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Functionalities such as automated driving, connectivity and cyber-security have gained increasing importance over the past few years. The importance of these functionalities will continue to grow as these cutting-edge technologies mature and market acceptance increases.

With the development of vehicle intelligence and the Internet of Vehicles, how to protect the safety of the vehicle network system has become a focus issue that needs to be solved urgently. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is currently a very widely used vehicle-mounted bus, and its security largely determines the degree of vehicle-mounted information security. The CAN bus lacks adequate protection mechanisms and is vulnerable to external attacks such as replay attacks, modifying attacks, and so on. On the basis of the existing work, this paper proposes an authentication method that combines Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA256 and Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) algorithms. This method is based on dynamic identity authentication in challenge/response made and combined with the characteristics of the CAN bus itself as it achieves the identity authentication between the gateway and multiple electronic control units (ECUs).

Since the early 1990’s, commercial vehicles have suffered from repeated vulnerability exploitations that resulted in a need for improved automotive cybersecurity. This paper outlines the strategies and challenges of implementing an automotive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to secure intra-vehicle networks. ...This research successfully met the four requirements and demonstrated that using ZT principles in an on-vehicle network greatly improved the cybersecurity posture with manageable impact to system performance and deployment.

Access control enforces security policies for controlling critical resources. For V2X (Vehicle to Everything) autonomous military vehicle fleets, network middleware systems such as ROS (Robotic Operating System) expose system resources through networked publisher/subscriber and client/server paradigms. Without proper access control, these systems are vulnerable to attacks from compromised network nodes, which may perform data poisoning attacks, flood packets on a network, or attempt to gain lateral control of other resources. Access control for robotic middleware systems has been investigated in both ROS1 and ROS2. Still, these implementations do not have mechanisms for evaluating a policy's consistency and completeness or writing expressive policies for distributed fleets. We explore an RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) mechanism layered onto ROS environments that uses local permission caches with precomputed truth tables for fast policy evaluation.

But unfortunately, automotive cybersecurity researchers hardly produce a comprehensive detection method due to the confidential nature of Controller Area Network (CAN) DBC format files, which is a standard long maintained by car manufacturers.

In adjusting the data flow, this is an option to increase the cybersecurity for a complete system. This addition to the cybersecurity system provides a clear benefit. ...While this is the traditional application experienced, there are other applications relevant to cybersecurity. As part of the blockchain technology, the nodes are responsible for decision-making.

Consequently, rise of this technological trend is bringing forth safety and cybersecurity challenges in form of new threats, hazards and vulnerabilities. As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions. ...As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions.

Strategies designed to deal with these challenges differ in the way in which added duties are assigned and cybersecurity topics are integrated into the already existing process steps. Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. ...Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. A cybersecurity development approach is frequently perceived as introducing impediments, that bear the risk of cybersecurity measures receiving a lower priority to reduce inconvenience. ...For an established development process and a team accustomed to this process, adding cybersecurity features to the product initially means inconvenience and reduced productivity without perceivable benefits.

Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.

To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. ...With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.

This paper is the second in the series of documents designed to record the progress of a series of SAE documents - SAE J2836™, J2847, J2931, & J2953 - within the Plug-In Electric Vehicle (PEV) Communication Task Force. This follows the initial paper number 2010-01-0837, and continues with the test and modeling of the various PLC types for utility programs described in J2836/1™ & J2847/1. This also extends the communication to an off-board charger, described in J2836/2™ & J2847/2 and includes reverse energy flow described in J2836/3™ and J2847/3. The initial versions of J2836/1™ and J2847/1 were published early 2010. J2847/1 has now been re-opened to include updates from comments from the National Institute of Standards Technology (NIST) Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP), Smart Grid Architectural Committee (SGAC) and Cyber Security Working Group committee (SCWG).

As well, functional safety and cybersecurity constraints will increase. Electrification implies replacing energy from thermal sources with electricity from the wall and will include enhanced integration between sub-systems and components, along with higher speed in real time controls.

Driven by the growing internet and remote connectivity of automobiles, combined with the emerging trend to automated driving, the importance of security for automotive systems is massively increasing. Although cyber security is a common part of daily routines in the traditional IT domain, necessary security mechanisms are not yet widely applied in the vehicles. At first glance, this may not appear to be a problem as there are lots of solutions from other domains, which potentially could be re-used. But substantial differences compared to an automotive environment have to be taken into account, drastically reducing the possibilities for simple reuse. Our contribution is to address automotive electronics engineers who are confronted with security requirements. Therefore, it will firstly provide some basic knowledge about IT security and subsequently present a selection of automotive specific security use cases.

The article also focus on innovative approaches that have recently adopted my many cybersecurity professionals for secured operation of ITS involving block-chain, artificial intelligence, and Machine Learning.

With the increased need for cybersecurity in automotive systems due to the development of more advanced technologies and corresponding increased threat vectors, coupled with the upcoming International Organization for Standardization and the Society for Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 cybersecurity standard for automotive systems and cybersecurity regulations in The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UNECE WP.29), it is becoming increasingly important for auto manufacturers and suppliers to have a clear and common understanding and agreement of cybersecurity metrics for the development and deployment of vehicles. ...Cybersecurity for automotive systems is challenging, and one of the major challenges is how to measure this specific system property. ...With the increased need for cybersecurity in automotive systems due to the development of more advanced technologies and corresponding increased threat vectors, coupled with the upcoming International Organization for Standardization and the Society for Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 cybersecurity standard for automotive systems and cybersecurity regulations in The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UNECE WP.29), it is becoming increasingly important for auto manufacturers and suppliers to have a clear and common understanding and agreement of cybersecurity metrics for the development and deployment of vehicles.

UNECE R155 explicitly references ISO/SAE 21434 and mandates a certified cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a prerequisite for automotive manufacturers to achieve vehicle type approval and sell new vehicle types. ...However, the gap in the CSMS framework is a lack in a standardized system that provides guidance and common criteria for automakers to measure a vehicle’s level of compliance and compute a publicly accepted cybersecurity rating. To help establish increased consumer confidence, OEMs and smart mobility stakeholders could take additional proactive steps to ensure the safety and security of their products. ...This paper addresses the above requirement and discusses the cybersecurity rating framework (CSRF) that could establish a framework for rating vehicle cybersecurity by standardizing the measurement criteria, parameter vectors, process, and tools.

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic.

The development of highly automated driving functions (AD) recently rises the demand for so called Fail-Operational systems for native driving functions like steering and braking of vehicles. Fail-Operational systems shall guarantee the availability of driving functions even in presence of failures. This can also mean a degradation of system performance or limiting a system’s remaining operating period. In either case, the goal is independency from a human driver as a permanently situation-aware safety fallback solution to provide a certain level of autonomy. In parallel, the connectivity of modern vehicles is increasing rapidly and especially in vehicles with highly automated functions, there is a high demand for connected functions, Infotainment (web conference, Internet, Shopping) and Entertainment (Streaming, Gaming) to entertain the passengers, who should no longer occupied with driving tasks.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

In the past, aircraft network design did not demand for information security considerations. The aircraft systems were simple, obscure, proprietary and, most importantly for security, the systems have been either physically isolated or they have been connected by directed communication links. The union of the aircraft systems thus formed a federated network. These properties are in sharp contrast with today’s system designs, which rest upon platform-based solutions with shared resources being interconnected by a massively meshed and shared communication network. The resulting connectivity and the high number of interfaces require an in-depth security analysis as the systems also provide functions that are required for the safe operation of the aircraft. This network design evolution, however, resulted in an iterative and continuous adaption of existing network solutions as these have not been developed from scratch.