared resources being interconnected by a massively meshed and shared communication network. The resulting connectivity and the high number of interfaces require an in-depth security analysis as the systems also provide functions that are required for the safe operation of the aircraft. This network design evolution, however, resulted in an iterative and continuous adaption of existing network solutions as these have not been developed from scratch.

., driver assistance functions, intrusion detection system, vehicle diagnostics, external device authentication during vehicle diagnostics, vehicle-to-grid and so on). The cybersecurity attacks targeting the global time result in false time, accuracy degradation, and denial of service as stated in IETF RFC 7384.

A broad range of information is being delivered to and used within modern vehicles. Information-based applications are becoming more highly integrated into the automobile. Security services are necessary to provide appropriate protection for this information. Encryption, digital signature, and hash functionalities enable information security services such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. However, the consumer of in-vehicle information services will not accept security services that introduce any inconvenience to their activities. This paper will discuss various security service methods and security management systems and propose methods to integrate these services acceptably into vehicle-based applications.

Automotive electronics and enterprise IT are converging and thus open the doors for advanced hacking. With their immediate safety impact, cyberattacks on such systems will endanger passengers. Today, there are various methods of security verification and validation in the automotive industry. However, we realize that vulnerability detection is incomplete and inefficient with classic security testing. In this article, we show how an enhanced Grey-Box Penetration Test (GBPT) needs less test cases while being more effective in terms of coverage and indicating less false positives.