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Although Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have now for some time been used in segregated airspace where separation from other air traffic can be assured, potential users have interests to deploy UAS in non segregated airspace. Recent technological and operational improvements give reason to believe that UAS safety and performance capabilities are maturing. But the skies can only really open up to UAS when there is an agreed upon UAS safety policy with commonly accepted UAS Safety Risk Management (SRM) processes enabling to show that the risks related to UAS operations in all the different airspace classes can be adequately controlled. The overall objective is to develop a UAS SRM framework, supporting regulators and applicants through provision of detailed guidelines for each SRM step to be conducted, including 1) system description, 2) hazard identification, 3) risk analysis, 4) risk assessment, 5) risk treatment.

NASA's Deep Space Network (DSN) uses high-power transmitters on its large antennas to communicate with spacecraft of NASA and its partner agencies. The prime reflectors of the DSN antennas are parabolic, at 34m and 70m in diameter. The DSN transmitters radiate Continuous Wave (CW) signals at 20 kW - 500 kW at X-band and S-band frequencies. The combination of antenna reflector size and high frequency results in a very narrow beam with extensive oscillating near-field pattern. Another unique feature of the DSN antennas is that they (and the radiated beam) move mostly at very slow sidereal rate, essentially identical in magnitude and at the opposite direction of Earth rotation.

Recent changes in DoD procurement directives have encouraged the purchase of civilian products for use in certain military applications. One such application is the upgrade of avionics suites with the Global Positioning System (GPS) in military air transport aircraft to meet joint civil-military operational requirements. This paper reviews the Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) concept and the proper use of TSOs, ACs, and FARs in both the design and integration process.

Many of the certification regulations in 14 CFR Part 25 are by design, broad and as such, can be subject to large differences in the interpretation of what constitutes adequate compliance. Advisory Circulars (AC's) were developed for many of the regulations to assist industry, as well as certification personnel, with what is considered an acceptable, but not the only means, of compliance. However, there are many regulations where no advisory material is available. In these cases, the “acceptable means” of compliance can vary to a greater degree among the various aircraft certification offices. This difficulty is aggravated as new applicants and regulatory personnel enter the certification field. Recent discussions and interpretations on the usage of an avionic unit's mean time between failure or MTBF for its detectable faults as the basic repair rate for undetected or latent faults, is a subject area where no significant advisory material exists.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) emerge as a viable, operational technology for potential civil and commercial applications in the National Airspace System (NAS). Although this new type of technology presents great potential, it also introduces a need for a thorough inquiry into its safety impact on the NAS. This study presents a systems-level approach to analyze the safety impact of introducing a new technology, such as UAS, into the NAS. Utilizing Safety Management Systems (SMS) principles and the existing regulatory structure, this paper outlines a methodology to determine a mandatory safety baseline for a specific area of interest regarding a new aviation technology, such as UAS Sense and Avoid. The proposed methodology is then employed to determine a baseline set of hazards and causal factors for the UAS Sense and Avoid problem domain and associated regulatory risk controls.

The need to improve the efficiency and capacity of the Air Traffic Control and Navigation System has placed greater emphasis on the functional integration of subsystems which have been treated independently in the past. This paper presents results of limited test programs designed to explore the relationship of terminal area navigation and the air traffic control system, and to show the benefits of an optimum combination of both functions. The need for further analysis is indicated with respect to carrying out the third generation system design postulated by the DOT Air Traffic Control Advisory Committee. It is concluded that functional integration of ATC and navigation in the terminal area presents the greatest challenge. In other areas, such as enroute, the availability of new, integrated avionics systems provides an expanded operational capability.

Materials are available for preventing or retarding aircraft cabin fires involving urethane foam seat cushions. Realistic fire tests performed in a wide-body test article demonstrate that some in-flight and ramp fires can be prevented, and that the allowable time for safe evacuation can be significantly extended during a survivable postcrash fuel fire, when the urethane foam seat cushion is covered by a “blocking layer” material.

Microprocessor technology is allowing functions in aircraft to be implemented to a greater degree by digital process control than by conventional mechanical or electromechanical means. A review of this technology indicates a need for updated certification criteria. A high level of commitment to the technology such as fly-by-wire is completely beyond the scope of existing certification criteria. This paper emphasizes the areas of software validation levels, increased concern with basic power system qualification, and increased environmental concerns for electromagnetic interference and lightning.

Average continuous flow rates for each type of aircraft exit were examined in 89 full-scale evacuation demonstrations. Passengers tend to form continuous lines at available exits when evacuating an airplane. The study concludes that, with rare exception, the passenger rates of egress from the same type exit on different make and model airplanes are not significantly different. Passenger cabin configuration, seat pitch, and aisle width have no significant bearing on the egress rates provided the aircraft certification requirements for minimum aisle width and exit accessibility are met. Injuries resulting from actual emergency evacuations and evacuation demonstrations are also examined.