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The successes of the long-duration MDA/NASA test programs for advanced life-support systems conducted prior to 1971 were highly dependent on the selection and training of both the test crews that remained inside the test chamber throughout the test periods and the outside operating staff. The operating staff was responsible for overall test performance, crew safety monitoring, operation and maintenance of the test facilities, and collection and maintenance of data. A selection, training, and certification program was developed and performed to ensure operating staff members had the correct technical skills and could work effectively together with the inside crew. A training program was designed to ensure that each selected operating staff member was capable of performing all assigned functions and was sufficiently cross-trained to serve at other positions on a contingency basis, if needed.

Tactical aircraft have tire lives as low as 3-5 landings per tire causing excessive support costs. The goal of the Improved Tire Life (ITL) program was to begin developing technology to double aircraft tire life, particularly for tactical aircraft. ITL examined not only the tire, but also aircraft/landing gear design, aircraft operations, and the operational environment. ITL had three main thrusts which were successfully accomplished: 1) development of an analytical tire wear model, 2) initiation of technology development to increase tire life, and 3) exploration of new and unique testing methods for tire wear. This paper reports the work performed and the results of the USAF sponsored ITL program.

This paper presents the integrated approach toward failure detection, isolation, and recovery/reconfiguration to be used for the Space Station Freedom External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS). The on-board and on-ground diagnostic capabilities of the EATCS are discussed. Time and safety critical failures, as well as noncritical failures, and the detection coverage for each provided by existing capabilities are reviewed. The allocation of responsibility between onboard software and ground-based systems, to be shown during ground testing at the Johnson Space Center, is described. Failure isolation capabilities allocated to the ground include some functionality originally found on orbit but moved to the ground to reduce on-board resource requirements. Complex failures requiring the analysis of multiple external variables, such as environmental conditions, heat loads, or station attitude, are also allocated to ground personnel.