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Real-time simulation of truck and trailer combinations can be applied to hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) systems for developing and testing electronic control units (ECUs). The large number of configuration variations in vehicle and axle types requires the simulation model to be adjustable in a wide range. This paper presents a modular multibody approach for the vehicle dynamics simulation of single track configurations and truck-and-trailer combinations. The equations of motion are expressed by a new formula which is a combination of Jourdain's principle and the articulated body algorithm. With the proposed algorithm, a robust model is achieved that is numerically stable even at handling limits. Moreover, the presented approach is suitable for modular modeling and has been successfully implemented as a basis for various system definitions. As a result, only one simulation model is needed for a large variety of track and trailer types.

Rapid control prototyping (RCP) is a widely used technique for verifying a controller's functional behavior. Typically, RCP uses a target processor with ample processing power and memory, which makes the technique attractive for engineers exploring new concepts. Presenter Thomas Erkkinen, MathWorks Inc.

The number of electronically controlled systems in commercial vehicles is increasing rapidly. Much of this electrical content is controlled using ECUs (Electronic Control Units) which share information using some type of networking technology, such as a CAN bus running the SAE J1939 protocol. Presenter Jeffrey Craig, Vector CANtech Inc.

The aerospace industry has long sought a solution for storing maintenance history information directly on aircraft parts. In 2005 leading airframe manufacturers determined that passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology presented a unique opportunity to address this industry need. Through the efforts of the Air Transport Association (ATA) RFID on Parts Committee and SAE International testing standards and data specifications are in place to support the broad adoption of passive RFID for storing parts history information directly on aircraft parts. The primary focus of the paper will be on the SAE AS-5678 environmental testing standard for passive RFID tags intended for aircraft use. Detail will be provided to help aerospace manufacturers understand their role and responsibilities for current programs and understand how this may impact their parts certification process.

Probabilistic methods are used in calculating composite part design factors for, and are intended to conservatively compensate for worst case impact to composite parts used on space and aerospace vehicles. The current method to investigate impact damage of composite parts is visual based upon observation of an indentation. A more reliable and accurate determinant of impact damage is to measure impact energy. RF impact sensors can be used to gather data to establish an impact damage benchmark for deterministic design criteria that will reduce material applied to composite parts to compensate for uncertainties resulting from observed impact damage. Once the benchmark has been established, RF impact sensors will be applied to composite parts throughout their life-cycle to alert and identify the location of impact damage that exceeds the maximum established benchmark for impact.

Abstract Battery Drain problems can occur in the vehicle due to improper network management between electronic control units (ECUs). Aim of this paper is to identify the factors that cause transmission and cease of transmission of a network management message of an ECU along with its application messages that controls the sleep/wake-up performance of other ECUs in the network. Strategy used here is, based on the root cause analysis of problems found in Display unit in vehicle environment, the functional CAN signals impacting sleep/wake-up behavior is re-mapped along with the state flow transition of AUTOSAR NM Algorithm. A re-defined test case design and simulation for vehicle model is created. Especially it focuses on validating the impact of functional CAN signals on DUT’s sleep/wake-up performance.

Abstract Modern vehicles integrate Internet of Things (IoT) components to bring value-added services to both drivers and passengers. These components communicate with the external world through different types of interfaces including the on-board diagnostics (OBD-II) port, a mandatory interface in all vehicles in the United States and Europe. While this transformation has driven significant advancements in efficiency and safety, it has also opened a door to a wide variety of cyberattacks, as the architectures of vehicles were never designed with external connectivity in mind, and accordingly, security has never been pivotal in the design. As standardized, the OBD-II port allows not only direct access to the internal network of the vehicle but also installing software on the Electronic Control Units (ECUs).

Abstract In the automotive domain, the overall complexity of technical components has increased enormously. Formerly isolated, purely mechanical cars are now a multitude of cyber-physical systems that are continuously interacting with other IT systems, for example, with the smartphone of their driver or the backend servers of the car manufacturer. This has huge security implications as demonstrated by several recent research papers that document attacks endangering the safety of the car. However, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no holistic overview or structured description of the complex automotive domain. Without such a big picture, distinct security research remains isolated and is lacking interconnections between the different subsystems. Hence, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the overall security of a car or to identify aspects that have not been sufficiently covered by security analyses.

Abstract There are already a number of cybersecurity activities introduced in the development process in the automotive industry. For example, security testing of automotive components is often performed at the late stages of development. Fuzz testing is often performed as part of the security testing activity. However, since testing occurs late in the development process, it is expensive and, in some cases, may be too late to fix certain identified issues. Another challenge is that some testing requires hardware that is costly and may not be available until late in the development. We suggest fuzz testing virtual ECUs, which overcomes these challenges and allows for more efficient and effective security testing.

"Spotlight on Design" features video interviews and case study segments, focusing on the latest technology breakthroughs. Viewers are virtually taken to labs and research centers to learn how design engineers are enhancing product performance/reliability, reducing cost, improving quality, safety or environmental impact, and achieving regulatory compliance. Just how prevalent is the problem of counterfeit electronic parts? What are the consequences of using sub-par components in safety or mission critical systems? The Federal Aviation Administration estimates that 2% of the 26 million airline parts installed each year are counterfeit, accounting for more than 520,000 units, maybe more.

Remote diagnostic systems support diagnostic communication by having the capability of sending diagnostic request services to a vehicle and receiving diagnostic response services from a vehicle. These diagnostic services are specified in diagnostic protocols, such as SAE J1979, SAE J1939 or ISO 14229 (UDS). For the purpose of diagnostic communication, the tester needs access to the electronic control units as communication partners. Physically, the diagnostic tester gets access to the entire vehicle´s E/E system, which consists of connectors, wiring, the in-vehicle network (e.g. CAN), the electronic control units, sensors, and actuators. Any connection of external test equipment and the E/E system of a vehicle poses a security vulnerability. The combination can be used for malicious intrusion and manipulation.

This specification covers an aluminum alloy in the form of bars and rods 0.500 in. (12.50 mm) and over in nominal diameter or least distance between parallel sides.

This specification covers an aluminum alloy in the form of bars and rods 0.500 inch (12.7 mm) to 8.000 inches (203.2 mm) in nominal diameter or least difference between parallel sides and up to 50 square inches (322.6 square centimeters) in cross-sectional area (see 8.7).