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The SPA-10 project, sponsored by U.S. National Science Foundation, is to acquire and qualify a replacement for the retired T-28 “storm penetration” aircraft previously used to acquire meteorological data to enable understanding and modelling of mid-continent thunderstorms. The National Science Foundation selected the Fairchild A-10 (bailed from the U.S. Air Force) as the platform to be adapted to perform the storm penetration mission to altitudes of eleven kilometers, and funded Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS) as prime contractor. An expert panel conducted a review of the SPA-10 project in 2014 and recommended a risk analysis addressing hazards to the aircraft and pilots, such as icing, hail, turbulence and lightning. This paper presents the results of the risk analysis performed in response to this need, including recommended mitigations.

In order to address a Naval Fleet Logistics Support (VR) Wing Commander’s request to proactively uncover safety factors in VR maintenance operations, a prototype climate survey was taken by VR Wing maintainers in 13 squadrons. Nearly 800 surveys were tabulated, and the results were analyzed using a model for high reliability organizations. Overall, the preliminary analysis of the survey data pointed out some potential areas in the VR Wing and each of its aircraft communities for intervention.

To study maintainer error, the Naval Safety Center’s Human Factors Accident Classification System (HFACS) was adapted for Maintenance Related Mishaps (MRMs). The HFACS Maintenance Extension (ME) successfully profiled the errors present Naval Aviation Class A MRMs. In order to assess its suitability for studying major and minor airline accidents, a post hoc analysis was conducted on 124 Naval Fleet Logistics Support (VR) Wing maintenance related mishap, hazard, and injury reports. Two judges separately coded the 124 VR Wing incidents; a Cohen’s kappa of .78 was achieved, indicating an “excellent” level of agreement. Generally, HFACS-ME was able to profile maintainer errors found in more minor incidents and the factors that contribute to them. Common factors observed include errors attributed to third party maintenance, inadequate supervision, failed communications, skill-based errors, and procedural violations.